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"It is therefore worth while to search out the bounds between opinion and knowledge, and 
examine by what measures, in things whereof we have no certain knowledge, we ought to 
regulate our assent and moderate our persuasions".
John Locke 1689.
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Abstract
This thesis investigates the causes for the abrupt, universal and virtually 
unprecedented decline in the total fertility rate in transition Europe. Using evidence from 
Russia, it tests two competing hypotheses on the fertility decline: the demographic and 
economic hypotheses. Empirical findings can be summarized as follows: I find 
insufficient support for the demographic hypothesis—the fertility decline in Russia 
cannot satisfactorily be explained by a simultaneous shift in values and attitudes towards 
reproduction and timing of births. In contrast, I provide preliminary cross-regional 
evidence to support the economic hypothesis—regions with the largest fall in (the proxy 
for) income and large uncertainty experienced the largest declines in the fertility rates. 
This result is consistent with Becker’s economic model of reproductive behaviour, insofar 
as it establishes a positive relationship between changes in income and fertility. It 
however introduces an additional explanatory variable: people’s perception of 
uncertainty. In a preliminary attempt to reconcile the standard economic model with 
these findings, a simple model of households’ reproductive decision is developed. It 
shows that each household tends to postpone the decision for an incremental child, 
whenever there is widespread uncertainty. It suggests that, if the individual decision to 
procrastinate is replicated over a large number of households, it can lead to an aggregate, 
short-term fall in the fertility rate. Provided that conclusions for the transition European 
region can be drawn from the Russian evidence, this inquiry shows that fertility has 
declined in response to a lower income and higher uncertainty: it reflects the deterioration 
in the quality of life and a loss in welfare. Thus, it is a strong negative indicator of the 
transition process.
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I. General Introduction
"The family is a remarkable institution. And a complex one.
Indeed, so complex that much of economic theory proceeds as if no such thing exists."
Am artya Sen, 1983
1. Purposes of Inquiry
Central and Eastern Europe is experiencing what is widely perceived as a fertility 
‘crisis’: an abrupt, unexpected and historically unprecedented drop in the total fertility 
rate. The recent pace of decline has only been known in the past during times o f desperate 
privation. In some countries, the fertility fall was even larger than during the American 
fertility decline in the Great Depression. The deterioration in the total fertility rate ranks 
among the striking indicators of social development in the current decade, along with 
high unemployment, rising income inequality and poverty.
Each country of Central and East Europe has been hitherto looking at its own 
falling total fertility rate, considering it as an isolated national feature. Yet, a comparison 
across countries reveals that the fertility decline is universally repeated throughout the 
region1. All countries of the region, without a single exception, feature accelerated 
fertility declines. This common pattern distinguishes the falling fertility rate from, for 
example, the mortality rate. For Shapiro (1995, 1997), the recent upsurge of mortality in 
Russia has no other equivalent in the region2.
Fertility declines have
markedly accelerated during the period 
of economic and political transition. 
Between 1990-1996, the total fertility 
rate declined between 22 percent
(Poland) and 37 percent (Czech
Republic) (UNICEF 1998). The total 
fertility rate (TFR)3, which may be most 
easily understood as the present
1 I thank the participants in the conference on “The Economics of Social Policy Choices” (1998) 
for having provided me with thoughtful comments supporting this.
2 More precisely, mortality rose in most Central and Eastern European countries after 1989, but has 
hit the hardest in the FSU countries (UNICEF 1997). By 1995, the adverse mortality trends were 
almost all being reversed.
3 The term ‘total fertility rate’ can be misleading for it actually represents a level and not a change. 
This inquiry focuses on the variation in the total fertility rate (or fertility rate in short).
Fig.1.1: Total Fertility  Rate, R ussia, 
1980-96
VO
Source: Goskomstat, 1996; INED, 1998
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projection of the completed family size based on current age-specific birth rates, is, across 
the region, well below the replacement level of 2.1 children per childbearing woman.
More startling is the finding that, even the most advanced countries in the process 
of economic transition, the so-called “successful reformers” of the World Development 
Report (World Bank 1996), such as Slovenia, Poland and the Czech Republic, are 
undergoing a rapid fertility decline as well. In Slovenia, we have the instructive case of a 
country having carried out far-reaching market reforms, enjoying steady economic growth 
for the last four years and a front-runner in the EU accession process with an infant 
mortality rate superior to that of the United States4. Yet, its fertility rate has fallen so 
sharply that it is now comparable to Russia (table 1.1).
Table 1.1: Total Fertility Rate: Russia, Slovenia and In this thesis, I have
Selected Western European countries, 1985-95
chosen to concentrate 
empirically on the very sharp 
case of Russia. Of the whole 
region, Russia is experiencing 
one of the most severe 
deteriorations in fertility 
indicators. In 1996, the number 
of newly bom children was a 
third less than six years earlier; 
the total fertility rate plummeted 
to 1.28 children per childbearing 
woman (INED 1998). For balance, the fertility rate levels of Western European countries, 
already considered by many demographers to be alarmingly low, is given in table 1.1.
1985 1990 1995
Russia 2.05 1.90 1.34
Slovenia 1.72 1.46 1.29
Sweden 1.74 2.13 1.74
United Kingdom 1.79 1.84 1.71
France 1.81 1.78 1.70
Belgium 1.51 1.62 1.54
Germany 1.37 1.45 1.24
Greece 1.68 1.43 1.40
Spain 1.63 1.33 1.18
Italy 1.39 1.29 1.17
Source: INED, 1998.
The accelerated fertility declines to levels well below replacement, combined 
with stagnating or even declining mortality rate and increased net out-migration, indicates 
that Central and Eastern Europe is currently experiencing a net loss of population. Since 
1990, population has declined in almost all countries of the region. In Russia, for 
example, the population shrunk by more than half a million between 1990 and 1996 
(UNICEF 1998).
4 I am grateful to Matjaz Hanzek from the Statistical Office of Slovenia for precious demographic 
information.
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The reduction in the size of the population has undeniably major policy 
implications for the long term. The most significant implication is that Central and 
Eastern Europe may run out of a vital resource for the economy: people. This 
demographic trend may slow down the pace of innovation and technological change, and 
thus undermine future economic growth.
As a result, Central and Eastern Europe is ‘catching u p * with Western Europe in 
fertility rate terms. Yet, the prospect of getting closer to Western Europe may be far from 
desirable. Central Europe is likely to inherit similar demographic problems to Western 
Europe: a shrinking younger population with a growing proportion of older people. This 
“graying” trend implies that fewer workers will have to provide for the great army of the 
retired, for the young who are still being reared and educated, and for the still insoluble 
legions of the unemployed. This is likely to be a delayed time bomb for the ‘European 
Welfare States’.
Technically, the decline in fertility could be reversed with a large immigration, 
particularly of ethnic minorities from higher fertility regions of the world. In many 
European countries, however, this is not considered as a viable policy option. The recent 
tide of immigrants is already causing social and political upheavals—notably in France, 
where the National Front has brought immigration to the centre of the political stage. 
More recently, the flow of Albanians in the Kosovo region is raising fears about ethnic 
balance and threats the political stability in the FYR of Macedonia.
In Central and Eastern Europe, some politicians have used the ‘fertility crisis’ to 
oppose the process of economic and political transition towards market economy and 
revive nationalistic feelings. In Russia, for example, opponents of market reforms 
nurtured the belief that “Russia is dying out” and there is “a (Western) conspiracy aimed 
at destroying the Russian State”. The ‘fertility crisis’ is attributed to the ‘shock therapy’ 
administered to the economy—explicitly blaming over-zealous economic reforms, 
Western advisors and the international community.
Despite its significance and policy salience, the rapid fertility decline in Central 
and Eastern Europe has been neglected by economists. The purpose of the thesis is to 
obtain a better understanding of the factors that caused the sharp fall in the total fertility 
rate across Central and Eastern Europe. In particular, it will test two competing
11
hypotheses (demographic and economic) on the fertility decline, by using Russia as a 
focus5.
2. Previous Research on the Subject
Despite half a century of investigation into the determinants of fertility change, 
the present state of knowledge cannot precisely identify the causes of the rapid fertility 
decline in Central and Eastern Europe, neither can it predict its future trajectory. There is 
virtually no literature to review on fertility changes in Central and Eastern Europe6.
The conventional body of theories on reproductive behaviour gives little insight 
into this matter. On the one hand, demographic and sociological theories of fertility 
primarily focus on issues raised by ‘high fertility countries’, notably their negative 
consequences on economic growth (Livi-Bacci 1989). Very little attention has been 
devoted to problems of ‘low fertility’ countries and rapid changes in the total fertility rate. 
On the other hand, the economic theory of reproductive behaviour, due to Gary Becker, 
has failed to deliver unambiguous predictions. Among other issues, Becker’s theory can 
not be falsified.
The failure to provide a single grand explanation on fertility change is probably 
ascribed to the complexity of the subject. Reproductive decisions are likely to be 
influenced by a complex series of contextual forces: economic, social, cultural, 
educational and political, as well as personal circumstances. These factors are neither 
fully independent of each other nor mutually exclusive: they overlap and interact. In his 
Nobel Prize lecture, Gary Becker (1996) expresses this complexity:
“Writing a Treatise on the Family (1981) is the most difficult sustained intellectual 
effort I have undertaken... Trying to cover this broad subject required a degree of 
mental commitment over more than six years, during many nighttime as well as 
daytime hours, that left me intellectually and emotionally exhausted. In his 
autobiography, Bertrand Russell says that writing the Principia Mathematica used 
up so much of his mental powers that he was never again fit for really hard
5 The context of the transition is interesting empirically for it is characterized by sharp changes in 
economic and demographic indicators. There is, however, nothing special about the transition 
context.
6 With few exceptions. For example: Macura (1995), Vishnevsky (1996), Zakharov and Ivanova 
(1996).
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intellectual work. It took about two years after finishing the Treatise to regain my 
intellectual zest..
As a result, the field of reproductive behaviour is often dominated by popular 
perceptions about the causes of fertility decline. These received opinions however rank 
no higher than pure speculations. I will show below that this is especially true in the 
recent episode of rapid fertility declines in Central and Eastern Europe. Let me first 
replace this episode in its context.
For Central and Eastern Europe, the current decade was marked by radical 
political and economic transformation—the so-called “transition” process towards 
market-based systems. Initially, transition led to large economic dislocations, acute 
supply problems, uncontrolled inflation, institutional vacuums and political uncertainties. 
Its immediate effects on economic output and a wide range of welfare indicators were 
almost exclusively negative (UNICEF 1997)7. The transition in Eastern Europe has been 
more painful than in Central Europe. Slovenia and Poland have, for example, long 
recovered from the initial transition shock. Yet, there is still major uncertainty about the 
long term. On the whole, an increasing number of people in transition Europe face rising 
prospects of unemployment, income inequality, and poverty (Milanovie 1995).
In the literature on transition, it became conventional wisdom to attribute the 
‘fertility crisis’ to this process of economic and political transition. In his study of the 
Eastern German ‘fertility crisis’, the leading German demographer, Nicholas Eberstadt 
(1994) summarizes his view:
“If there are any lingering doubts as to whether Eastern Germany’s unexpected 
and rapid transition from communism to a “social market economy” has been a 
time of shock and crisis for the general public of the former GDR, they should be 
dispelled by the region’s demographic trends...For populations that have known 
only the planned economy and the closed society, transition to the liberal market 
order might be expected to entail far-reaching, often traumatic, adjustments. 
Eastern Germany’s demographic data document dramatic, unexpected, and in 
many ways unprecedented adjustments by the local populace to their new 
socioeconomic environment”.
7 Appendix 1.1 shows welfare indicators for selected Central and Eastern European countries.
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The Russian demographer Khodov (1995) goes even further: he asserts that, not 
only market reforms but the market itself contributed to the ‘fertility crisis’ in Russia:
“it is becoming ever clearer that the market is always against children.. .the 
market is killing babies: both those already bom and those expected. Not only 
inflation but the market itself, the system with all its attributes.”
A closer look at the evidence provided to support those views quickly reveals 
obvious weaknesses. Both authors roughly approximate the start of the rapid fertility 
decline to the initiation of transition, and the introduction of market reforms. In Russia, at 
least, I will show that this is not the case. Moreover, both authors remain silent on the 
mechanisms through which transition may have affected reproductive decisions. Is it for 
example, the deterioration in living standards (and the increase in the opportunity cost of 
children)? A shift towards modem Western individualistic values? Another shift in the 
incentives structure? The lack of new flats? Broad uncertainty associated with rising 
unemployment?
In this thesis, I choose to investigate two particular mechanisms of transmission. 
The choice of those mechanisms is based on the fact that they represent popular 
perceptions of the fertility decline, and have been widely used in the literature on 
transition as proven hypotheses. These are: 1) a shift in values that altered the 
fundamental attitudes towards reproduction, and 2) a fall in individual income that forced 
households to have fewer children.
1. Under the first mechanism, fertility fell in response to the spread of Western 
individualistic values to the East that accompanied the transition process. In 
the process of rapid ‘adaptation’ towards Western fertility levels, a new 
system of values and attitudes emerged. This system features a greater 
emphasis on individualism and a lesser desire for children. The decline in 
fertility is considered as a positive, long-term indicator of development8. 
This is referred to as the demographic hypothesis.
8 This is a simplified interpretation of the demographic model. In fact, demographers are 
concerned with fertility decline (and refer to a ‘fertility crisis’) whenever there is a sharp variation 
in the TFR and the fertility rate falls below replacement level. I am grateful to demographers at 
the Economic Commission for Europe for this point.
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2. Under the second mechanism, fertility fell in response to the economic crisis 
in general, and the deterioration in income in particular, that accompanied the 
transition process. Households wanted as many children as before the 
transition, but they could not afford them because their income had shrunk. 
The decline in fertility reflects therefore the deterioration in the quality of life 
and happiness. In other words, it is a strong negative* short-term indicator of 
the process of transition. This is referred to as the economic hypothesis.
The extent to which the economic crisis has influenced downturns in fertility is 
far from obvious. I now briefly illustrate with two countries, Russia and Slovenia why the 
economic explanation of the fertility decline requires more thorough investigation.
Figure 1.2 plots the crude birth 
rate (a crude measure of fertility)9 and 
the volume of industrial production (a 
proxy for income10) for Russia. As 
shown, both (the proxy for) income and 
the crude birth rate, fell for a while, in 
parallel: this suggests that (the proxy 
for) income and the crude birth rate are 
related to one another. But a closer 
look at the timing of the decline reveals 
a much more complex story: the crude 
birth rate started to fall around 1986, about 3 years before the (proxy for) income started 
to collapse (Vandycke 1996a).
Slovenia shows the opposite state: the total fertility rate has been continuously 
falling since 1990 while aggregate income has been steadily growing. Since 1995, 
Slovenia has made substantial advances in market reforms and shows impressive 
economic annual growth rates of about 5 percent (Hanzek 1998). In total, the Slovenian 
rapid fertility decline cannot entirely be explained by the fall in aggregate income.
9 Appendix 1.2 examines alternative measures of fertility. Appendix 1.3 discusses the extent to 
which changes in the total fertility rate (TFR) adequately reflect changes in attitudes towards 
reproductive choice.
10 As will be discussed in Chapter IV, the volume of industrial production can be considered as a 
better proxy for income than GDP or household income.
Fig.1.2 Birth Rate and Volume of 
Industrial Production, Russia, 1986-95
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3. Methods of the Present Study
This inquiry investigates the causes for the rapid fall of the total fertility rate in 
Central and Eastern Europe, using the Russian experience as a focus. I now expose how I 
am pursuing the subject through the central use of comparative analysis, econometric 
tools, a theoretical model and an interdisciplinary approach.
I start by analyzing the most important theories on the causes of fertility change 
(Chapter II). I show that there are three approaches to the topic, i.e. economic, 
sociological and demographic, with each of them talking at cross-purposes. In seeking to 
bridge the disciplinary gap, I clarify the hypotheses underlying each approach. This 
comparative analysis helps to understand the fundamental differences between economic 
and demographic theories of reproductive choice.
I test the demographic and economic hypotheses on the rapid fertility decline in 
transition Europe (Chapters in  and IV). I first test whether the rapid fertility decline is 
due to a shift in values and a change in attitudes towards reproduction. Then, I test 
whether the rapid fertility decline is due to the fall in income and increased uncertainty.
I use two types of data: 1) time-series fertility data are used to explore the 
behaviour of fertility over a long period of time and 2) cross-regional income and fertility 
data are used to explore possible explanatory factors.
To test the above hypotheses, I apply econometric techniques11. Because of the 
complexity of the issues at stake, I make use of sophisticated testing tools. The most 
complex of all, stochastic (unit root) analysis, is useful to study the behaviour of variables 
over time. Structural break analysis is used to detect an abrupt change in the evolution of 
a variable over time. Equipped with these powerful tools, I can show, for example, that in 
Russia, the most significant change in the total fertility rate (TFR) did not take place at 
the start of market reforms (1992): the decline in the TFR accelerated before 1992. 
Standard regression analysis is applied on regional fertility data.
As I indicated above, I use evidence from the Russian Federation. The choice of 
Russia as a reference case is based on four motives: first, the fertility decline in Russia
11 Standard Ordinary-Least Square (OLS) method is used for regressions. The quantitative 
software used in this inquiry is Econometric Views.
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offers a fresh example that has received little attention. Second, it illustrates the most 
startling changes connected to transition. The variation in both economic and 
demographic indicators is so sharp that it leaves little doubt as to whether there is an 
interesting issue to investigate. In Russia, for example, real GDP fell by 42 percent 
between 1989 and 1997 (UNECE 1998).
Third, the vast Russian State provides the richest illustration of striking regional 
differences. This will be a particularly useful characteristic for empirical testing. For 
example, I will show that, in the regions where the fall in (the proxy for) income was the 
largest, fertility rates fell the most. The study of the regional dimension of the fertility 
decline is an original contribution of this inquiry. Finally, Russia is the case that I know 
best, having spent time there, worked there briefly and having continued good contacts 
with demographers and economists there.
This inquiry is based on fertility data that I collected in Moscow and Paris. I 
obtained unpublished official data from the Russian Statistical Office, Goskomstat. At the 
time, the department in charge of regional data was compiling regional birth rate 
registration data for the 1989-95 period. I returned to original records in Goskomstat’s 
archives to obtain information on earlier periods. I gathered information for all regions of 
Russia for the 1980s. I compiled these cross-section (regional) and time series data in a 
single database.
It is at the Centre for Human Ecology and Demography, the demographic 
institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, that I found more sophisticated 
demographic information12. Their French collaborators at the Institut National d’Etudes 
Demographiques in Paris provided me with the missing registration data series.
Economic and demographic information for the rest of transition Europe was 
obtained from the Economic Commission for Europe and the International Child 
Development Centre.
Finally, in a modest contribution, I reconcile my empirical findings and the 
economic theory of reproductive behaviour. I model the reproductive decision process 
under ‘broad uncertainty’. The model shows that the lack of confidence in tomorrow can
12 The research institute includes leading Russian demographers notably Dr. Anatoly G. 
Vishnevsky, the Director, and Sergei V. Zhakarov, the leading specialist on Russian population 
reproduction, both of whom have outstanding international reputation and collaborative links.
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lead households to postpone the decision of having an additional child to a later date. I 
suggest that this model can give insight into the rapid fertility decline in Slovenia.
This inquiry offers a good opportunity to re-establish a link between economics 
and sociology/demography in the area of reproductive behaviour. The social sciences 
locus is the fundamental understanding of human society. Also, the process of 
reproduction and variation over time arises as an essential concern of those disciplines.
My investigation lies on the borders between economics and other social 
sciences, and is deliberately interdisciplinary. Indeed, one of my earliest findings has 
been that the absence of such a broad approach is handicapping progress in understanding 
development in this field. I hope that the interdisciplinary approach I adopt will shed 
some light on this area of fundamental interest to economics, sociology and demography.
My interest in social issues13 and the social impact of transition in particular was 
fostered over the past eight years. It all started with a profound interest in 
macroeconomics and a tenacious curiosity for Central and Eastern Europe. At the 
International Monetary Fund first and later at the World Bank, I became involved in the 
design and negotiation with government officials of macroeconomic stabilization 
programs in those countries. The interaction with government officials played a vital role 
in my understanding of transition. It gave me a unique opportunity to witness very 
closely political and economic developments of transition. But, more importantly, as an 
economist, it enlarged my vision of the transition with a new emphasis on the social 
consequences of the process of economic reforms.
131 recently gave a talk on the following topics: “ Causes and Consequences of Wage Arrears in 
Russia” (Stockholm, May 1998) and “Employment in the European Union” (Tilburg, November 
1997). I also participated in the seminar on ‘The Economics of Social Policy Choice” (Prague, 
February 1998).
4. Summary
Chapter II. In a comparison of the various approaches to the causes of fertility 
decline, I will clarify the hypotheses underlying the economic and demographic 
paradigms. I will show that, for economists, reproduction results from an individual and 
voluntarist decision. In contrast, for demographers, it is constrained by superior laws of 
Nature and a Darwinian selection process. For economists, reproductive behaviour can 
change in response to variations in both relative prices of children and income. For 
demographers, the cause for fertility change lies in a deeply rooted process of ‘adaptation’ 
of society towards a modem, Western equilibrium fertility level.
Chapter III. This chapter will develop and test a demographic hypothesis of the 
fertility decline, by using Russia as a focus. The hypothesis states that the rapid fertility 
decline in Russia results from two inter-linked processes. First, an accelerated adaptation 
towards Western fertility levels (the catching-up effect). This accelerated adaptation took 
place through a rapid change in attitudes towards reproduction. Second, a historical shift 
in the timing of births (the lagged-effect). Using time-series fertility Russian data, I will 
make two findings: first, the presence of a significant structural break in the fertility trend 
in 1989. Assuming that fertility trend reflects attitudes towards reproduction, this finding 
suggests a change in attitudes around 1989. Second, insufficient support to the 
demographic hypothesis. Specifically, I will fail to reject the stochastic model. This 
means that (almost all) fertility series behave randomly: they cannot simply be 
represented by a long-term deterministic breaking trend.
Chapter IV. This chapter will use standard OLS regression technique to test the 
extent to which the economic crisis has influenced downturns in the fertility rate. Using 
cross-section data for 66 regions of Russia (1990-95), I will find that regions with the 
largest fall in the total (and urban) fertility rate experienced the largest fall in (the proxy 
for) income and higher uncertainty. These findings challenge the simple economic 
explanation of the fertility decline, in which the deterioration in income explains the 
entire story. It shows that ‘people’s perception of uncertainty’ increases the explanatory 
power of the regression model.
Chapter V. In a preliminary investigation, this chapter will explore the specific 
connection between reproductive decisions and uncertainty. It begins to show that ‘broad 
uncertainty’ is endemic to Central and Eastern Europe. It will then develop a small model
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of reproductive decision. In this model, broad uncertainty undermines the household’s 
capacity to process information: it perceives that the cost of doing something now is 
‘overly high’, compared to doing it tomorrow. Under those assumptions, the household 
puts off the birth of the additional child. Also, I suggest that ‘people’s perception of 
uncertainty’ can help explain why the fertility rate continued to fall in Slovenia (Poland or 
the Czech Republic), while aggregate income has been steadily growing. This chapter 
will show that the treatment of uncertainty in the economic theory of reproductive 
behaviour deserves more analysis.
Chapter VI will summarize each chapter and draw the policy implications of the 
inquiry. This investigation started with a concern about the social impact of the transition 
process in Central and Eastern Europe. Its purpose was to find out whether the rapid fall 
in the total fertility rate that was experienced throughout the region reflected a sharp 
deterioration in the quality of life and happiness. Based on Russian evidence, it will show 
that decline in the fertility rate represented the response to lower income and higher 
uncertainty (insecurity). As such, it can be interpreted as a strong negative indicator of 
the transition process.
Provided that conclusions can be drawn for the entire region on the basis of the 
Russian experience and the fertility decline is to be reversed, the investigation will 
conclude that ‘successful reforms’ have to be rapidly achieved. In particular, the 
following specific policy suggestions emerge as palliatives, although important ones, if 
the fertility decline is to end sooner rather than later:
1) Strong and rapid recovery of individual income is a priority for the entire 
region;
2) Provision of an adequate social safety net is needed to stabilize individual 
income and minimize the uncertainty surrounding future income. This is 
particularly important during the period of rapid economic transformation 
those countries have been experiencing.
3) After the turmoil of the first years of economic and political reforms, 
economic and political ‘stabilization’ is needed in the region. This process 
could help reverse the generalized lack of confidence in tomorrow that has 
characterized the transition process.
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Appendix 1.1
Table 1.1.1
Welfare Indicators of Russia
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Macroeconomic Context
GDP growth rate (% change)
Annual inflation rate (%)
Annual index of real wages (base=100) 
Registered unemployment rate (%)
Demographic Indicators
Total population (millions)
Share of children in total population (%) 
Crude birth rate (per 1,000 pop.)
Crude death rate (per 1,000 pop.)
Female life expectancy at birth (years)
Male life expectancy at birth (years) 
Maternal mortality (per 100,000 live births) 
Net migration (thousands)
Reproductive Behaviour
Total fertility rate
Share of births to unmarried mothers (%) 
Share of births to teen mothers (%)
Abortion rate (per 100 live births)
Family Stability
Crude marriage rate (per 1,000 pop.) 
General divorce rate (per 100 marriages) 
Children involved in divorce (thousands)
Child Welfare
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) 
Under 5 mortality rate 
DPT immunisation rate (% children <2 yrs.) 
Kindergarten enrolment rate (% 3-6 yrs.) 
Basic school enrolment rate (% 7-15 yrs.)
1.6 -4 -5 -14.5
5.6 92.7 1526
100 109.1 102.4 68.9
0.1 0.8
147.342 147.913 148.245 148.31
27.2 27.1 27 26.7
14.797 13.569 12.212 10.794
10.75 11.2 11.4 12.19
74.5 74.3 74.3 73.8
64.2 63.8 63.5 62
49.015 47.414 52.434 50.767
115.3 183.8 16.7 252.9
2.01 1.89 1.73 1.55
13.5 14.61 16.04 17.15
11.84 13.85 15.37 16.45
204.93 206.32 201.07 216.47
9.4 8.9 8.6 7.1
42.1 42.4 46.8 60.7
479.1 466.1 522.2 569.1
17.8 17.4 17.8 18
21.97 21.35 21.9 22.09
82.7 68.5 68.7 72.6
69.3 66.4 63.9 56.8
93 93.6 94.4 93.3
-8.7 -12.6 -4 -5
875 307.4 197.7 47.7
69.1 63.7 45.9 52
1.1 2.2 3.2 3.4
148.146 147.968 147.774 147.373
26.4 26 25.7 25.2
9.381 9.591 9.298 8.922
14.37 15.55 14.91 14.13
71.9 71.2 71.7 72.6
58.9 57.6 58.3 59.9
51.632 52.338 53.307 48.902
440.3 809.6 502.5 343.5
1.39 1.4 1.34 1.28
18.18 19.58 21.14 22.99
17.66 18.22 17.45 16.06
235.24 217.32 202.84 203.28
7.5 7.3 7.3 5.9
59.9 63 61.9 64.9
593.8 613.4 588.1 463.5
19.9 18.6 17.6 17
24.31 23.01 22.66 25
79.2 88.1 92.7 95.1
57.4 56.2 55.5 55
91.9 90.7 91.3 91.4
Source: TransMONEE database 3.0, UNICEF, 1998.
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Table 1.1.2
Welfare Indicators of Slovenia
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Macroeconomic Context
GDP growth rate (% change) -0.5 -4.7 -8.9 -5.5 2.8 5.3 4.1 3.1
Annual inflation rate (%) 549.7 117.7 201.3 32.3 19.8 12.6 9.7
Annual index of real wages (base=100) 100 73.8 61.8 61.3 70.4 75.4 79.4 83.1
Registered unemployment rate (%) 2.9 4.7 8.2 11.5 14.4 14.4 14.1 13.9
Demographic Indicators
Total population (millions) 1.996 1.998 1.999 1.996 1.992 1.989 1.99 1.989
Share of children in total population (%) 25.5 25.2 24.8 24.3 23.9 23.4 22.9 22.4
Crude birth rate (per 1,000 pop.) 11.816 11.244 10.848 10.064 9.985 9.836 9.581 9.501
Crude death rate (per 1,000 pop.) 9.35 9.29 9.66 9.68 10.05 9.73 9.53 9.36
Female life expectancy at birth (years) 76.67 77.28 77.38 77.25 77.29 77.38 76.76 78.25
Male life expectancy at birth (years) 68.8 69.43 69.54 69.45 69.4 69.58 70.27 70.79
Maternal mortality (per 100,000 live births) 4.265 0 4.633 5.005 10.105 10.276 5.269
Net migration (thousands) 2.4 2.2 3.1 0.4 1.4 0.9 2.5
Reproductive Behaviour
Total fertility rate 1.52 1.46 1.42 1.34 1.34 1.32 1.29 1.28
Share of births to unmarried mothers (%) 23.25 24.54 26.42 27.67 27.97 28.77 29.81 31.85
Share of births to teen mothers (%) 8.15 7.81 7.04 7.03 5.93 5.36 5.14 4.31
Abortion rate (per 100 live births) 67.73 65.86 64.99 66.35 61.41 58.18 56.85 54.39
Family Stability
Crude marriage rate (per 1,000 pop.) 4.9 4.3 4.1 4.6 4.5 4.2 4.1 3.8
General divorce rate (per 100 marriages) 22.1 21.8 22.4 21.6 21.7 23.1 19.2 26.5
Children involved in divorce (thousands) 2.1 2 1.9 2 2 2 1.5 2
Child W elfare
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) 8.2 8.4 8.2 8.9 6.8 6.5 5.5 4.7
Under 5 mortality rate 10.28 10.19 9.96 10.61 8.39 8.17 6.74 6.07
DPT immunisation rate (% children <2 yrs.) 97.4 97.1 97.3 97.8 98.1 98.1
Kindergarten enrolment rate (% 3-6 yrs.) 57 56.3 56.6 55.8 56.2 60.3 62.8 65.1
Basic school enrolment rate (% 7-15 yrs.) 96 96.1 97.1 96.8 97.6 97.8 96.7 97.3
Source: TransMONEE database 3.0, UNICEF, 1998.
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Table 1.1.3
Welfare Indicators of the Czech Republic
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Macroeconomic Context
GDP growth rate (% change) 2.4 -1.2 -11.5 -3.3 0.6 2.7 5.9 4.1
Annual inflation rate (%) 10.8 56.6 11.1 20.8 10 9.1 8.8
Annual index of real wages (base=100) 100 93.6 68.9 76 78.8 84.9 92.2 100.4
Registered unemployment rate (%) 0.3 2.6 3.1 3 3.3 3 3.1
Demographic Indicators
Total population (millions) 10.362 10.363 10.309 10.318 10.331 10.336 10.331 10.315
Share of children in total population (%) 26.9 26.6 26.2 25.6 24.9 24.2 23.5 22.7
Crude birth rate (per 1,000 pop.) 12.439 12.686 12.596 11.836 11.759 10.346 9.334 8.799
Crude death rate (per 1,000 pop.) 12.33 12.5 12.06 11.66 11.44 11.36 11.42 10.93
Female life expectancy at birth (years) 75.4 76.01 75.67 76.11 76.35 76.55 76.94 77.27
Male life expectancy at birth (years) 68.11 67.54 68.21 68.52 69.28 69.53 69.96 70.37
Maternal mortality (per 100,000 live births) 9.349 8.425 13.142 9.86 11.568 6.568 2.081 5.528
Net migration (thousands) 1.5 0.6 2.9 11.8 5.5 9.9 10 10.1
Reproductive Behaviour
Total fertility rate 1.874 1.893 1.861 1.715 1.666 1.438 1.278 1.185
Share of births to unmarried mothers (%) 7.9 8.55 9.82 10.69 12.66 14.55 15.55 16.9
Share of births to teen mothers (%) 13.61 14.1 15.5 16.2 15.77 13.46 11.04 9
Abortion rate (per 100 live births) 98.56 96.55 92.81 89.79 70.6 63.27 64.09 66.3
Family Stability
Crude marriage rate (per 1,000 pop.) 7.8 8.8 7 7.2 6.4 5.7 5.3 5.2
General divorce rate (per 100 marriages) 38.6 35.2 40.8 38.6 45.8 52.9 56.7 61.4
Children involved in divorce (thousands) 34.7 35.2 32 31.1 32.5 33.1 32.8 34.7
Child W elfare
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) 10 10.8 10.4 9.9 8.5 7.9 7.7 6
Under 5 mortality rate 11.756 12.438 12.106 11.618 10.138 10.161 9.532 7.85
DPT immunisation rate (% children <2 yrs.) 99 99 99 99 99 98 96 98
Kindergarten enrolment rate (% 3-6 yrs.) 89.8 89.8 89.8 83.3 84.9 86.6 88.7 88.5
Basic school enrolment rate (% 7-15 yrs.) 96.9 97.3 99.3 98.6 97.4 96.1 95.3 92
Source: TransMONEE database 3.0, UNICEF, 1998.
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Table 1.1.4
Welfare Indicators of Slovakia
Macroeconomic Context
GDP growth rate (% change)
Annual inflation rate (%)
Annual index of real wages (base=100) 
Registered unemployment rate (%)
Demographic Indicators
Total population (millions)
Share of children in total population (%) 
Crude birth rate (per 1,000 pop.)
Crude death rate (per 1,000 pop.)
Female life expectancy at birth (years)
Male life expectancy at birth (years) 
Maternal mortality (per 100,000 live births) 
Net migration (thousands)
Reproductive Behaviour
Total fertility rate
Share of births to unmarried mothers (%) 
Share of births to teen mothers (%)
Abortion rate (per 100 live births)
Family Stability
Crude marriage rate (per 1,000 pop.) 
General divorce rate (per 100 marriages) 
Children involved in divorce (thousands)
Child W elfare
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) 
Under 5 mortality rate
DPT immunisation rate (% children <2 yrs.) 
Kindergarten enrolment rate (% 3-6 yrs.) 
Basic school enrolment rate (% 7-15 yrs.)
1989 1990 1991 1992
1.1 -2.5 -14.6 -6.5
10.8 61.2 10.1
100 94.2 67.3 72.6
0.6 6.6 11.4
5.276 5.28 5.284 5.305
30.6 30.4 30.1 29.7
15.255 15.226 14.942 14.137
10.22 10.35 10.34 10.07
75.2 75.4 75.2 76.2
66.8 66.6 66.8 67.6
9.986 6.251 14 1.34
0.1 1.2 2
2.081 2.086 2.05 1.979
7.19 7.61 8.95 9.76
11.9 12.05 14 14.34
70.28 70.23 67.64 66.36
6.9 7.7 6.2 6.4
22.7 21.9 24.1 23.8
10.9 13.5 10.3 9.7
13.5 12 13.2 12.6
15.84 14.06 15.41 14.7
99.1 99.4 99.7 99.3
91.5 83.7 75.7 78.1
96.8 97.2 98 99.8
1993 1994 1995 1996
-3.7 4.9 6.8 6.9
23.2 13.4 9.9 5.8
69.2 71.4 75.3 81.9
12.7 14.4 13.8 12.6
5.325 5.346 5.364 5.372
29.2 28.6 27.9 27.2
13.818 12.465 11.501 11.236
9.9 9.61 9.83 9.54
76.7 76.5 76.3 76.65
68.4 68.3 68.4 68.8
12.286 6.027 8.14 4.99
1.8 4.8 2.8 2.3
1.92 1.66 1.52 1.47
10.55 11.71 12.61 14.02
14.34 13.43 12.3 11.73
62.18 62.17 58.41 51.37
5.8 5.3 5.1 5.1
26.5 30.8 32.7 34.2
9.7 10.3 6.8 7
10.6 11.2 11 10.2
12.7 13.2 13.12
99.1 98.9 99.1
78 74.6 70.2 75.2
99.5 97 96.5 96.3
Source: TransMONEE database 3.0, UNICEF, 1998.
Table 1.1.5
Welfare Indicators of Poland
Macroeconomic Context 
GDP growth rate {% change)
Annual inflation rate (%)
Annual index of real wages (base=100) 
Registered unemployment rate (%)
Demographic Indicators
Total population (millions)
Share of children in total population (%) 
Crude birth rate (per 1,000 pop.)
Crude death rate (per 1,000 pop.)
Female life expectancy at birth (years)
Male life expectancy at birth (years) 
Maternal mortality (per 100,000 live births) 
Net migration (thousands)
Reproductive Behaviour
Total fertility rate
Share of births to unmarried mothers (%) 
Share of births to teen mothers (%)
Abortion rate (per 100 live births)
Family Stability
Crude marriage rate (per 1,000 pop.) 
General divorce rate (per 100 marriages) 
Children involved in divorce (thousands)
Child W elfare
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) 
Under 5 mortality rate 
DPT immunisation rate (% children <2 yrs.) 
Kindergarten enrolment rate (% 3-6 yrs.) 
Basic school enrolment rate (% 7-15 yrs.)
1989 1990 1991 1992
0.2 -11.6 -7 2.6
585.8 70.3 43
100 75.6 75.4 73.3
6.1 11.8 13.6
37.962 38.111 38.246 38.364
29.9 29.7 29.5 29.3
14.978 14.475 14.419 13.52
10.09 10.24 10.61 10.29
75.45 75.49 75.27 75.7
66.76 66.51 66.11 66.7
10.63 12.78 12.78 9.899
24.4 15.8 15.9 11.6
2.046 2.039 2.049 1.929
6.14 6.51 6.93 7.48
7.35 8.01 8.47 8.43
14.6 10.89 5.66 2.27
6.7 6.7 6.1 5.7
18.5 16.6 14.5 14.7
50.1 45.1 35.8 33.5
19.1 19.3 18.2 17.3
21.8 21.9 20.4 19.6
90.1 88.9 88
48.7 47.1 43.9 42.6
97.9 97.5 97.3 97.1
1993 1994 1995 1996
3.8 5.2 7 6
35.3 32.2 27.8 19.9
71.2 71.6 73.7 77.9
16.4 16 14.9 13.6
38.461 38.543 38.595 38.624
28.9 28.4 27.9 27.3
12.94 12.586 11.305 11.164
10.2 10.03 10 9.98
76 76.1 76.4 76.6
67.4 67.5 67.6 68.1
11.734 11.012 9.928 4.904
15.5 19 18.2 13.1
1.847 1.798 1.611 1.6
8.45 8.98 9.47 10.17
8.34 8.2 8.01 7.83
0.25 0.18 0.13
5.4 5.4 5.4 5.3
13.4 15.2 18.4 19.4
28.4 32.8 40.6 42.2
16.1 15.1 13.6 12.2
18.1 17.3 15.6 14.14
89 89.5 90.5 91.7
42.7 44.3 45.3 46.8
97.2 97.1 97.2 97.4
Source: TransMONEE database 3.0, UNICEF, 1998.
Table 1.1.6
Welfare Indicators of Hungary
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Macroeconomic Context
GDP growth rate (% change) 0.4 -3.5 -11.9 -3.1 -0.6 2.9 1.5 1
Annual inflation rate (%) 28.9 35 23 22.5 18.8 28.2 23.6
Annual index of real wages (base=100) 100 94.3 87.7 86.5 83.1 89.1 78.2 74.3
Registered unemployment rate (%) 0.4 0.8 8.5 12.3 12.1 10.4 10.4 10.5
Demographic Indicators
Total population (millions) 10.481 10.365 10.346 10.324 10.294 10.261 10.229 10.193
Share of children in total population (%) 25.1 25.1 24.9 24.5 23.9 23.3 22.8 22.2
Crude birth rate (per 1,000 pop.) 11.826 12.193 12.351 11.84 11.411 11.305 10.993 10.366
Crude death rate (per 1,000 pop.) 13.8 14.05 14 14.41 14.6 14.31 14.22 14.04
Female life expectancy at birth (years) 73.79 73.71 73.83 73.73 73.81 74.23 74.5 74.7
Male life expectancy at birth (years) 65.44 65.13 65.02 64.55 64.53 64.84 65.3 66.1
Maternal mortality (per 100,000 live births) 15.409 20.688 12.578 9.858 18.798 10.381 15.171 11.399
Net migration (thousands) 21.8 25.7 17.4 10.4 12.9 9.2 11.2 7
Reproductive Behaviour
Total fertility rate 1.78 1.84 1.86 1.77 1.69 1.64 1.57 1.46
Share of births to unmarried mothers (%) 12.39 13.14 14.15 15.6 17.64 19.44 20.68 22.62
Share of births to teen mothers (%) 12.25 12.27 12.27 12.42 12.6 12.49 11.53 10.96
Abortion rate (per 100 live births) 73.4 71.92 70.7 71.53 64.3 64.44 68.68 72.76
Family Stability
Crude marriage rate (per 1,000 pop.) 6.4 6.4 5.9 5.5 5.3 5.3 5.2 4.8
General divorce rate (per 100 marriages) 37.3 37.5 39.9 37.9 41.3 43.3 46.5 46.2
Children involved in divorce (thousands) 26.1 26.1 25.4 22.9 22.9 23.3 24.9 21
Child W elfare
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) 15.7 14.8 15.6 14.1 12.5 11.5 10.7 10.9
Under 5 mortality rate 18 16.78 17.59 15.95 14.6 13.5 12.5 12.7
DPT immunisation rate (% children <2 yrs.) 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.8
Kindergarten enrolment rate (% 3-6 yrs.) 85.7 84.9 85.9 86.5 86.6 86.1 86.9 87
Basic school enrolment rate (% 7-15 yrs.) 99 99.2 99.2 99.2 99.1 99.1 99.1 99.2
Source: TransMONEE database 3.0, UNICEF, 1998.
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Table 1.1.7
Welfare Indicators of Romania
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Macroeconomic Context
GDP growth rate (% change) -5.8 -5.6 -12.9 -8.7 1.5 3.9 7.1 4.1
Annual inflation rate (%) 5.1 161.1 210.4 256.1 136.7 32.3 38.8
Annual index of real wages (base=100) 100 105.2 88.9 77.3 64.4 64.6 72.7 79.8
Registered unemployment rate (%) 3 8.2 10.4 10.9 9.5 6.3
D emographic Indicators
Total population (millions) 23.002 22.795 22.763 22.73 22.684 22.619
Share of children in total population (%) 28.7 28.4 28.1 27.7 27 26.3 25.6 24.9
Crude birth rate (per 1,000 pop.) 16.077 13.662 12.051 11.498 11.052 10.926 10.497 10.291
Crude death rate (per 1,000 pop.) 10.68 10.65 10.95 11.58 11.57 11.71 11.98 12.65
Female life expectancy at birth (years) 72.41 72.65 73.05 73.17 73.17 73.32 73.36 73.09
Male life expectancy at birth (years) 66.51 66.56 66.59 66.56 66.06 65.88 65.7 65.3
Maternal mortality (per 100,000 live births) 169.398 83.559 66.479 60.293 53.201 60.388 47.752 41.064
Net migration (thousands) 41.4 96.9 42.6 29.4 17.2 16.3 21.2 19.5
Reproductive Behaviour
Total fertility rate 2.2 1.84 1.57 1.52 1.44 1.41 1.34 1.3
Share of births to unmarried mothers (%) 17 18.29 19.75 20.71
Share of births to teen mothers (%) 15.14 15.22 16.9 17.36 18.37 17.93 17.25 16.54
Abortion rate (per 100 live births) 52.1 315.26 314.93 265.7 234.31 214.88 212.49 197.2
Family Stability
Crude marriage rate (per 1,000 pop.) 7.7 8.3 8 7.7 7.1 6.8 6.8 6.6
General divorce rate (per 100 marriages) 20.2 17.1 20.2 16.8 19.3 25.7 22.7 23.7
Children involved in divorce (thousands) 30.6 27.7 30.5 23.6 21.6 32.8 27.2 26.8
Child W elfare
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) 26.9 26.9 22.7 23.3 23.3 23.9 21.2 22.3
Under 5 mortality rate 34.9 35.7 30.8 30.5 30.3 29.7 26.2 27.5
DPT immunisation rate (% children <2 yrs.) 79.3 75.5 77.3 86.8 97.6 97.6 98.3 98
Kindergarten enrolment rate (% 3-6 yrs.) 63.3 54.3 51.9 53.3 50.2 55.2 58.4 55.1
Basic school enrolment rate (% 7-15 yrs.) 93.6 89.5 89.4 89.6 90.3 91.4 92.6 93.9
Source: TransMONEE database 3.0, UNICEF, 1998.
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Table 1.1.8
Welfare Indicators of Bulgaria
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Macroeconomic Context 
GDP growth rate (% change)
Annual inflation rate (%)
Annual index of real wages (base=100) 
Registered unemployment rate (%)
Demographic Indicators
Total population (millions)
Share of children in total population (%) 
Crude birth rate (per 1,000 pop.)
Crude death rate (per 1,000 pop.)
Female life expectancy at birth (years)
Male life expectancy at birth (years) 
Maternal mortality (per 100,000 live births) 
Net migration (thousands)
Reproductive Behaviour
Total fertility rate
Share of births to unmarried mothers (%) 
Share of births to teen mothers (%)
Abortion rate (per 100 live births)
Family Stability
Crude marriage rate (per 1,000 pop.) 
General divorce rate (per 100 marriages) 
Children involved in divorce (thousands)
Child W elfare
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) 
Under 5 mortality rate
DPT immunisation rate (% children <2 yrs.) 
Kindergarten enrolment rate (% 3-6 yrs.) 
Basic school enrolment rate (% 7-15 yrs.)
-0.3 -9.1 -11.7 -7.3
26.3 333.5 82
100 111.5 68 76.7
13.2
25.1 24.8
8.718
24.5 23.9
12.724 12.138 11.181 10.514
12.04 12.46 12.79 12.65
75.1 74.8 74.7 74.5
68.6 68.1 68 68
18.702 20.917 10.426 21.316
217.6 87.6 46.5 67.7
1.9 1.81 1.65 1.54
15.52 18.45 22.11 24.5
23.51 24.64 24.91 23.73
117.57 137.52 144.31 149.09
7.1 6.9 5.7 5.2
20 19 22.6 21.1
14.1 12.7 12 10.3
14.4 14.8 16.9 15.9
18.3 18.7 21.4 20.6
99.5 99.5 99.4 97.9
69.1 67.7 58.7 62.5
98.4 98.6 97.3 95.1
-2.4 1.8 2.1 -10.9
73 96.3 62 123
77.6 63.7 60.2 49.6
15.8 14 11.4 11.1
8.632 8.54 8.472 8.444
23.3 22.8 22.3 21.7
10.031 9.467 8.616 8.698
12.93 13.24 13.64 14
74.6 74.9 74.9 74.6
67.7 67.3 67.1 67.1
14.218 12.588 19.453
64.4 62.7 50.5 66.1
1.45 1.37 1.23 1.24
25.73 28.1
22.62 21.11
127.27 122.82 134.91 136.54
4.7 4.5 4.4 4.3
18.3 21.1 29 28
7.8 7 9.3 8.6
15.5 16.3 14.8 15.6
19.6 20.9 19 19.84
97.7 93.3 94.8 95.1
60.4 62.6 67.5 69.2
94 94.3 93.7 93.6
Source: TransMONEE database 3.0, UNICEF, 1998.
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Table 1.1.9
Welfare Indicators of Ukraine
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Macroeconomic Context
GDP growth rate (% change) 5 -3.4 -11.6 -13.7 -14.2 -23 -11.8 -10.1
Annual inflation rate (%) 4.2 91 1210 4700 891 376 80
Annual index of real wages (base=100)
Registered unemployment rate (%) 0.4 0.4 0.5 1.5
Demographic Indicators
Total population (millions) 51.518 51.637 51.746 51.896 51.925 51.667 51.277 51.001
Share of children in total population (%) 25.9 25.7 25.5 25.4 25.1 24.8 24.5 24.1
Crude birth rate (per 1,000 pop.) 13.532 12.838 12.294 11.593 10.874 10.219 9.678 9.224
Crude death rate (per 1,000 pop.) 11.66 12.19 12.95 13.43 14.28 14.8 15.46 15.23
Female life expectancy at birth (years) 75 75 75 74 73 73.2 72.7
Male life expectancy at birth (years) 66 66 66 64 63 62.8 61.8
Maternal mortality (per 100,000 live births) 32.707 32.41 29.803 31.335 32.827 31.253 32.261 30.393
Net migration (thousands) 108.9 139.3 148.4 288.1 49.6 143.2 94.8 131.1
Reproductive Behaviour
Total fertility rate 1.9 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3
Share of births to unmarried mothers (%) 10.81 11.18 11.9 12.12 13.01 12.83 13.21 13.6
Share of births to teen mothers (%) 14.13 16.13 17.31 18.33 18.86 19.53 19.86 19.47
Abortion rate (per 100 live births) 153.18 155.06 151.71 156.22 154.45 147.64 145.2
Family Stability
Crude marriage rate (per 1,000 pop.) 9.5 9.3 9.5 7.6 8.2 7.7 8.4 6
General divorce rate (per 100 marriages) 39.6 39.9 40.7 56.5 51.2 52 45.9 62.8
Children involved in divorce (thousands) 155.9 158.5 170.7 186.7 184.7
Child W elfare
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) 13 12.8 13.9 14 14.9 14.5 14.4 14.3
Under 5 mortality rate 17.432 17.151 18.378 18.59 19.657 19.36 19.745 19.259
DPT immunisation rate (% children <2 yrs.) 79.2 78.8 86 88.1 95.6 91.5 95.8
Kindergarten enrolment rate (% 3-6 yrs.) 61 57.4 51 54.7 49.4 47 44.3 41
Basic school enrolment rate (% 7-15 yrs.) 93.1 93.5 92.4 91.6 90.8 91 90.3
Source: TransMONEE database 3.0, UNICEF, 1998.
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Table 1.1.10
Welfare Indicators of Khazakstan
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Macroeconomic Context
GDP growth rate (% change) -0.1 -0.4 -13 -2.9 -10.4 -17.8 -8.9 1.1
Annual inflation rate (%) 78.8 1381 1662.3 1892 176.3 39.1
Annual index of real wages (base=100) 100 64.8 49.1 32.9 33.4 34.4
Registered unemployment rate (%) 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.7 3.6
Demographic Indicators
Total population (millions) 16.645 16.67 16.806 16.903 16.892 16.739 16.54 16.471
Share of children in total population (%) 36.9 37 36.7 36.5 36.2 35.9 35.6 35.1
Crude birth rate (per 1,000 pop.) 22.965 21.796 21.069 20.025 18.723 18.311 16.748 15.371
Crude death rate (per 1,000 pop.) 7.6 7.73 8.01 8.15 9.25 9.59 10.21 10.08
Female life expectancy at birth (years) 73.1 73 72.9 72.7 71.9 71 70.4
Male life expectancy at birth (years) 63.9 67.7 63.3 63 61.8 60.6 59.7
Maternal mortality (per 100,000 live births) 53.104 54.77 48.009 57.02 49.642 48.286 57.399 52.928
Net migration (thousands) 93.4 130.9 48.9 179.3 222.1 414.4 238.5 175.5
Reproductive Behaviour
Total fertility rate 2.877 2.719 2.5 2.3 2.26
Share of births to unmarried mothers (%) 12.01 13.17 13.42 13.36 13.4 14.47 15.69 17.6
Share of births to teen mothers (%) 8.69 10.04 10.93 11.17 12.23 13.04 13.03 12.65
Abortion rate (per 100 live births)
Family Stability
Crude marriage rate (per 1,000 pop.) 9.9 9.9 9.9 8.7 8.7 7.4 7 6.2
General divorce rate (per 100 marriages) 27.7 26.5 29.5 33.9 31.1 34 33.5 39.5
Children involved in divorce (thousands) 41.1 40.5 45.8 47.4 43.6 39.2 37.1 39.3
Child W elfare
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) 25.9 26.4 27.4 26.1 28.4 27.2 27.3 25.4
Under 5 mortality rate 34.915 35.628 34.183 38.098 36.175 38.425 35.173
DPT immunisation rate (% children <2 yrs.) 84.8 84.2 82.7 85.3 81.6 84.4 92.9 95
Kindergarten enrolment rate (% 3-6 yrs.) 54.7 53.5 52.5 45.3 39.8 29.3 23.5
Basic school enrolment rate (% 7-15 yrs.) 93.9 93.1 92.7 91.7 91.5 90.9 90.5 90
Source: TransMONEE database 3.0, UNICEF, 1998.
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Appendix 1.2
Alternative Measures of Fertility
This appendix presents alternative measures of fertility and discusses the pros and cons in
each case.
1. The Crude Birth Rate (CBR)
• The crude birth rate (CBR) is the simplest and commonest measure of natality.
• In general, it is defined as the number of births in a year per 1,000 mid-year
population.
• It is the principal characteristic of a ‘crude’ birth rate that all ages and both sexes are 
represented in the rate. As a result, the CBR depends on the age-structure of the 
population. For example, the observed fall in the birth rate in 1960 may simply come 
from the fact that the number of women in childbearing age (say 20 years old) is 
unusually low. These women were bom around the time of World War II (1940).
• The CBR is readily available from official registration data.
2. The Age-Snecific/Adiusted Fertility (Birth) Rate (ASFR)
• The age-specific fertility rate (ASFR) is defined as the number of births to women of
a given age group, per 1,000 women in that age group. Generally, the rates are 
defined for 5-year age-groups: 15-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39,40-44,45-49.
• The ASFR is unaffected by differences between the groups in age-sex composition.
3. The Total Fertility Rate (TFR)
• The Total Fertility Rate (TFR) is a synthetic index and represents an approximate 
measure for the average size of a family.
• Specifically, it shows the total number of children a woman would have if she were 
subject to the age-specific fertility rates of women that year.
• It is computed as the sum of the age-specific fertility rates in a given year. Table
1.2.1 shows, for example, the TFR in 1995 in Russia. The TFR is obtained by adding 
the ASFR and multiplying the result by 5 (given the use of fertility rates by group of 
five years). Thus, the TFR = (45.6 + 113.5 + 67.2 + 29.7 + 10.7 + 2.2 + 0.1) = 269.3
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per 1,000 women (or 0.2693); 0.2693 x 5 = 1.347. In 1995, the TFR is equal to 
1.347.
• The TFR does not equate the number of children women will actually have or the 
number they expect to have by the time they complete childbearing, because the TFR 
is influenced by the timing o f birth. As I will show in appendix 1.3, the TFR can be 
low if women are postponing births to future years, but compensating by having more 
children in other years, leaving their true family size (or completed fertility) 
unaffected. As a result, the TFR may exaggerate current trends in relation to the final 
future outcome of family size, whenever changes in births are due to shift in the 
timing of birth.
Table 1.2.1
Population, Births, and Age-Specific Fertility Rate, Russia, 1995
Population Births ASFR (0/00)
15-19 years 5,219,715 238,019 45.6
20-24 years 4,949,744 561,796 113.5
25-29 years 4,603,735 309,371 67.2
30-34 years 5,761,448 171,115 29.7
35-39 years 6,375,607 68,219 10.7
40-44 years 5,942,273 13,073 2.2
45-49 years 5,720,000 572 0.1
Total: 269.3
Source: Goskomstat (1996) and author's own computation. 
Note: ASFR (col 3) = Births (col 2)/average population (co l.l)
4. Cumulative and Completed Fertility
• As noted above, the TFR is by no mean an exact measure of the average size of a 
family. For that, it is necessary to know the exact history of a particular birth cohort 
and derive the completed fertility rate.
• A cohort (or generation) is a group of people with a common characteristic referenced 
to a fixed point in time. For example, all women bom in 1930 or all women married 
for the first time in 1970 when aged 20-24 are cohorts. The cohort method of 
analysis is concerned with examining how different cohorts compare one with 
another in respect to some variables of particular interest.
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• The concepts of cumulative and completed fertility are better illustrated with an 
example. Consider an array of age-specific fertility rates, for a current year and a 
series of earlier years, for each age 15 to 49 identified in terms of year of birth. Table
1.2.2 shows a portion of such an array, i.e. age-specific rates for ages 15 to 19 from 
1941 to 1945. I can attribute to a particular cohort the rates that concern her from the 
reading of the appropriate diagonal. For example, I can detect what concerns the 
cohort reaching age 15 in 1941, thus bom in 1941 -  15 = 1926.
• Table 1.2.3 derives the set of cumulative fertility rates showing fertility up to each 
successive age. This table shows the fertility progress of the 1926-birth cohort 
through the childbearing ages. For example, at the age of 19, the cumulative fertility 
rate achieved by the 1926 cohort, is of 420 births per 10,000 women (10 + 42 + 112 + 
256).
• The completed fertility rate at the age of 50 for this the 1926-birth cohort is of 25,661 
births per 10,000 women, the equivalent of 2.57 births per women.
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Table 1.2.2
Total Fertility, by age (per 10,000 women)
Age 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945
15 years 10 11 11 11 10
16 years 37 42 27 36 58
17 years 98 108 112 114 124
18 years 211 236 267 256 279
19 years 370 420 512 497 511
48 years 5 6 4 4 4
49 years 5 6 5 4 3
Total 18,208 20 ,1 1 0 21,879 22,422 23,025
Source: Pressat. 1981.
Table 1.2.3
Cumulative and Completed Fertility Rates for the 
1926 birth-cohort
Age
Total Fertility 
(by age) Cumulative Fertility
15 years 10 0
16 years 42 10
17 years 112 52
18 years 256 164
19 years 511 420
48 years 3 25,656
49 years 2 25,659
50 years - 25,661
Note: the final figure o f the series gives the completed fertility 
Source: Pressat. 1981.
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Appendix 1.3
On the Volatility of the Total Fertility Rate
Coleman and Salt (1992) states that the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) exaggerates 
current trends in relation to the final outcome of family size whenever changes in births 
are due to a shift in the timing of birth. This appendix presents a small model to examine 
how this may happen.
I construct a model where individuals live for 5 periods. They can have children 
in the first four years of their lives. I assume the following age-specific fertility rates 
(ASFR per 100 women):
at age 1 of their lives, the ASFRi = 10; 
at age 2 of their lives, ASFR2 = 80; 
at age 3 of their lives, ASFR3 = 60; 
at age 4 of their lives, ASFR4 = 40.
I assume that individuals live until the end of age 5. In this simple world, the Total 
Fertility Rate (TFR) is equal to 1.914.
Let me now examine two 
scenarios.
In the first scenario. I 
assume that the above age- 
specific rates are observed every 
year. As shown in table 1.3.1, all 
women at age 1 of their lives 
experience an age-specific 
fertility rate of 10. This ASFRi 
prevails in year 1, year 2, year 3 
and year 4. Similarly, all women 
at age 2 of their lives experience
14 The TFR is derived as the sum of the age-specific fertility rates. Thus, TFR =ASFRi + ASFR2 + ASFR3 
+ ASFR4 = 10 + 80 + 60 + 40 = 190 (or 1.9 per 100 women).
Table 1.3.1 
Total Fertility by age - Scenario 1
Child-bearing Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 
Age ______________________________________
Age 1 10 10 10 10
Age 2 80 80 80 80
Age 3 60 60 60 60
Age 4 40 40 40 40
TFR: 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9
Note: Completed Fertility for cohort 1 is in bold-see below.
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an age-specific fertility rate of 80. This ASFR2 prevails in year 1, year 2, year 3 and year
4. To sum up, in this static world, the pattern of ASFR (10/80/60/40) is reproduced every 
year.
Table 1.3.2
In the second scenario, 
some women decide, for Total Fertility by age - Scenario 2
whatever reason, to postpone
in the timing of birth is a fall in 
the TFR in year 2, leaving the 
completed fertility unchanged.
Child-bearing
Age
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4
Age 1 10 5 10 10
Age 2 80 40 80 + 5 80
Age 3 60 30 60 + 40 60
Age 4 40 20 40 + 30 40
TFR: 1.9 0.9 2.7 1.9
For simplicity, I assume that all the ASFR in year 2 are halved. This means that 
half of all the women (in childbearing age) decide to delay births. Thus, table 1.3.2 
shows that the ASFR in year 2 are equal to 5, 40, 30 and 20. In year 3, women decide to 
make up for lost time. Thus, in year 3, these women have the ‘normal’ ASFR plus the 
‘delayed births’.
The computation is best illustrated by an example. Let me consider women of 
cohort 1. These women are in childbearing age 3 in year 3. These women have the 
‘normal’ ASFR of 60. On top of that, they have to make up for lost time in the earlier 
year. In year 2, these women were in childbearing age 2 and were thus expected to have a 
fertility rate of 80 (ASFR2 = 80). At the time, they only had 40 children. The other 40 
were postponed to the following year. At the end of year 3, women of cohort 1 have a 
fertility rate of 100 (60 + 40). The same computation is carried for each cohort in year 3.
In scenario 2, the I hK fluctuates quite a lot in year 2 and 3--the TFR at the end of 
year 3 is equal to 2.75, and is back to 1.9 at the end of year 4. The fluctuation in the TFR 
is due to a simple shift in the timing of births. I will now show that, in both scenarios, the 
completed fertility rate is unchanged.
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I derive the completed 
fertility rate by birth cohorts. As 
discussed in appendix 1.2, the 
completed fertility rate is
Table 1.3.3
Completed Fertility for Birth Cohort 1 - Scenario 1
ASFR Cumulative Fertility
Age 1 10 0
Age 2 80 10
Age 3 60 90
Age 4 40 150
Age 5 - 190
calculated from the diagonal of the ^ ge j
Total Fertility Table. Let me give
an example for the birth cohort 1.
As shown in table 1.3.3, for
women bom in year 1 the Completed Fertility
completed fertility is equal to 1.9. . , ,
r  Source: Author s own computation
Thus, in the first scenario, the total fertility rate is equal to the completed fertility rate for 
every year.
1.9
In scenario 2, it can be 
shown that the actual family size is 
unaffected over time: the
completed fertility for birth cohorts
1,2, 3 and 4 is 1.9.
Table 1.3.4
Completed Fertility for Birth Cohort 1 - Scenario 2
ASFR Cumulative Fertility
Age 1 10 0
Age 2 40 10
Age 3 100 50
Age 4 40 150
Age 5 - 190
Completed Fertility 1.9
Source: Author's own computation
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II. The Determinants of Changes in Reproductive Behaviour:
An Analytical Survey of Economic, Sociological and Demographic Theories
"One of the greatest pieces of economic wisdom is to know what you do not know"
John K. Galbraith
Introduction
This chapter presents an analytical survey of half of a century of investigation 
into reproductive behaviour. Despite intensive research, there is no single grand 
explanation on why and how reproduction changes over time. There are fundamentally 
three approaches to the topic, i.e. economic, sociological and demographic, with each of 
them talking at cross-purposes. In an effort to find out the reasons for this disagreement, 
this chapter contrasts the different approaches and establishes the limitations and 
strengths in each case. This comparative analysis helps to a better understanding of the 
most important theories in the field of reproductive choice.
There is at least one consensus in the field, i.e. the fact that there is no single 
theory on the causes for fertility change over time. “We have to accept the fact that there 
is no general theory of fertility determinants, even tentative ones, which might explain 
fertility movements and differentials as a whole. Most of the quantitative analyses help to 
explain, at best, 10 to 20 percent of fertility variance” (Leridon 1981).
The field of reproductive choice emerges as a collection of quite distinct, often 
contradictory approaches to the question of fertility change. For example, I will show 
that economic theory considers reproductive decisions as a matter of conscious and 
individual choice. In contrast, in the ‘classical’ demographic paradigm, apparent 
elements of conscious and individual choice are constrained by superior laws of Nature 
and a Darwinian process of natural selection.
The gap between disciplines became so wide that it makes any attempt to relate 
them extremely difficult. Its results are open disagreements and disciplines talking at 
cross-purposes. Economists, for example, reached the conclusion that “Demography is 
too important to be left to demographers” (Kirk 1996). In contrast, demographers 
consider that economists’ efforts to develop a theory of fertility is “like the invasion of a 
horde of primitives on a technologically advanced community proclaiming loudly their 
intent to reinvent the wheel” (Leibenstein 1974).
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Each discipline fails to provide a solid and testable theory on the causes for 
fertility change. Robinson (1997) argues that, “conclusions and new policy-relevant 
implications (in the economic theory of reproduction) have proven curiously elusive”. 
Moreover, “a number of attempts have been made to ‘test’ empirically the capacity of the 
(economic) theory to explain fertility differentials... The basic answer that emerges is 
that for the most part the facts do not appear to be in conformity with theory” 
(Leibenstein 1974).
The sociological framework became so general and its theoretical relationships so 
flexible that it could not generate unambiguous testable hypotheses regarding the specific 
causes of fertility change. Finally, the demographic theory “seems like a grand historical 
generalization buttressed by a variety of ad hoc causal assertions” (Leibenstein 1974). 
Szreter (1993) stresses its “ability to survive a continuous stream of contradictory 
findings that would long ago have killed off more mortal entities”. He continues:
“It is a remarkable paradox that although there has been an accumulation of 
modem and early modem historical evidence that would seem to have 
comprehensively discredited the accuracy and the validity of demographic 
transition as either a theory or a general historical description, this model of 
demographic change remains a central preoccupation in contemporary population 
studies.”
The objective of this chapter is to go into the fundamental debate on reproductive 
choice to find out why these disciplines talk at cross-purposes. The scheme of the chapter 
is as follows: section 1 examines the economic model of reproductive behaviour. Section 
2 studies the sociological model, and section 3 focuses on what I shall refer to as the 
‘classical’ demographic model of fertility. The paper contains the state of discussion as it 
presents itself at the present time. Because of the excellent survey that has been made by 
Van de Kaa (1996), I confine myself to review tendencies in research, with no pretence of 
balanced or comprehensive coverage.
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1. The Economic Model of Reproductive Behaviour
This section examines the economic model of reproductive behaviour. The 
discussion focuses on the economic theory of Gary Becker. Broadly speaking. Becker’s 
theory is a straightforward application of the Rational Choice theory in general, and 
consumer choice theory in particular, to reproductive choice. I first expose, and then 
apply, Rational Choice theory to reproductive decisions. Finally, I discuss two extensions 
of this simple model: the first deals with the inter-temporal dimension, and the second 
with the collection dimension of reproductive decisions.
1.1. Behavioural Foundations of Economic Theory
Economic theory rests upon a specific conception of human behaviour. It is based 
on the belief that human action involves a ‘choice’ among a range of alternatives, and 
there is a correspondence between the actual choice and the use of reason. These are the 
foundations of Rational Choice theory and constitute the prevailing economic paradigm. 
In this part I examine the behavioural foundations of Rational Choice theory (under 
certainty)15. The description is organized along three questions: what is the object of 
choice? What structures this choice? What principle leads to this choice? These 
questions will be used further below to highlight the essential differences between the 
prevailing economic paradigm on the one hand, and the prevailing sociological and 
demographic paradigms on the other hand.
1.1.1. Context of Choice
Economic theory focuses on individual choice. It assumes that each individual 
has to make a choice between commodity bundles. The objects of choice can be 
unambiguously and objectively described.
In practice, “each decision is effectively a choice among total life histories. Such 
a theory is certainly impractical, and we are thus forced to compartmentalize the different 
aspects of life, decisions in each area being treated in some sense independently” (Arrow 
1984). Thus, economic theory provides a partial equilibrium analysis of the total life 
histories. This is even true in what is known as General Equilibrium analysis.
15 Chapter V reexamines the behavioural assumptions of economic theory under uncertainty.
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1.1.2. Structure of Choice
The axiomatic requirements of Rational Choice theory are as follows:
1. Preference ordering. Each individual is assumed to be able to rank all 
alternative commodity bundles in order of preference16.
2. Internal Consistency. The ordering of all conceivable alternatives represent 
the ‘revealed preferences’ (or tastes) of an individual. For example, if an 
individual is observed to choose x rejecting y, he is declared to have revealed 
a preference for x over y. ‘Revealed preferences* can be represented by an 
ordinal binary relation. A choice is said to be inconsistent if the individual 
chooses x and rejects y on one occasion and then promptly proceeds to do the 
exact opposite.
3. Other Requirements. In more demanding formulations of the theory, 
additional requirements can include 1) the binary relation is transitive, and /or 
2) the binary relation is represented by a cardinal function—more commonly 
known as the Utility function17. In the example above, the preference of x 
over y can be represented by a higher Utility assigned to the preferred 
alternative.
An individual is described as ‘rational* (in the narrow sense) if he does not reveal 
any inconsistencies in his choice behaviour. In other words, his choices can all be 
explained in terms of some preference relation consistent with the revealed preference 
definition (Sen 1982)18.
16 His preference ordering is supposed to reflect his interest, represent his welfare, summarize the 
individual’s idea of what should be done, and describe his actual choices and behaviour (Sen 
1982).
17 In general, economic theory assumes diminishing marginal utility. Applied to reproductive 
decisions, this means that the utility a household gains from a first child is larger than the utility he 
gains from a second child.
There is a second concept of rationality prevalent in economics. This concept establishes an 
external correspondence between the choices that a person makes and the self-interest o f the 
person (Sen 1998). Rationality is identified with the possibility of justifying each human action in 
terms of self-interest. For example, when x is chosen by a given individual and y is rejected, this 
implies that the individual’s personal interests are expected by the individual to be better served by 
x than by y.
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North (1990) defines the scope of the rationality assumption:
“The behavioural assumptions that economists use do not imply that 
everybody’s behaviour is consistent with rational choice. But they do rest 
fundamentally on the assumption that competitive forces will see that those who 
behave in a rational manner will survive, and those who do not will fail.” 19
Moreover, individuals are constrained in their choice among alternative actions 
by what Pareto called the ‘obstacles’. Typically, individuals will be constrained by the 
prices at which they can buy goods (on which they have no influence in a competitive 
environment) and their income. Together prices of goods and income define each 
individual’s budget constraint.
1.1.3. Principle of Decision-making: Individual Maximization
In its strict form, economic theory considers that individual behaviour, at any 
moment in time, can be best described as the achievement of the optimal position. The 
choice among alternative outcomes results from individualistic utility (wealth) 
maximization under budget constraint.
19 What happens when there is no competition and sanction of the market as in a reproductive 
choice? Becker ignores those considerations. I am grateful to Judith Shapiro for this point.
1.2. The Economic Theory of Reproductive Behaviour 20
For the most part, the economic model of reproduction applies the standard 
behavioural assumptions of Rational Choice theory to reproductive choice. This model is 
a special version of the consumer choice theory, whereby individuals (or households) are 
assumed to solve their problems, say, in terms of choosing a family size, by choosing a 
bundle of children and goods, given the budget constraint, which maximizes utility. This 
section draws on the seminal contribution of Becker to derive the determinants of fertility 
change and a simple formalization.
1.2.1. Chanee in the Price of Children
In economic theory, all goods have a price and for Becker, children are no 
exception. The ‘bundle of children’ has a price (or cost) and any variations in this price 
relative to other commodities influence the quantity demanded of children21. I now 
examine the factors that affect the price of children.
1.2.1.1. The Quality of Children
The first factor that affects the price of children is what Becker (1981) refers to as 
the “quality of children”. The idea is that households decide not only about the number of 
children (aspect of quantity), but also about their educational goals and their placement. 
In this framework, increased spending on an individual child begins to compete with a 
higher number of children with less cost involved. Thus, the desire for children of 
‘higher quality’ may reduce the quantity demanded of children.
To illustrate this trade-off, I draw upon Becker’s explanation of fertility 
behaviour in the black American community (1981). “Blacks have invested less in 
training because rates of return on investments in education, health, and other training 
have been lower than for whites. The quantity-quality interaction implies that blacks 
would respond to poorer investment opportunities with higher fertility. As opportunities
20 This model is sometimes referred to as Chicago school model. A rival framework is the 
Pennsylvania school model that gives more emphasis to preference formation and supply factors 
(see Easterlin, Poliak and Wachter, 1980).
21 The theory does not distinguish between the acquisition of a baby and purchase of a motor car. 
Children are treated as ‘consumption goods’ (on children as investment goods, see for example, 
Cigno (1992) and Barro and Becker (1986)). This gave rise to Blake (1968)’s acerbic comment in 
an article entitled “Are babies consumer durables?”.
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for blacks have improved in recent years, they have invested more in their training and at 
the same time reduced their fertility relative to whites”.
1.2.2.2. The Opportunity Cost of Time
The second factor that affects the cost of children is the opportunity cost of time. 
To understand this factor, I return to the theory of non-market allocative decision 
developed by Becker (1965). The idea is that households decide on the allocation of their 
time. As a scarce resource, time has to be allocated between activities valued at the 
traditional money price and those that are not valued on the market but carry an 
opportunity cost. The production and rearing of children for instance are affected by both 
the traditional money price and the opportunity cost of time.
Mincer (1963) investigated empirically the notion of opportunity cost of time as a 
determinant of household behaviour. He finds that an increase in the cost of the wife’s 
time tends to reduce fertility. In particular, household will substitute away from children 
and search for alternative ways of producing children that require less of their time, 
whenever the relative prices of capital over labour, and the relative wages of men over 
women fall (Schultz 1974).
1.2.2. Change in Income
The effect of income on the fertility rate presented economists with a puzzle, 
which in turn stimulated a good deal of research22. The central puzzle can be summarized 
as follows:
• If the price is constant, then higher income groups can afford more children 
and should want more children. There is no reason to believe that children 
are ‘inferior goods’.
• De facto, higher income groups ‘buy’ fewer children than lower income 
groups. The analysis of population change shows a long-term negative 
correlation between the fertility rate and national income per capita 
(Dasgupta 1992).
To solve this puzzle, Becker investigated the reproductive behaviour of different 
income groups in the American society. He found that richer families tended to have
22 Chapter IV discusses and tests empirically the relationship between the fertility rate and income.
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fewer children than those with lower incomes. Becker explained his observation as 
follows:
1. Children are not ‘inferior’ goods. In fact, as income rises people want more 
children (the positive income effect).
2. Whenever income rises, the price of children is not held constant: increased 
parental income (especially maternal income) raises simultaneously the cost 
of children. For example, parent may want higher quality children. Thus, 
children become more expensive relative to other goods (the negative 
substitution effect).
3. The negative price effect is strong enough to outweigh the positive income 
effect.
Leibenstein (1975) proposes an alternative theory to account for the inverse 
relation between family size and income level that does not employ or lean heavily on 
these hypotheses. The central idea is that economic changes affect the social status of 
families; and that whenever individuals change their social status, their tastes change as 
well. Tastes change not only for children but simultaneously for a) goods that compete 
with children; and b) the goods and services involved in the nurture of children. This 
change in taste is such that it shifts towards a higher preference for goods as against 
children, as we go up hierarchically recognized social groupings. In other words, the 
status effect of increased income raises the desire for material goods and lowers the desire 
for children.
1.2.3. Change in Other Constraints
The economic model of reproduction assumes that individuals voluntarily control 
their fertility decisions, and that they are only constrained by budgetary factors. In 
reality, the extent to which individuals control these decisions is limited by other 
constraints as well23. I choose to examine two types of constraints: technology and a 
general equilibrium effect:
23 In this paper, I leave aside factors that influence the supply of children (except women’s age at 
first marriage in Section 2.2). For a comprehensive study on the supply factors, see Boongaarts 
and Menken (1983).
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1. The availability and cost of contraceptive techniques. Easterlin (1975) 
developed a model to show that the Western decline in actual childbearing is 
explained by the increased availability of contraception, the widespread 
adoption of birth control practices and the lower cost in fertility regulation. 
Coleman and Salt (1992) strongly criticize this explanation: “this view 
assumes that people always want fewer babies than they actually have 
(because of inefficient family planning). Hence any improvement in 
efficiency or availability of contraception will always drive down the birth 
rate. Such a simple view cannot accommodate increases in fertility at times 
when contraceptive knowledge and technique were generally increasing, as in 
the late 1930s and the post-war baby boom”. Why and how this happened 
are unresolved questions.
2. The provision of housing. The process of household formation depends on 
societal changes and in particular on the provision of housing. In countries 
where housing supply varies from place to place and over time, household 
formation is expected to vary largely (Shapiro 1998).
1.2.4. Economic Theory of Reproductive Choice: Formalization
I now formalize the economic decision of reproduction. The model embodies the 
standard behavioural assumptions of rational choice theory. It includes some of the 
determinants of fertility change that I described above (changes in the price of children 
and individual income) but ignores the other constraints. The model treats each 
household as a unit of analysis24 and children as consumption goods. The process of 
reproductive decision can be decomposed as follows:
1. Structure of Choice
The household chooses between bundles of commodities, one of which being the quantity 
of children, n. The household views children the same way as the purchase of a durable 
good. The various other commodities are aggregated into a single commodity, Z.
24 Dasgupta (1992) relaxes this assumption and allows for members of the household to have 
different motivations or ordering over allocations.
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2. Context of Choice
The household orders the alternative bundles according to its preferences. His tastes are 
reflected in the Utility Function. The utility function is then:
U = U (n, Z) (1)
His choice among alternative bundles is constrained by a budget equation: income Y is 
spent on the purchase of good Z at price 7tz and on children at a cost pn. Each family is 
constrained by a budget equation:
.n + 7tz. Z = Y (2)
The household is assumed to be rational:
“For an economic theory to be valid, one need not to assume that typical behavior 
is ‘rational’. It is sufficient that behavior at critical junctures be of a ‘rational’ 
type... In addition, it is not required that all households behave this way. If a 
reasonable proportion do, then an economic theory that depends on rationality is 
significant” (Leibenstein 1975).
3. Decision-Making Principle
The household consciously optimizes its utility function (1) under prices and income 
constraint (2). Given pn, Ttz and Y, the optimal quantities of n and Z are determined by the 
usual marginal condition:
MU„ / MUZ = pn/Kz (3)
4. Demand Functions
From the equilibrium condition (3), the demand equations for commodity Z and n can be 
derived as a function of prices and income.
= Dn ( pn, Kz ,Y)
Z = D z ( p n,7 t z, Y )  (4)
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The Slutzky equation decomposes the demand change induced by a price change. In 
particular, it decomposes the change in the demand for children Dninto two effects:
1. Substitution (or relative price) effect. It indicates how the Hicksian 
demand changes while keeping utility constant. The effect of a rise in 
the price of commodity Z, Hz, on the quantity demanded of children 
depends on the degree of substitutability between Z and n. If Z is a 
perfect complement to n, the rise of 7Cz will increase the demand for 
children—a positive substitution effect. If Z is a perfect substitute for n, 
the rise of 7Cz will increase the demand for children—a negative 
substitution effect. Becker assumes that commodity Z is a substitute 
(although imperfect) for children so that the substitution effect is always 
negative.
2. Income effect. It indicates the impact of a change in the ‘purchasing 
power’ of income on demand, while holding relative prices constant. For 
normal goods, the income effect is expected to be positive. Becker 
assumes that children are normal goods. In effect, a fall in the real 
purchasing power of income (due to a rise in the price of children) will 
normally reduce the quantity demanded for children.
To sum up, Becker assumes that the preferences are given (or the utility function is 
fixed25). Fertility changes in response to variations in relative prices and income.
25 Even if the ‘income effect’ implies a move from one indifference curve to another, preferences 
remain the same. In technical terms, the utility function is defined up to a monotonic 
transformation.
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1.3. Inter-temporal Theories of Reproductive Behaviour
Becker’s theory of reproduction behaviour is static. I now examine alternative 
models with inter-temporal dimensions.
The first attempt to introduce an inter-temporal dimension to the decision to have 
children is from the American economist and demographer, Richard Easterlin in the 
“fertility cycle hypothesis”. Easterlin suggested (1968) that population and economy are 
linked in a perpetual series of fluctuations, powered by income expectations, alternation 
of cohort size26, and autonomous cycles in the economy itself (business cycle). His model 
consists of a set of hypotheses. First, economic aspirations of cohorts of adults are fixed 
in adolescence through their experience of the household in which they were brought up. 
Second, fertility of these cohorts depends on the extent to which they can match these 
aspirations in their subsequent adult life, any shortfall in “relative income” being met with 
responses to limit fertility. Third, economic opportunities available to large and small 
cohorts of births are quite different.
For example, members of large cohorts experience fiercer competition throughout 
their lives for places in schools, university, employment, and promotion. Wage growth 
will be low and unemployment will be high. Their incomes relative to those of their 
parents will seem unsatisfactory. To preserve expected standards as far as possible, 
family size will be kept small. But their children, bom into small cohorts, will themselves 
experience comparatively favourable opportunities for promotion, recruitment and wage 
increase. Their income relative to their parents will be correspondingly higher, their 
fertility will be high, and so the cycle will continue (Coleman and Salt 1992).
The second attempt to build a more elaborate model of human behaviour is due to 
Barro and Becker (1988). They explore altruism as another facet of utility maximization, 
in which individuals get utility from the well-being of others. The welfare of all 
generations of a family depends on the consumption, fertility and number of descendants 
in all generations. Children are viewed as ‘investment goods’. The head of a family acts 
as if he maximizes an inter-temporal utility function27 subject to an inter-temporal budget
26 A cohort is a group of people with a common characteristic referenced to a fixed point in time. 
For example, all women born in 1930 or all women married for the first time in 1970 when aged 
20-24 are cohorts.
27 The inter-temporal utility function arises from parental altruism toward children, where the 
utility of parents depends on their own consumption, their fertility, and the utility of each child.
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constraint that depends on the wealth inherited by the head, the cost of rearing children
and earnings in all generations. Utility maximization implies an arbitrage condition for
• • 28 consumption over generations .
The Barro-Becker model suffers from one shortcoming: it predicts outcomes 
under well-informed agents and certainty29. For decisions which have implications for 
the future, like having children, one has to consider that informational problems and 
uncertainty can become important variables in the decision process. What is, in 
particular, the effect of uncertainty? For Barr (1998), whenever individuals are risk- 
averse, uncertainty per se entails a welfare loss. Because of uncertainty, individuals tend 
to demand less of the good than what is optimal (under certainty). I have not found 
anywhere in the economic literature a discussion of reproductive behaviour under 
uncertainty.
28 If the cost of rearing descendants is constant over time, fertility depends on interest rates 
(positively), the time-preference factor (positively), and the degree of altruism (positively).
This is a simplified interpretation of the Barro-Becker model. In fact, the model assumes that 
households have a forward-looking (Rational Expectations) behaviour. Chapter V will show that 
this assumption is unsatisfactory in a context of broad uncertainty.
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1.4. Collective Choice and Reproductive Behaviour
The model of reproductive behaviour discussed at this point considers the action 
of isolated individuals. One question that arises is whether individual reproductive 
decisions are socially optimal or yield Pareto-efficient outcomes. Kingsley Davis (1967) 
replies in the negative. “There is no reason to expect that the millions of decisions about 
family size made by couples in their own interest will automatically control population 
for the benefit of society”. There may be circumstances in which the desired fertility of 
individual couples is socially non-optimal, or there is a difference between the social and 
individual valuation of the costs and benefits of a birth.
There are two broad reasons for a possible dissonance between household and 
societal levels of reproduction: the ubiquitous phenomenon of externalities, and ‘wrong’ 
relative prices of goods and services. I briefly review each explanation.
1. The 1984 World Development Report states that “one reason (individual and 
social gains) differ is the existence of externalities” (World Bank 1984). 
Externalities are the costs and benefits of children that are passed on by 
parents to society30. They include, for instance, the public costs of education, 
health, and pensions, cost sharing for public goods and social infrastructure. 
There are many sources of externalities, but their sign is generally uncertain 
(Lee and Miller 1991).
2. For the sake of completeness, the other source of discrepancy is ‘wrong’ 
relative prices of goods and services because of market imperfections. 
Children are assumed to have a ‘market price’. Yet, this price can be 
incorrect if the market for children is not perfectly competitive (Lee and 
Miller 1991).
30 Nerlove, Razin and Sadka (1987) formally discuss the problem of externalities. Their line of 
argument goes as follows: each couple chooses some level of fertility that maximizes its 
satisfaction, given its preferences and constraints. The key question is whether the couples could 
do better if they reach a collective decision about fertility rather than choosing their fertility 
individually. Put differently, could a social planner with coercive powers over fertility, and acting 
solely in the interests of the couples as a group, increase their satisfaction over the level they could 
attain choosing their fertility individually under a policy of laissez-faire in reproduction? If so, 
then there is a difference between the implicit net cost of a child as perceived by the parents and as 
recognized on their behalf by the planner. The difference between these perceived costs equals the 
external costs of a child.
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2. The Sociological Model of Reproductive Behaviour
The present section compares the prevailing sociological paradigm with the 
economic paradigm. It then examines some sociological theories of reproductive choice.
2.1. Sociological and Economic Paradigms: A Comparison
Economists considerably value the contribution of sociology in the field of 
reproductive choice: sociologists may adopt different methods from those which 
economists are used to, but most of their concepts, such as ‘choice’ in human action and 
‘rationality’, are very similar. For example, sociologists admit that human conduct can be 
directed at the achievement of an aim—in a sense, the “purpose-rational individual 
behaviour” of Weber is close to the utility-maximizer individual behaviour of economists. 
Sociologists recognize, however, that human action is not only purpose-rational. 
Typically, in Max Weber’s terms, human action will also be “traditional, affective, and 
value-rational”( Weber 1922).
This section presents a systematic comparison of the prevailing sociological and 
economic paradigms. In some respects, it can be argued that there is no essential 
contradiction between paradigms, but only a difference in emphasis31. The comparison 
articulates around three central questions, previously used to describe the economic 
paradigm: what is the object of choice? What structures this choice? What principle leads 
to this choice?
2.1.1. The Context of Choice
The sociological paradigm focuses on the ‘social’ as opposed to the ‘individual’ 
dimension of reproductive behaviour. In this framework, society determines the desirable 
number of children, or the ‘ideal family size’32.
Opinion surveys help to determine what most people regard as ‘ideal’. A typical 
question of an opinion survey is: “What do you think is the ideal family size?”. In Britain,
31 It can be argued that economics studies ‘choice’ while sociology explains why there is no 
choice. I am grateful to Norbert Wunner for this point.
32 The central assumption of the sociological paradigm is as follows: when many members of a 
society face a recurrent common problem with important social consequences they tend to develop 
a normative solution to it. This solution, a set of rules of behaviour in a particular situation, 
becomes part of the culture, and the society indoctrinates its members to conform more or less 
closely to the norms by implicit rewards and punishments.
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for instance, two or three children remain the ideal of 80 percent; only six percent think 
one or none is ideal (Coleman and Salt 1992). Successive opinion surveys help to 
determine how preferences change over time. In Britain, most people regard a family size 
of two children as ideal but this preference seems to have grown stronger over the years 
(Coleman and Salt 1992).
Sociologists also developed a more realistic measure of family size: the 
‘expected family size’. This concept embodies a family’s target as a result of realistic 
thinking, in view of a set of economic and political conditions. In Britain, for instance, 
women bom before World War II expected high family size--2.5 children, while women 
bom after the War expected only 2.27 children (Coleman and Salt 1992).
Technically, there is no reason to believe that expectations are not matched by 
performances. Thus, the sociological concept of ‘expected family size’ is close to the 
economists’ concept of ‘actual family size’. Both family size numbers would be identical 
in a ‘perfect contraceptive population’: the widespread and systematic use of 
contraception would ensure that the desired family size is actually realized in achieved 
family size, and that there is not any unwanted pregnancies. In reality, Western European 
populations are not close to efficient contraception.
In contrast, the Russian population is quite close to a perfect contraceptive 
population. The equality between desired and achieved family size does, however, not 
result from the widespread use of contraception which remains relatively rare, but from 
the massive use of abortions. The figures in 1992 show that each woman had on average 
2.6 abortions in her childbearing life. This is one of the highest abortion rates in the 
world (INED 1996).
2.1.2. The Structure of Choice
Sociologists are interested in a different set of questions than economists. 
Contrary to economists’ beliefs, sociologists probably tackle the hardest questions. 
Sociologists are primarily interested in finding out how tastes (or preferences) are formed. 
The central object of their investigation is therefore the process of formation of attitudes 
(or tastes). In contrast, economists assume that tastes are fixed.
I now illustrate both approaches in the context of racial discrimination analysis. 
A sociologist will be primarily interested in rinding out why there is a preference for
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discrimination and how ‘tastes’ towards racial discrimination are formed. In contrast, an 
economist will assume that tastes for racial discrimination are fixed. Individuals act as if 
they had “tastes for discrimination” (Becker 1971). In his Nobel Prize lecture, Becker 
(1996) concludes on the costs of indulging those tastes. “When the majority is very large 
compared to the minority—in the United States whites are nine times as numerous as 
blacks and have much more human and physical capital per capita than blacks—market 
discrimination by the majority hardly lowers its incomes...Discrimination is (therefore) 
effective. However, when minority members are a sizable fraction of the total, 
discrimination by members of the majority injures them as well... Its sizable cost to 
whites helps explain why apartheid...(was) never fully effective and eventually broke 
down”.
In the sociological paradigm, tastes are shaped through ‘norms and values’. Each 
individual has to make a choice (consciously or unconsciously) under the influence of 
norms that he would have internalized during the process of socialization. These norms 
shape the ‘ideal’ behaviour.
If the analysis of the sociological paradigm has been hitherto straightforward, the 
remaining part becomes quite opaque. I now attempt to explain some of the problems 
encountered in the sociological paradigm.
The first problem concerns the direction of causality. In some sociological 
studies, ‘norms’ are the object of study and the (‘ideal’) fertility behaviour is taken as 
given. In other studies, fertility behaviour is the object of study and ‘norms and values’ 
are taken as given. These studies led to multi-directional causal relationships. As a 
result, theories that underlie those relationships cannot generate unambiguous testable 
hypotheses regarding the specific causes of fertility change.
The second problem concerns the explanatory variables. In the sociological 
paradigm, ‘norms and values’ are only ‘intermediate’ explanatory variables; there are 
‘ultimate’ explanatory variables as well. This distinction forms the weakest part of the 
paradigm.
As an illustration, let me look at theories that lie at the border of economics and 
sociology. These theories argue that ‘norms and values’ are ultimately shaped by the 
underlying economic and social conditions. For instance, the expectations of economic 
prosperity and social advancement are expected to contribute to the development of larger
54
family size ideals and positive opinions on a larger number of children. Thus, social and 
economic conditions shape the ‘norms and values’, that in turn define the ‘ideal family 
size’. This implies that fertility changes are determined by changes in social and 
economic conditions.
Social and Economic Conditions —> Norms and Values —> Ideal Family Size 
This framework leaves at least three fundamental questions open33:
1. If ‘ideals’ are influenced by social and economic conditions, what 
determines the ‘expected family size’ -  the family’s target as a result of a 
realistic thinking in the face of given conditions? Do socio-economic 
conditions simultaneously determine ‘ideal’ and ‘expected’ family sizes? 
If this is the case, what is the difference between those concepts?
2. What happens when economic and social conditions change more rapidly 
than norms and values, as it is often the case? What are the consequences 
of this ‘mismatch’?
3. Why are similar socio-economic conditions producing a different ‘norms 
and values’ system?
2.1.3. Decision-making Principle: Satisfaction
The economic paradigm assumes that people make decisions either by going 
through a maximization calculation or by doing things which result in the maximization 
of utility, profit or some other maximands (Leibenstein 1981). Economics does not 
indicate what procedure individuals go through in order to arrive at a decision. Rather, it 
tells us something about the essential nature of the decision after that fact.
In contrast, sociology specifies some the basic characteristics of the decision­
making procedures by the decision unit. This may still be a fairly abstract theory: it will 
not specify all the details of the actual decision making, nor will it capture the full variety 
of decision procedures actually used by households when they consider whether or not to
33 For one discussant of the paper, these questions do not invalidate but strengthen the sociological 
paradigm.
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have a child. But it will be concerned with a decision process rather than an approach 
that argues that whatever is done is the result of maximization.
The dynamics of social behaviour is described as a process that leads either to an 
optimum or to a weaker form, satisfaction.
2.2. ‘Institutional’ Theories of Reproductive Behaviour: An Application of the 
Sociological Paradigm
In this part, I choose to examine theories that attribute a primary role to 
institutions in the process of formation of ‘norms’ and ‘ideal family size’. I begin with 
the contribution of Judith Blake, prominent sociologist in the field of family formation. I 
then briefly conclude with recent avenues of investigation.
In the sociological theory of Blake (1994), “(the) individual is said to be under 
constraint and suffer coercion, in any society, regarding reproduction”. What are those 
constraints? These constraints correspond to what I referred to above as the ‘cost and 
utility functions’ in economics. In the economic theory of reproductive behaviour, 
fertility is calculated given the relative prices/costs of children and given the utility of 
children. In contrast, sociologists will relax the fixity of these functions and investigate 
their process of formation34.
‘Institutional’ theories claim that the individual costs and utility functions are set 
by the institutional structure of every society—the institutional structure of a society is 
made up of formal rules (laws and regulations) and informal rules and norms of the 
broader society (World Bank 1997). “The institutional structure of every society defines 
and controls what it is that individual couples ‘get out’ of having children—the rewards 
or utilities for having a family, and how much couples must sacrifice to have them—the 
costs” (Blake 1994).
Given these constraints, individuals will adjust their reproductive behaviour. 
Blake (1994) summarizes the argument: “(Reproductive behaviour) reflects a balancing 
of the various utilities parents derive from having children and costs they bear in rearing 
them... People make their ‘voluntary’ reproductive choices in an institutional context that
34 For a comprehensive survey on the costs and utilities of children, see Blake (1994)
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severely constrains them not to choose non-marriage, not to choose childlessness, not to 
choose only one child, and even not to limit themselves solely to two children”.
Finally, I conclude with two avenues of investigation:
• Change in the Social Institution of Gender. Social forces move the 
fertility goals of women relative to men in the opposite direction 
(Dasgupta 1992). In poor societies marked by gender-based asymmetry 
in employment opportunities and power, women’s reproductive goals 
differ noticeably from those of men. As women are becoming 
increasingly (economically) independent from male family members, 
their desires for children, as well as their age of marriage, the costs of 
children and the use of contraception tend to change. Although this 
theory has hitherto found little empirical support, gender inequality 
seems likely to have some influence on fertility (Oppenheim 1989).
• Change in the Social Institution of Age of Marriage. The age of marriage 
is embedded in the social structure of a society and affects fertility 
(Benedict 1972). Revelle (1968) argues that late marriage does appear to 
reduce fertility. “In Western Europe, until quite recent times, the age of 
marriage of women was high and many men and women never married. 
This had a marked effect on lowering fertility”. However, he also notes 
that “in most other societies, the age of marriage does not seem to be 
significant in affecting fertility”.
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3. The ‘Classical’ Demographic Model of Fertility
"It is necessary to be absolutely modem" 
Arthur Rimbaud
This section examines the model of a sub-group of demographers, the proponents 
of the deterministic model of fertility change. I refer to them as ‘classical’ demographers 
to distinguish them from ‘modem’ demographers that subscribe to socio-demographic 
theories of fertility change. The focus on ‘classical’ demography reveals quite sharply the 
differences between the demographic and economic conceptions of reproductive 
behaviour. I begin with such a comparison and then expose the deterministic theory of 
fertility.
3.1. Demographic and Economic Paradigms: A Comparison
If economists believe that sociologists make a point in the field of reproductive 
behaviour, they look at demographers with mixed feelings. For Kirk (1996), economists 
reached the conclusions that “demography is too important to be left to demographers”.
“Demography evaluates and initially digests the vast reservoirs of social data 
complied in censuses and vital statistics...Demographers, more than most social 
scientists, are interested in having their basic data as close to accuracy as 
possible. It is a question of minimizing errors, and, unlike many social 
scientists, they know that no measurements are ever exact” (Caldwell 1996)35.
Despite, or perhaps because of their care to improve their data, demographers’ main 
failing is that they do not have a theory on demographic change36. Kirk (1996) 
summarizes the argument: “demography is a science short on theory, but rich in 
quantification”.
3.1.1. Demographic Paradiem: Hypotheses
The demographic paradigm rests on three hypotheses:
35 Caldwell (1996) describes demographers as “inheritors of nineteenth-century positivism”— 
“positivism...emphasizes the factual position against the speculative, the useful against the idle, 
the certain against the indecisive, the precise against the vague, the positive as against the negative 
or critical”.
36 The ethymology of the word demography (from the ancient Greek demos (society) and grapho 
(describe)) confirms the preeminence of the descriptive approach.
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1. Existence of a population equilibrium. Each society converges towards a 
state of equilibrium. As I will show below, the state of equilibrium in 
modem societies is characterized by a low level of fertility and mortality. In 
reality, demographers do not know whether this state of equilibrium ever 
existed. They only assume that if they proceed in terms of a long enough 
period of time, they will be able to observe it37.
2. Uniqueness of the equilibrium. Demography postulates that all societies 
converge towards a unique state of equilibrium.
3. Predestination in Human behaviour. The mechanism that drives each society 
towards its equilibrium is beyond its control. Population, and in particular 
fertility behaviour is pre-determined. The idea of pre-determination is close 
to the concept of complete determinism in exact sciences. It means that there 
exist exact and necessary (or ‘natural’) laws of causation—this is contrasted 
with ‘reasonable expectations’ in economics for example.
For example, demography defines concepts close to the natural laws in exact 
sciences, such as “natural fertility”38. This determinism also transpires in 
Historical Demography. In this domain, human History is confined to a 
scaled general model where all societies are placed into a rank-ordered 
typology in terms of observable economic and demographic characteristics. 
As Kirk (1944) had put it: “In regard to demographic matters the different 
countries of the world may be considered as on a single continuum of 
development.”
3.1.2. Demographic and Economic Paradigms: Comparison of Hypotheses
I now compare the hypotheses underlying the demographic paradigm, with those 
underlying the economic paradigm:
37 Strictly speaking demography does not claim the existence of an equilibrium but only of a trend 
toward such an equilibrium. Along that trend, most proximate causes for population changes are 
assumed constant. This assumption is a necessary condition for the permanent existence of a 
population system. I explore this point in Chapter HI.
This is the ‘equilibrium’ level of fertility and its value is assumed to be at or above the 
replacement level.
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1. The economic paradigm embodies the concept of ‘equilibrium’, but not 
exclusively: economic theory allows for no-equilibrium situations to arise. 
For example, in adverse selection problems, cases may arise where profitable 
deviations always exist and the system never settles down (Mas-Colell et al. 
1995).
2. Economics can derive a ‘unique’ equilibrium: it can derive ‘multiple 
equilibria’ as well. For example, multiple equilibria are often encountered in 
game theory—an area in economics that studies the strategic behaviour of 
individuals (Mas-Colell et al. 1995)39.
3. Most importantly, economic theory responds to the idea of ‘voluntarism’ on 
behalf of individuals. Economics assumes that individuals have full control 
over their environment and do not respond to total predestination.
3.1.3. Demographic Paradigm: Further Characterization
This being said, I can apply the typology used above to characterize precisely the 
demographic paradigm: what is the object of choice? What structures this choice? What 
principle leads to this choice? It is understood from the discussion above that the term 
‘choice’ is taken loosely here.
3.1.3.1. The Context of ‘Choice’
Fertility behaviour responds to superior laws of Nature. There is no decision to 
make either by individuals, or by society. In Chapter HI, I will argue that, although 
individuals do not decide the number of children, they can decide the timing of births.
3.1.3.2. The Structure o f ‘Choice*
Constraints to the formation of ‘ideals’ are the weakest part of the demographic 
paradigm. Demography assumes the existence of superior laws of Nature, but fails to give 
insight into the origin of these laws. For economists, this failure invalidates the 
contribution of demography as a theoretical discipline.
39 Game theory uses various tools (called “refinements”) to narrow down the number of 
‘reasonable’ equilibria (Hirshleifer and Riley 1992). The multiplicity of equilibria undermines the 
predictive power of these theories (Kreps and Wilson 1982). I am grateful to Norbert Wunner for 
this point.
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3.1.3.3. The Decision-making Principle: The Darwinian Selection Process
The final outcome results from two inextricably linked processes: first, the 
struggle for existence—a principle similar to the competition mechanism that results from 
optimization in the economic paradigm40. Second, the natural selection process—the 
dynamics of the struggle for life leads to a single end result, where only the fittest survive. 
This Darwinian conception of human action ensures pre-destination in human 
behaviour41.
3.1.4. Demographic and Economic Paradigms: Object of Study
Now that I have completed the description of the demographic paradigm, I can 
contrast the object of study of each: the economic and demographic paradigms. The 
argument that I briefly outline here will be discussed in details in following chapters.
• Demography is primarily interested in long-term trends, and not in short-term 
fluctuations in demographic variables. For example, fertility inquiries are 
dominated by the following questions: what is the average level of fertility to 
which post-industrial societies are tending? Is a two-child average here to 
stay? Might the current TFR of 1.8, or even less, become the norm? Or even 
no children at all (Coleman and Salt 1992). The emphasis on long-term 
issues, and neglect of short-term fluctuations turned out to be a serious 
impediment to the understanding of large fluctuations in Western fertility in 
the last half-century42.
• In contrast, economics makes relatively few assumptions about long-term 
equilibrium relationships; economics is primarily concerned with short-term 
fluctuations.
To conclude, the demographic paradigm does not simply differ from the 
economic paradigm in its approach to study reproductive choice; it makes up for an 
entirely distinct paradigm.
40 An essential difference with the prevailing economic paradigm is that demography excludes 
cooperative solution as possible optimal outcome.
41 It could however be argued that economic theory (with its concept of competition) subscribes to 
a similar conception of human behaviour.
42 Demography also failed to predict most large fertility changes of this century, notably after the 
second World War.
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3.2. The Adaptation Hypothesis: An Application of the Demographic Paradigm
The original demographic model of Notenstein (1945)43 predicts that each society 
will experience an ‘adaptation’ towards a given equilibrium fertility level. This is often 
referred as the ‘Demographic Transition Hypothesis’.
The model remains vague on what exactly this equilibrium level is. The model 
only says that the equilibrium fertility level will be ‘low and unique’. In reality, the 
equilibrium fertility level was never observed in actual data. All that can be observed is a 
long-term trend towards an equilibrium. I will return to this point in Chapter IE.
In the process of ‘adaptation’ towards the equilibrium fertility level, the total 
fertility rate is expected to fall from its initial ‘high’ level towards a ‘low’ level.
For demographers, the decline in the total fertility rate is viewed as a positive 
long-term indicator of development:
1. It features only ‘modem’ societies.
“fertility would only fall as a result of the cumulative mutually reinforcing 
spectrum of effects consequent on full-scale industrialization and 
modernization; enhanced survival; a growing culture of individualism; rising 
consumer aspirations; emergence of huge and socially mobile urban 
populations; loss of various functions of the family to the factory and the 
school” (Szreter 1993).
2. It reflects ‘increased rationality’ on behalf of individuals who make fertility 
decisions. Because individuals live in a modem society, they become ‘more 
intelligent’ and capable of making ‘rational decisions’ (Caldwell 1982). In 
contrast, in traditional societies, agents make ‘irrational choices’, high- 
fertility being one of them44.
43 The ‘modernized’ version of the demographic transition theory abandoned the more rigorous, 
unidirectional specification of causal relationships posited in Notenstein’s original version.
44 One can easily infer how this view affected the policy debate on fertility control in developing 
countries, for instance.
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3. It is associated with the prospect of ‘Westernization’ and adoption of the 
Western system of values and attitudes. Western social ends—liberalism and 
democracy, are considered as desirable for each society. Szretzer (1993) 
summarizes the argument:
“...the institution of liberal and democratic groundrules in the economic as in 
the political realm (is)..., in these societies, the necessary precondition for 
entering the evolutionary path of (demographic) transition”.
Once embarked on the process of ‘adaptation’ towards a modem, rational, and 
Western fertility level, each society undergoes an irreversible and permanent decline in 
fertility. This implies, for example, that British society will never return to the average 6  
children per family, the fertility standards (or ‘ideal family size’) in the 1870s.
Although attractive by its simplicity, the adaptation (also referred to as 
modernization) hypothesis is frequently in dispute with factual evidence. For example, in 
France, fertility decline within marriage began a century earlier, in the 1780s, without 
industrialization. In Scandinavia, fertility decline started just a few decades after Britain, 
although it remained dependent on agriculture, fishing, forestry, and other primary 
productions (Coleman and Salt 1992).
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Table 2.1.
A Summary of Theories of Reproductive Behaviour
Economic Theory Sociological Theory 'Classical' Demographic Theory
Key Assumptions
1. Context of Choice - individual and conscious decision -
- actual family size
social and individual decision 
ideal and expected family size
- no decision (Laws of Nature)
- ideal family size
2. Structure of Choice - Preferences (Utility Function)
- Prices and Income
- Perfect Rationality
Norms and Values - biology
_ 'modernization', 'Westernization' and 
'rationality'
3. Decision-Making Principle - Optimization Satisfaction - Darwinian selection process
Limitations
- no predictive power
- not falsifiable
- uncertainty?
not falsifiable (circularity) - no explanatory power
Strengths
- formalization
- potential for empirical testing
individual/social complexity - unambiguous predictions
- description of long-term demographic 
changes ( 'Demographic Transition 
Hypothesis')
Policy Implications
- sharp fertility decline = negative
- effectiveness of pro-natalist
- fertility decline = positive 
Sharp variation/TFR below 
replacement level = negative
- ineffectiveness of pro-natalist policy.
Conclusions
This chapter explored the most significant contributions to the question of 
reproductive choice. The field emerges as a collection of quite distinct, often 
contradictory approaches. The gap between disciplines became so wide that it makes any 
attempt to relate them extremely difficult. Yet, one of my earliest findings has been that 
the absence of such a broad approach is handicapping progress in understanding 
development in the field. In using an interdisciplinary approach, I clarified the reasons 
for this disagreement.
I compared the three approaches to the topic, i.e. economic, sociological, and 
demographic, in using three questions: what is the object of the choice? What constraints 
the choice? What principle leads to this choice? In each case, I established the limitations 
and strengths. In this part, because of its importance for what follows, I confine myself to 
highlight the essential differences between the prevailing economic and demographic 
paradigms (table 2 .1 ) and show that they make up for a fundamentally distinct conception 
of reproductive behaviour:
• For economists, reproductive choice results from an individual and 
voluntarist decision-making process. In contrast, for demographers, it is 
constrained by superior laws of Nature and the Darwinian selection principle. 
Thus, there is little room for individual choice.
• For economists, reproductive behaviour results from a process of 
optimization. As such, households will always ‘rationally’ choose the 
optimal number of children. For demographers, fertility decisions are not 
always rational. Typically, in primitive societies, households can make 
‘irrational’ choices, high-fertility being one of them. Rational fertility 
decisions are only possible in a modem (Western) society.
• For economists, reproductive choices can change in response to variations in 
both relative prices (cost) of children and income. For demographers, the 
cause for fertility change lies in a deeply rooted process of ‘adaptation’ of 
society towards the equilibrium fertility level. In this framework, the decline 
in fertility is viewed as a positive indicator of development; it indicates that 
‘adaptation’ is underway.
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• In spite of its potential as an elegant theory, the economic theory of 
reproductive behaviour fails to produce definite predictions, particularly on 
the effect of income changes on fertility. In contrast, demographic theory 
generates unambiguous predictions; it predicts that there is an irreversible 
decline in fertility over time.
• The economic theory of reproductive behaviour cannot be falsified and fails 
to account satisfactorily for uncertainty. The demographic theory was never 
validated empirically. The theory fails to explain the causes for ‘adaptation’. 
For economists, this failure invalidates the contribution of demography as a 
theoretical discipline.
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III. The Effect of Shifts in Values and Timing of Births on Fertility: 
Evidence from Russian Time-Series Fertility Data
"Science is built up of facts, as a house is built up of stones; but an accumulation of facts
is no more a science than a heap of stones is a house"
Henri Poincare
Introduction
There is no single grand demographic explanation on the rapid fertility decline in 
transition Europe. There are only fragmented pieces of explanations that emphasize the 
role of adaptation towards Western fertility levels. The purpose of this chapter is twofold: 
first, to develop a demographic hypothesis on the rapid fertility decline in Russia, and 
second, to test it on Russian fertility data.
The demographic hypothesis states that the fertility crisis45 in Russia results from 
two inter-linked processes: first, the gradual adoption of the Western system of values and 
attitudes. This system promotes a greater individualism and a lesser desire for large 
family size. The effect of Transition was exactly similar to a large social shock: it 
accelerated the adaptation towards the Western system of values and attitudes towards 
reproduction (the catching-up effect).
Second, the historical lagged-effect of pro-natalist policies in the past. The 
lagged-effect refers to the births that were brought forward in the 1980s as a result of the 
pro-natalist policies, but eventually returned to their ‘normal’ level in the 1990s. For 
example, in Russia, the government introduced pro-natalist policies in the mid-1980s. 
The immediate effect of those policies was to reduce the interval between successive 
births. After the removal of policy-induced additional births, the fertility rate returned to 
its ‘normal’ level—this is shown in the current fertility decline.
The outcome of this chapter is threefold: first, a consistent demographic 
hypothesis of the rapid fertility decline in transition Europe is derived. Second, the 
importance of attitudinal changes in the fertility decline is tested empirically. Finally, this 
simple explanation is enriched by adding a second explanatory variable: the shift in the 
timing of births. Shifts in attitudes (or values) and timing of births constitute what I shall 
refer to as the demographic hypothesis.
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To test this hypothesis, I make use of Russian time-series data46 from the Institut 
National d ’Etudes Demographiques and Goskomstat. The data set consists of the annual 
total fertility rate (TFR) and age-adjusted fertility rates time-series (1960-95)47. All data 
are expressed in natural logarithms.
The scheme of the chapter is as follows: section 1 develops a demographic 
hypothesis of the rapid fertility decline in Russia. Section 2 introduces structural break 
analysis and shows evidence of attitudinal changes towards reproduction in Russia. 
Section 3 tests the demographic hypothesis.
45 In this context, the term ‘fertility crisis’ is appropriate. As argued in Chapter I, demographers 
use the term ‘crisis’ whenever there is a sharp variation over time in the total fertility rate.
46 This chapter uses the Total Fertility Rate (TFR), rather than the completed fertility, as a measure 
of the actual family size. The reason is that the construction of the true indicator of fertility would 
require information that will not be available for decades. This issue is explored in appendix 1.2.
47 Russia started to develop a universal birth registration system in 1959.
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1. A Demographic Hypothesis of the Fertility Decline48
There is no grand demographic theory on the rapid fertility decline in transition 
Europe. There are only fragmented pieces of explanations that emphasize the role of 
‘adaptation’ towards Western fertility levels. This section develops a demographic 
hypothesis of the ‘fertility crisis’ in Russia. It extends the analysis of the ‘classical’ 
demographic paradigm presented in Chapter II and makes use of two central ideas in 
demography: adaptation and shifts in the timing of births.
This section first reminds the reader of the meaning of those concepts. It then 
exposes how those concepts can be used to explain the rapid fertility decline in transition 
Europe. Finally, it derives its implications for testing.
1.1. The Demographic Concepts of ‘Adaptation’ and ‘Shifts in the Timing of Births’
Demography evolves around two central concepts49: first, the ‘adaptation 
hypothesis’. It states that each society progresses from the traditional ‘state of population 
equilibrium’ towards the modem ‘state of population equilibrium’. Second, shifts in the 
timing of births. It states that households can decide the timing of births. They can shift 
(bring forward or postpone) the birth of a child in response to a change in the 
environment in which they live.
The concept of ‘adaptation’ (towards a population equilibrium) encompasses a 
large number of ideas. Based on the discussion in Chapter n, I now remind the reader of 
the essential features of the hypothesis. I focus on its implications for fertility (TFR).
1. Theoretically, there is an equilibrium fertility level. In reality, this 
equilibrium was never observed: actual data only reflects the long-term trend 
towards that equilibrium50. Along that trend, proximate causes for fertility 
changes are assumed to be constant.
48 This chapter focuses on the ‘classical’ demographic paradigm for it delivers a relatively simple 
hypothesis to test. It ignores the ‘modern’ paradigm that adds to the simple demographic model, 
sociological and economic factors.
49 This part offers a systematic and formal interpretation of the two concepts that emerges from the 
extended reading of demographic articles on fertility.
50 The long-term fertility trend is used to proxy the ‘fertility standard’, ‘ideal family size’ or 
‘normal’ TFR.
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2. There are technically two states o f equilibrium. One that is prevalent in 
‘traditional societies’ and the other in ‘modem societies’. The adaptation 
hypothesis gives the level of fertility corresponding to each society. In 
traditional society, the equilibrium fertility level is ‘high’, while in modem 
societies the equilibrium fertility level is ‘low’. Thus, a low fertility level is 
an inherent feature of a modem society.
3. Evolution implies a shift away from tradition towards modernity. In 
particular, it triggers a shift away from a high fertility level towards a low 
fertility level. Thus, adaptation towards modernity implies a decline in 
fertility. Fertility decline is a long-term positive indicator of development for 
a society.
I now further characterize 
the process of adaptation (Figure 
3.1). First, the dynamics of 
fertility over time, i.e. the move 
from the traditional fertility level 
(A) to the modem fertility level (B) 
defines the ‘fertility path’.
Empirically, this path corresponds to the long-term fertility trend. Second, the dynamics 
of fertility over time is uni-directional. There is only one way for a society to move over 
time: it is by going from A to B. Alternative fertility paths such as from A to C (with a 
rising fertility level), followed by C to B (with a declining fertility) are excluded.
Third, the decline in fertility over time, i.e. the move from A to B, is irreversible. 
Each society necessarily goes from A to B. The fertility rate of a modem society (B) will 
for instance, never revert to A. The direction for the course of fertility history is set and 
fixed forever51.
51 As argued in chapter II, the pre-deterministic nature of the process is consistent with the 
Darwinian conception of human behaviour that characterizes the ‘classical’ demographic 
paradigm.
Figure 3.1: The Fertility Rate over Time
Fertility A
Time
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Finally, although demography remains elusive on this aspect, the process of 
adaptation can, in some circumstances, be accelerated—the so-called catching-up effect. 
For example, a large social shock to a population can hasten the speed of convergence 
towards the equilibrium level. In that case, the catching-up effect will be shown in the 
accelerated decline in fertility.
The interesting question concerns the mechanisms through which ‘adaptation’ 
takes place. Demography assumes that ‘adaptation’ goes through the adoption of a new 
system of values and attitudes52. This system promotes a greater individualism, increased 
awareness of the opportunity cost of time, and a lesser desire for larger family size.
In the adaptation process, individuals have little choice. In fact, ‘classical’ 
demography assumes that individuals do not really choose the number of children: society 
and the laws of Nature set for individuals the fertility standard (ideal family size).
Individuals (or households) can only choose the timing of the births (or interval 
between successive births). This means that they can shift (bring forward or postpone) 
the births in response to changes in the environment in which they live. For example, 
they can decide to reduce the interval between successive births of planned children when 
large maternity benefits are introduced.
In anticipation of section 1.3,1 argue that the concepts of adaptation and shift in 
the timing of births are closely connected to one another. On the one hand, adaptation 
implies the existence of a long-term fertility trend. By nature, the ‘fertility trend” is stable 
over time. On the other hand, the actual TFR can fluctuate a lot if individuals often shift 
the timing of births. In this case, the actual fertility level can rise above the fertility trend 
or fall below it. Yet, in the long term, it will revert to the fertility trend. I will return to 
these ideas below.
52 As shown in chapter II, the concept of ‘values and attitudes’ can be related to the concept of 
‘tastes’ (and utility) in economics.
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1.2. A Demographic Hypothesis on the Fertility Decline in Russia
I now apply the concepts of adaptation towards Western fertility standards and 
shifts in the timing of births to the Russian case.
1.2.1. The Catching-up Effect
In the early 20th century, traditional family patterns prevailed in Russia. Typically, 
women were getting married between the ages of 15 and 18 and expected a first child 
soon after. Women would generally have 3 to 4 children in the course of their life. The 
average rural family comprised 5.6 persons; early and almost universal marriages 
prevailed (INED 1996).
Throughout the post-war period, and especially in the 1970s and 1980s, 
significant changes in the family behaviour led some Russian demographers to argue that 
Russia was undergoing an ‘adaptation’ towards Western fertility standards. For 
Vishnevsky (1996a), “the postwar decades became a period of increased convergence in 
the evolution of the family and demographic behaviour across Russia and the West 
(particularly the United States). This is confirmed by the various indicators of family size 
and composition, family cycle, nuptiality, divorces, fertility, living arrangements, etc...”. 
For example, the share of the two-member families rose, whereas the proportion families 
with five or more members steadily increased (INED 1996)53.
What has been the impact of transition on family patterns? I will assume the 
following: prior to transition, Russia was isolated from the West. Transition coincided 
with the opening of the East to the West. This in turn led to the rapid replacement of the 
Eastern system of values and attitudes by the Western system of values and attitudes.
What this Western system of values and attitudes represents is far from obvious. 
In general, Western values encompass rising emphasis on individualism, privatization of 
formerly community interest and ownership, and the spread of consumerism as the basis 
of individual ambition (Hall and White 1995). Western attitudes towards family 
formation encompass a lesser desire for large family. For the Council of Europe (1993), 
“individualistic Western values involve the rejection of conventional social norms, greater
53 At the same time, the postwar decades were marked by the preservation of numerous traditional 
features. These include, for example, the maintenance of traditionally early and almost universal
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personal and sexual freedom and higher valuation of the opportunity cost of the 
consumption foregone due to the birth of a child”. To sum up, Western attitudes towards 
reproduction mean fewer children.
Transition was similar to a large social shock on the population. In particular, it 
accelerated the adaptation process towards Western fertility levels. In the absence of 
transition, the fertility level would have slowly declined over time. Transition accelerated 
the decline in fertility.
1.2.2. The Lagged-Effect
Even if I assume that there was a large social shock to the population, the 
attitudes towards reproduction cannot have radically changed overnight. I need an 
additional factor to account for the sharpness of the decline. I find this factor in the 
history of the country.
In the 1980s, the Russian government introduced pro-natalist policies. For 
Zakharov and Ivanova (1996b), the immediate effect of these policies was to reduce the 
interval between successive births, while leaving attitudes towards reproduction 
unchanged. Specifically, households wanted the same number of children as before these 
policies were introduced. Households simply brought forward the births of children they 
had planned to have. For example, in the absence of pro-natalist policies, they would have 
had two children, one in 1985 and the other in 1990. Under pro-natalist policies, they had 
one child in 1985 and the other immediately after.
In this vein, looking at the actual TFR can give a very misleading picture of 
reproductive decisions. If the TFR rose in the mid-1980s, it does not necessarily mean 
that households decided to have more children. In fact, they may not have changed their 
attitudes towards reproduction; they may simply have brought forward the births of their 
planned children. Also, the current fall in the TFR does not necessarily mean that 
households decided to have fewer children. This may simply reflect the removal of 
policy-induced additional births and a return to the ‘normal’ level of fertility. I refer to 
the latter as the lagged-effect of pro-natalist policies.
marriages, relatively early fertility, and the predominance of abortion as a main method of family 
planning (INED 1996).
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1.3. Implications for Empirical Testing
The challenge of this chapter is to translate theoretical ideas into statistical 
concepts that can be applied to actual data. To establish such a link, it is necessary to 
make a number of assumptions. In this part, I explore how I intend to detect empirically 
shifts in values and timing of births.
1.3.1. Shift in Values and Structural Break in the Fertility Trend
The total fertility rate follows a long-term trend. Along that trend, the proximate 
causes for fertility changes are assumed constant. I will assume that the fertility trend can 
be used to proxy for the attitudes towards reproduction54.
If the fertility trend reflects the attitudes towards reproduction, and those attitudes 
are expected to have suddenly changed in the process of accelerated adaptation, I should 
observe at a particular point in time the rise of a new fertility trend. Thus, the study of the 
fertility trend over time can give insight into a possible change in attitudes.
In econometrics, structural break analysis helps to detect changes in the 
behaviour of a long-term trend. For our purpose, this technique is useful to find out 
whether fertility data is consistent with the declining fertility trend of the 1980s or a new 
fertility trend in the 1990s.
1.3.2. Shifts in Timing and Fluctuations around the Fertility Trend
By assumption, attitudes towards reproduction are reflected in the long-term 
fertility trend. If attitudes do not change, the fertility trend will not change either. Thus, 
if actual fertility data rises above or falls below the trend, but always reverts to the trend 
in the long term, it will represent a shift in the timing of births.
The idea of fluctuations around a long-term trend has been applied in Business 
Cycles theory (Lucas 1983). According to this theory, output fluctuates around a long­
term trend (the ‘natural output’), but there is an inherent propensity for output to revert to 
this trend in the long term. This chapter will test whether fertility behaves in a similar 
way as output (long-term trend and regular fluctuations around that trend). I will use
54 It is also used to proxy for ‘values’. In what follows, I ignore the distinction between values and 
attitudes and use both terms interchangeably.
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techniques that are currently applied to output time-series to test the empirical validity of 
this deterministic trend model.
To sum up, testing the demographic hypothesis consists of verifying the existence 
of (1) a structural break in the long-term fertility trend (Section 2); and (2) a deterministic 
(breaking) trend, with fluctuations around that trend (Section 3)55.
55 As I will discuss in Section 3.3, I will test the deterministic trend model (with regular 
fluctuations around the trend), but not the historical lagged effect of Russian pro-natalist policies in 
the 1980s.
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2. Shift in Values: Empirical Evidence
This section tests for shifts in values and subsequent change in the attitudes 
towards reproduction in the 1990s in Russia. I use age-adjusted and total fertility rates 
time-series data (Goskomstat 1996 and INED 1996, 1998)56.
2.1. Preliminary Econometric Concepts
The first concept relates to the dummy variable. In general, a dummy variable is 
defined to take only two possible distinct values, zero or 1. This variable reflects a simple 
‘yes or no’ situation. For example, a dummy can be used to account for the fact that some 
individuals are confident about the future, and others are not. The dummy variable takes 
the value of 1 if the individual is confident and 0 if not.
The second concept concerns the structural break. A structural break is 
technically a change in the slope (or the intercept, or both) coefficients in a subset o f data. 
For example, if we study the USA output series over the period 1910-1970, which 
includes two wars and one Depression, we may expect that these events affected the 
output trend. Assuming a constant parameter structure in the regression for the whole 
period is not reasonable. A more adequate model would allow for a different slope (or 
intercept) in a subset of data (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1991).
Figure 3.2: Statistical Representation of Data over Time
'data"
Time
Legend: x  data points
■ ■■• Model 1 
—  Model 2
the value of 1 after the structural break.
Econometric studies 
have used dummies to account 
for shifts in either slope, or 
intercept or both—the so-called 
structural break dummy (Dt). 
In general, the dummy variable 
takes the value o f zero for any 
period before and at the time of 
the structural break; and takes
56 In a preliminary inquiry on attitudinal changes, I examined survey data, but was unable to 
conclude satisfactorily. Vciom data suggested that, if one uses the ideal number of children to 
proxy for attitudes towards reproduction, there was a remarkable change in a short period of time: 
it fell between 1991 and 1992 by 27 percent and returned to its 1991 level less than two years after 
(Vishnevsky 1996b). In contrast, RLMS 1992 data suggested that there was no attitudinal change:
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A simple example is drawn in figure 3.2. Time-series data can be represented by 
at least two models57. The first model, quite unsatisfactorily passes a straight and 
continuous line through the points. This specification misses one very important feature 
of the data behaviour: time-series data did not fall continuously over time, but fell with 
greater rapidity at one particular point in time, TB. At that point, the slope of the straight 
line abruptly decreased. To capture the discontinuity at TB and the subsequent change in 
the slope, I specify a second model. This model adds to the first specification an 
explanatory variable, the structural break dummy Dt. I define the dummy as follows: Dt 
takes the value 0 prior to the break (TB) and 1 after (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1991).
Model 1: Ft = p 1 + p2.T
Model 2: Ft = Pi + P2 -T + P3 . T. Dt
where D, = 0 if t > TR ; and 1 otherwise
The second model has the following implications:
1) For years before the break (Dt = 0), the regression (fitted) line has the form:
E(F,) = p, + p2.T (1)
2) After the break (D, = 1 ), the regression line has the form:
E(Ft) = pi + (p2+ p3) . T (2)
In equation (1), the slope of the Trend, T before the break, is p2. After the break, 
the slope of the regression line changes to (p2 + P3). Model 2 is referred to as the 
‘changing slope model*58.
only 1 percent cited interference with their educational or career aspirations as the main motivation 
for fewer children (Comia 1995).
5 7 1 model data with the restriction that the line being estimated is continuous.
58 Technically, the structural break can take the form of a change in either the slope or the intercept 
(or both). I tested the nature of the structural break on Russian fertility data and concluded that a 
change in the slope provided the best statistical representation of Russian fertility data. I then 
followed Perron (1989) to model a gradual change in the trend (the structural break dummy takes 
the value of 0 prior to the break; and D(TB)t = t -  TB after the break). However, the results are not 
significantly affected when taking the simpler specification described in the text (abrupt change in 
the trend).
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Now that I have specified the form of the regression model, I have to determine 
how well this model fits with the data. In econometrics, the adequacy (or fitting) of the 
model is assessed by looking at the significance of each coefficient in the model.
The significance of coefficients is measured by the probability that they are 
different from zero. Specifically, a statistic, the so-called t-test statistic, is computed 
assuming that the coefficient is equal to zero (the null hypothesis is pi = 0). The t-test 
statistic is then compared with the standard value tent59. There are two possible outcomes: 
1) reject the null hypothesis if the t statistic is greater than tcrit or less than -tent, or 2) fail 
to reject if the t statistic lies between tent and -tent (Dougherty 1992).
2.2. Empirical Findings60
I now test for a structural break in the Russian fertility trend. The dependent 
variable is the total fertility rate (Goskomstat 1996 and INED 1996, 1998). I obtained the 
following results:
1) The coefficient of the 1992 structural break, DCT^t is significant at a level of 
1 percent. This result suggests that the start of transition (1992 price 
liberalization) coincided with the emergence of a new fertility trend. More 
specifically, the total fertility rate slowly declined up to 1992, and sharply 
accelerated its fall after 1992.
Fertilityt = 13.929 -0.001 T -  0.116 D(T92)t
(4.84) (-4.59) (-4.81) (t-test in parenthesis) (*) (1)
R2 = 0.717 35 observations
(*) all coefficients are significant at a 1 percent significance level.
2) I examine an alternative model to check whether the largest structural break 
in the fertility trend did actually take place in 1992. After carrying out 
several regressions, I detected a significant break in the fertility trend in 1989 
as well.
59 The tent is computed at given degrees of freedom and significance level.
60 Structural break analysis was applied to crude demographic data of Central and Eastern 
European countries by, inter alia, Comia and Paniccia (1996b). However, as I will show below, 
their model (deterministic with breaking trend) does not provide the best fit to Russian fertility 
data. In a preliminary stage, I apply this method to detect the year of the break. Indeed, most 
testing strategies proceed on the ground of an a-priori (known) break (Perron 1989).
78
Fertility = 8.762 - 0.001 T -  0.064 D(T89),
(3.35) (-3.07) (-7.22) (t-test in parenthesis)(*) (2)
R2 = 0.814 35 observations
(*) all coefficients are significant at a 1 percent significance level.
Is the evidence of two structural breaks in the fertility trend a serious drawback 
for the rest of the analysis? The answer is negative. Empirical results obtained on both 
structural break dummies indicate that both years 1989 and 1992 were marked by a 
significant change in the fertility trend from the past. The key question is whether both 
structural breaks are equally significant.
To assess the comparative importance of both breaks I run a third regression that 
contains both breaking dummies. I find that the 1992 dummy is no longer significantly 
different from zero. This means that the slope of the fertility trend broke in 1989. This 
would suggest that attitudinal changes towards reproduction took place as early as 1989.
Fertility, = 8.342 - 0.001 T -  0.07 D(T89)t + 0.025 D(T92),
(3.07) (-2.81) (-4.11) (0.64) (t-test in parenthesis)(*) (3)
R2 = 0.817 35 observations
(*) all coefficients are significant at a 1 percent significance level, except D(T92)t
This finding challenges previous studies in the following way:
1. Mv preliminary findings (Vandvcke 1996). In using the crude birth rate, I 
falsely concluded that the ‘fertility crisis’ started before 198961. It now 
appears that, if one abstracts from the age-sex structure of the population and 
uses the total fertility rate, the ‘fertility crisis’ started around 1989.
2. Comia and Paniccia (1996b) empirical study. They suggested that the 
fertility crisis in transition economies coincided with the introduction of 
market reforms. Specifically, they argued that “the test (of predictive failure) 
would improve if, instead of using 1989 as a general pre-transition baseline, 
country-specific baselines reflecting more accurately the introduction of 
market reform in each specific situation were used”. If this had been the
61 See chapter I.
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case— and I showed that it is not, the 1992 structural break (start o f the price 
liberalization) would probably have been the most significant structural break 
for Russia62.
62 In the same vein, in a response to Eberstadt (1994)’s alarming article on the role of transition 
(and unification) in the fertility crisis of GDR, Ellman (1997) uses preliminary evidence to show 
that both events are only imperfectly related. Ellman shows the crude birth rate fell by 18 percent 
between 1980-89 and concludes that the downward trend in the crude birth rate in Eastern 
Germany took place prior to the political and economic collapse of the GDR.
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3. Shifts in Values and Timing of Births: Empirical Evidence
This section uses stochastic (unit root) analysis to conclude on the existence of 
regular fluctuations around the trend. Because the testing procedure is complex, I left the 
formal exposition in appendices63. In this section, I confine myself giving the intuition of 
the approach and the empirical findings.
3.1. Intuition behind the Testing Procedure
The purpose of this section is to find an appropriate statistical representation (or 
model) of fertility data over time64. I define two possible models:
1. Model 1 assumes that fertility data behave ‘randomly’ over time. In this 
case, the fertility rate does not simply follow a long-term trend, with regular 
fluctuations around that trend. At best, the fertility rate observed at time t, 
can be related to the fertility rate observed at time (t-1), but not to earlier 
years. This model is referred to as ‘stochastic (trendV65.
2. Model 2 assumes that fertility data behave in a ‘predictable’ way over time. 
The fertility rate follows a long-term trend, and there are regular fluctuations 
around that trend. This model is referred as ‘deterministic trend’. Moreover, 
using findings of a known structural break in the trend in 1989,1 can define 
model 2 as the ‘deterministic breaking trend’ model. This model is the 
(approximate) statistical representation of the demographic hypothesis.66
I test model 1 against the alternative model 2. In particular, I test whether fertility 
data follow a stochastic behaviour against the alternative of a ‘deterministic trend with a 
structural break in 1989’.
63 Appendix 3.1 formally exposes the testing procedure.
64 The starting point of these specifications is the recognition that fertility time-series are non- 
stationary. In the first model, non-stationarity arises from the fact that the observation at time t 
depends on the past (t-1), while in the second model, from the fact that it depends on a Trend. 
Appendix 3.2 tests the stationarity of Russian total and age-adjusted fertility data.
65 The term ‘stochastic’ comes from the Greek and means pertaining to chance. In this case, the 
term stochastic trend refers to variables that exhibit “systematic variations”, although “hardly 
predictable” (Maddala and Kim 1998).
As discussed in section 3 .3 ,1 will not test precisely the historical lagged effect of pro-natalist 
policies in the 1980s, but the presence of a reversion to the trend.
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There are two possible outcomes to this testing procedure:
1. I fail to reject the ‘stochastic model’. In this case, it means that the 
demographic hypothesis of the fertility decline (long-term trend and regular 
fluctuations) does not provide the best fit to fertility data.
2. I can reject the ‘stochastic model’. This outcome is the worse in two 
respects: first, it does not tell me whether the demographic hypothesis 
adequately represents fertility data; and second, it does not tell me the 
appropriate statistical representation of fertility data over time.
3.2. Empirical Findings
The findings are reported in table 3.1 and can be summarized as follows:
• I found insufficient support for the (proxy of the) demographic hypothesis of 
the fertility decline in Russia. Specifically, I fail to reject the stochastic 
model for almost all fertility series (with the exception of the first two age- 
adjusted fertility series). This suggests that fertility data behave randomly: 
they cannot simply be represented by a deterministic breaking trend model.
• Two age-adjusted fertility rates series (of women below the age of 24) follow 
a distinct pattern. Indeed, for these two series, the ‘stochastic’ model can be 
rejected. In other words, these series do not behave randomly. This is as far 
as I can conclude from this finding. As indicated above, I cannot infer that 
these series follow therefore a ‘deterministic breaking trend’ model, and I 
cannot tell what is the appropriate statistical model for these series.
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Table 3.1
Tests for Unit Roots in the presence of Structural Breaks, Russian Fertility Data, 1960-95
Xt = p, + yT  + K D(Tb)i + p Xt-l + £  Si A Xt-i + Vt
Tb = 1989 k P V Y K tK P tp=i a(v t )
Total Fertility rate 
Age-adjusted Fertility rate
1 1.935 1.430 -0.001 -1.310 -0.019 -2.650 0.726 -3.046 0.026
< 20 years 1 -53.571 -8.890 0.028 8.900 -0.048 -8.260 0.178
00001 0.029
20 to 24 years 1 -1.407 -1.390 0.001 2.820 -0.034 -4.590 0.515 -4.443(*} 0.019
24 to 29 years 1 5.492 2.670 -0.002 -2.406 -0.012 -1.302 0.765 -2.612 0.034
29 to 34 years 3 11.402 2.800 -0.005 -2.710 -0.015 -1.125 0.719 -2.975 0.040
34 to 39 years 3 16.558 3.030 -0.007 -3.010 -0.003 -0.359 0.757 -3.179 0.045
39 to 44 years 1 28.919 3.260 -0.014 -3.270 0.001 0.034 0.731 -3.388 0.066
< 20 to 49 years 1 0.649 0.446 0.001 0.034 -0.016 -2.085 0.828 -2.928 0.029
(<) the v a lu e  o f the t-s ta tis tic  fo r the e s tim a te d  p a r e  larger than th e  c ritica l v a lu e  - 3 .8 2  a t the 5 p e rc e n t s ig n ific an ce  leve l.
N o te s : all v a r ia b le s  (e x c e p t the T rend  and  D (T B)t ) are ex p ressed  in n a tu ra l logs, k re p re se n ts  th e  n u m b e r o f  la g s . o ( v t) is the stan d ard  
e rro r o f  the reg re ss io n . T here  a re  36  o b se rv a tio n s .
In te rp re ta tio n : A ll se ries  (w ith  the e x cep tio n  o f  th e  f irs t tw o -ad ju s ted  fe rtility  se r ie s )  are  c h a rac te riz ed  by  a s to ch as tic  tren d  (o r a re  D S P ). 
In d eed , the v a lu e  o f  the t-s ta tis tic  fo r the e s tim a te d  p  is sm a lle r  th an  the c r i tic a l va lu e : the n u ll h y p o th e s is  (D S P ) can n o t be  re je c te d . 
S o u rc e s : G o sk o m s ta t (1 9 9 6 ), IN E D  (1 9 9 6 , 1 9 98 ) and a u th o r’s ow n co m p u ta tio n .
3.3. Further Discussions
Finally, I discuss the limits of the testing procedure67. First, the method I applied 
tested the demographic hypothesis only imperfectly. Indeed, due to the current techniques 
available in econometrics, I could not test, specifically, whether the current fertility 
decline resulted from the historical lagged effect of pro-natalist policies in the 1980s. I 
only tested the much broader idea of reversion to a deterministic trend (or regular 
fluctuations around a trend). Thus, the method I applied is only a preliminary step in the 
application of stochastic analysis to demographic data.
Second, the statistical procedure may appear inappropriate. In an ideal world, I 
should have tested the deterministic breaking trend model, a proxy for the demographic 
hypothesis, against the alternative stochastic trend model. This hypothesis-testing 
exercise would have then led to either reject or accept the demographic hypothesis.
Unfortunately, stochastic (unit root) analysis proceeds the other way around. It 
tests whether fertility time-series data follow a stochastic trend, against the alternative of 
a deterministic breaking trend. Again, the testing-procedure was essentially constrained 
by the current state of knowledge in econometrics. The techniques (and critical values of 
the limiting distribution) have not yet been developed: it is technically impossible to test 
directly the deterministic breaking trend model.
The key question is whether this limitation poses a serious challenge to my 
findings. My answer is that this limitation is more apparent than real. Although I did not 
test directly the (proxy for the) demographic hypothesis, I tested it indirectly. Indeed, for 
almost all series, I was unable to reject the stochastic model. This means that fertility 
series appear to be more adequately represented by a stochastic model, rather than by a 
deterministic (breaking trend) model68. It also means that reproductive behaviour is a 
complex phenomenon, probably even more than the demographic hypothesis would 
suggest.
67 Appendix 3.1 discusses other limitations of the testing strategy.
68 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to evaluate the meaning of a ‘stochastic model’. Some 
argue that it simply means that data cannot be explained, while others like Dolado, Jenkinson and 
Sosvilla-Rivero (1990) argue that data can be consistent with a Rational Expectations behaviour.
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Conclusions
This chapter developed and tested a (proxy for the) demographic hypothesis of 
the fertility decline, by using Russian aggregate and age-adjusted fertility time-series data. 
It started with the observation that there is no single grand demographic theory of the 
fertility decline in transition Europe, but only fragmented pieces of explanations that 
emphasize the role of ‘adaptation’ towards Western fertility levels. Thus, I developed a 
demographic hypothesis, starting from two central concepts in demography: adaptation 
and shifts in the timing of births.
The demographic hypothesis states that the rapid fertility decline in Russia results 
from two inter-linked processes. First, an accelerated adaptation towards Western fertility 
levels (the catching-up effect). This accelerated process took place through a rapid change 
in attitudes towards reproduction. Second, a historical shift in the timing of births (the 
lagged-effect).
I then translated this hypothesis into statistical concepts that could be applied to 
actual data. To establish such a link, I made two assumptions: first, the long-term fertility 
trend can be used to proxy the attitudes towards reproduction. Second, fluctuations of 
fertility data around the fertility trend represent shifts in the timing of births.
Using structural break analysis, I first tested whether there is evidence of 
attitudinal shifts towards reproduction. I concluded for such a change, based on the 
finding of a significant structural break in the fertility trend in 1989.
Using stochastic (unit root) analysis, I then tested the full demographic 
hypothesis. In particular, I tested whether fertility data follow a ‘stochastic trend’ against 
the alternative of a ‘deterministic trend with a structural break in 1989’. For almost all 
series, I found that fertility data behave randomly; they cannot simply be represented by a 
long-term deterministic (breaking) trend. Thus, preliminary Russian evidence provides 
insufficient support to the demographic hypothesis.
The approach used in this chapter is only a first step in the direction of testing a 
consistent demographic explanation of the fertility decline on actual data, by using 
recently developed econometric techniques. It is impeded by both technical and 
knowledge-based limitations in econometrics.
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Appendix 3.1
Hypothesis-Testing Procedure Against Shifting Trend Functions: 
Formalization and Limits
This appendix presents the econometric techniques used to test the demographic 
hypothesis. The techniques discussed are aimed at finding the appropriate statistical 
representation of fertility time series69. The use of those techniques is complex, while 
their outcomes may appear limited. We stand here at the edge of fundamental research in 
econometrics.
3.1.1. Pre-Requisite: Stationaritv and Non-Stationaritv
From a theoretical point of view a time series is a collection of random variables 
{xT}. Such a collection of random variables ordered in time is called a stochastic process 
(Maddala and Kim 1998).
Whenever the time series {xi, x2, x3...xT} has been generated by a stochastic 
process, it means that each value in the series is drawn randomly from a probability 
distribution. In modeling such a process, I attempt to describe the characteristics of its 
randomness. One important property is whether the underlying process that generated the 
series can be assumed to be invariant with respect to time. If the stochastic process is 
fixed in time, i.e. if it is stationary, this means that the process is assumed to be in 
equilibrium about a constant mean (expectation) level70. The probability of a given 
fluctuation in the process from that mean level is assumed to be the same at any point in 
time.
In economics, most time series are not non-stationarv. The GNP, for example, 
has for the most part been growing steadily, and for this reason alone its stochastic 
properties in 1980 are different from those in 1933.
Technically, a stationary time series shares the following properties:
69 For a detailed theoretical treatment, see Harvey (1990), Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1991) and 
Maddala and Kim (1998).
70 Technically, a time series is said to be strictly stationary if the distribution of the stationary 
process remains unchanged when shifted in time by an arbitrary value k. Thus the parameters that 
characterize the distribution of the process does not depend on t, but on the lag k (Maddala and 
Kim 1998).
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1) the variance of xt is finite and does not depend on t;
2) the error term Dt has only a temporary effect on the value of xt;
3) xt fluctuates around its mean of zero;
4) the auto-correlation rk decreases steadily in magnitude for large enough k.
A non-stationarv time series (or integrated of the first-order, 1(1), because the 
series becomes stationary after first-differencing) shares the following properties:
1) the variance of xt goes to infinity as t goes to infinity;
2) an innovation \)t has a permanent effect;
3) the auto-correlation rk—>1 for all k as t goes to infinity. A typical non- 
stationary process is a random walk (where the coefficient on the lagged term 
is equal to unity).
Economic theory generally deals with equilibrium relationships. Thus the 
majority of economic theory is built upon the assumption of stationarity71. Given that in 
practice most economic time series are non-stationary and the objective is to model these 
series, one will have to transform data into stationary processes. The transformation of all 
data in natural logarithm can be used to neutralize the variability in the variance of the 
series (Mills 1993). After transformation, one is often left with variability in the mean of 
the series.
3.1.2. The Dickev-Fuller fDF) Testing Strategy
The non-stationary behaviour of time series emanates from two sources:
1. The series depends on its past—a random walk process (or a process that is 
stationary in first differences: a difference-stationary process, DSP). In this 
case, xt is a direct function of its own past xt.i and a random error vt, with 
constant mean and variance. It is clear that the process xt has no constant 
mean, and is therefore non-stationary. However, a simple rearrangement
71 For example, both Keynesian and Classical macroeconomists assume that output movements can 
be explained by a slowly growing natural trend and transient deviations around that trend. In 
technical terms, they assume that output follows a trend-stationary process. This implies in 
particular that any shock to output will generate temporary deviations from the natural trend. In a 
pioneering study, Nelson and Plosser (1982) show that this is not the case: output tends to follow a 
stochastic trend (or DSP process), so that shocks will have long-standing effects on output. As can
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could make it stationary: each successive change (or differencing) in xt (i.e. 
Ax, = x, -  x,.i) is drawn independently from a probability distribution with 
constant mean (E(Ax,) = E(v,) = 0). First-order differencing of the series 
leads to stationarity of the series.
x, = x,_i + v, where E(vt) = 0 and E(v,vs) = 0 for t * s
2. The series depends on a Trend—a trend-stationary process (or a process that
is stationary around a trend: TSP). In this case, x, is function of a trend (T) 
and a random error u,, with constant mean and variance. Here again, the 
process has no constant mean, because of the trend component.
x, = T, + \>t where ECo,) = 0 and E(o),us) = 0 for t *  s
The technique used to transform this non-stationary series into a stationary one is
a little more complex. It includes to regress x, over T, in order to derive the so- 
called “de-trended” series {x,T}. The de-trended series is stationary.
To sum up, the following two models can be specified:
Difference-Stationary (DSP): xt = xt.i + v, or Ax, = v, (1)
(or Stochastic Trend)
Trend-Stationary (TSP): x, = pT + u, (2)
(or Deterministic Trend)
where A denotes the first-order time difference (i.e. Ax, = x, -  x,.i), T = deterministic 
Trend and v ,, u, = i.i.d errors.
In a large sample at least, each specification has different statistical properties and 
economic implications. Differences arise from the fact that a shock to (1) has permanent 
effects on the series xt; while a shock to (2) has only short-lived effects: in the long-term, 
the series will revert to its trend value.
For our purposes, the demographic model described in Section 3.1 assumes that 
fertility series follows a deterministic trend (TSP), with only short-lived fluctuations
be seen from this example, the question of stationary is particularly relevant in the discussion on 
the welfare costs and benefits of policy interventions.
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around the trend. An alternative model is that fertility series follows a stochastic trend 
(DSP).
I now formally present the strategy to test the DSP model against the TSP model. 
This procedure (often referred as ‘unit root’ for the coefficient of x,.i is equal to 1 in the 
DSP model) was proposed by Dickey and Fuller (DF). Formally, I run the following 
regression72:
xt = p xM + v, (3)
or subtracting from each side of the equation (3) xt.i to obtain the first-difference form:
Ax, = (p -1) xn + v, (4)
where v, is an i.i.d. error process73.
Under the null hypothesis, we test for unit root (or p = 1). The obvious test-statistic is the 
usual ‘t-ratio’ of the estimate of (p -1) to its estimated standard error. Dickey and Fuller 
show, however, that this test-statistic does not have the conventional distribution and the 
correct values must be simulated. Several papers, including Dickey and Fuller (1979), do 
just this.
In an extension of this simple testing-procedure, Dickey and Fuller propose to 
consider the null hypothesis that a time series has a unit root with possibly non-zero drift 
(p) against the alternative that the process is ‘trend-stationary’. Formally, the null 
hypothesis is:
H0: xt = p + xt-i + v„ (5)
The alternative hypothesis is:
Hi: x, = a  + pT + \), (6)
72 The test assumes that only auto-regressive (AR) terms are required to obtain satisfactory 
representations.
73 The error process is i.i.d (or independent and identically distributed) if it features low auto­
correlation rt in the residuals and low standard error a(v,).
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Their testing-strategy is to embed both hypotheses in a common model and run the 
following regression:
xt = ^  + YT + px,.i+ vt (7)74
Equivalently in first-difference form:
Axt = p. + YT + 0 x t.i + vt (8)
In regression (7), I test whether p = 1 and y = 0. Equivalently, in first-difference form, 
the unit root test consists of verifying whether 0 = 0 and y = 0.
3.1.3 Extension of the DF Strategy: The Perron Testing Strategy
The DF procedure is invalidated in the presence of breaking trends: “Standard 
tests of the unit root hypothesis against trend stationary alternatives cannot reject the unit 
root hypothesis if the true data generating mechanism is that of stationary fluctuations 
around a trend function which contains a one-time break” (Perron 1989). A new test 
statistic that distinguishes between the two hypotheses when a break is present has to be 
applied on data. Perron (1989) developed such a test-statistic, with a corresponding 
statistical distribution.
The Dickey-Fuller (DF) testing strategy is extended to ensure a consistent testing 
procedure against shifting trend function. Let me first return to the initial DF regression:
xt = H + yT + p Xu + Vt (7)
I now introduce in (7) the possibility of a shift in the slope of the function at a 
single point in time. For that purpose, I define the time of break as T b , i.e. the period at 
which the change in the parameters of the trend function occurs, and a structural break 
dummy variable D(TB)t. The dummy variable takes the value of zero before the break, 
and, following Perron (1989), takes an increasing value thereafter as follows: D(TB)t = t -  
TBi f l > T B75.
74 It can be shown that models (5) and (6) are special cases of xt = a  + p T + v t / ( l  - <|>L); with L = 
lag operator. Under model (6), I (J> I < 1 . Under model (5), <|> = 1.
73 This specification allows for a transition period during the change in the trend function. This 
formulation reflects the possibility of a gradual, rather than an abrupt change in attitudes.
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I am interested in testing for unit root, against the alternative of stationary 
fluctuations around a deterministic breaking trend function. Formally, the null and 
alternative hypotheses can be defined as follows:
H0: xt = p, + p xt-i+ vt (9)
Hi: xt = ^ + Y1T + (y2 -Yi)D(TB)t+ v, (10)
The testing strategy is to embed both hypotheses in a common model as follows:
To test for unit roots, the null hypothesis is p =1, and K = y  = 0.
An extension is necessary to allow for the innovation sequence {vt} to be serially 
correlated. One approach suggested by Perron is to add extra lags of the first differences 
of the data as regressors. The final regression to run is:
Finally, Maddala and Kim (1998) note that the size and power properties of the 
test are sensitive to the number of lagged terms (k). For example, including too few lags 
may have a substantial effect on the “size of the test” (Perron 1989). In the literature, 
several guidelines have been suggested for the choice of k. I follow Perron (1989) and 
adopt a fairly liberal procedure: the value of k is equal to k* if the t statistic on 5j is 
greater than 1.60 in absolute value and the t statistic on 8i for l>k* is less than 1.60. “This 
liberal procedure is justified in the sense that including too many extra regressors of 
lagged first-differences does not affect the size of the test but only decreases its power” 
(Perron 1989).
x , = |I + y T +  p Xu  +kD (T b),+  v, (11)
xt = |A + YT+ KD(TB), + p x t.i+ Z kj«i 5iAx,.i+ v, ( 12)
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3.1.4. Empirical Implementation
3.1.4.1. Nelson and Plosser (1982)
The publication of the paper by Nelson and Plosser (1982) is a hallmark in the 
application of unit roots analysis to time series. They found that they could not reject the 
null of (an auto-regressive) unit root in 13 (out of 14) US macroeconomic time series, in 
some cases spanning over 100 years. The existence of a unit root was interpreted as 
having important implications for the theory of business cycles and the persistence of the 
effect of real shocks to the economy. Though some economists argued that the evidence 
on unit roots is empirically ambiguous and also irrelevant to the question of the 
persistence of the effect of real shocks, the literature on unit roots keeps proliferating 
(Maddala and Kim 1998).
3.1.4.2. Russian Fertility Data
Table 3.1 in the main text shows the results for the estimated regression (12) on 
Russian total and age-adjusted fertility time-series. As a reminder, I tested the following 
null hypothesis: p = 1 and y = K = 0 against the alternative assumption of stationary 
fluctuations around a deterministic trend function, p < 1 and y * K * 0. The structural 
break year TB is 1989.
Table 3.1.1
Summary Results of the Unit Root Tests with Structural Break
S eries (with Tb = 1989) k P tp=i
Total Fertility rate 1 0.726 -3.046
Age-adjusted Fertility rate
< 20 years 1 0.178 -8 .812(*)
20 to 24 years 1 0.515 -4.443(*)
24 to 29 years 1 0.765 -2.612
29 to 34 years 3 0.719 -2.975
34 to 39 years 3 0.757 -3.179
39 to 44 years 1 0.731 -3.388
< 20 to 49 years 1 0.828 -2.928
Sources: Goskomstat (1996), INED (1996,1998), author's own computation
Note: Critical value is -3.82 at five percent significance level.
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Table 3.1.1 summarizes the main results. For all series, it shows the lag length k 
and the t-statistic for p = 1. Using Perron (1989), the critical value for tp = i is -3.82, at a 
five percent significance level76. For all series, with the exception of the first two age- 
adjusted fertility series, the values of the t-statistic for the estimated p is smaller than the 
critical value. This means that I fail to reject the null hypothesis: almost all series are 
better represented by a stochastic trend model.
For the first two age-adjusted time-series, the null hypothesis can be rejected. 
However, the rejection of the null hypothesis of a unit root (conditional on the possibility 
of the underlying trend function at a known date) does not imply that these series are best 
represented by a deterministic breaking trend model.
3.1.5 Critical Evaluation of the Testing Strategy
The testing strategy used in this chapter is impeded by several limitations:
1. Testing against a specific class of alternative hypotheses. The relevant 
question in a modeling exercise is: how probable is one hypothesis relative to 
other competing hypotheses? The usual outcome of a hypothesis-testing 
exercise is, however, much more limited: a researcher either rejects or fails to 
reject a hypothesis, but cannot tell the probability that a hypothesis holds. 
More generally, “as a matter of general principle, a rejection of the null 
hypothesis does not imply acceptance of a particular alternative hypothesis” 
(Perron 1989). In my example, either of the following results can be 
obtained: (1) fails to reject the null hypothesis: the series is better modeled by 
a stochastic trend; (2) can reject the null hypothesis: the series does not 
follow a unit root. Unfortunately, in the latter case, one cannot conclude that 
the series is therefore best modeled by a deterministic breaking trend. In fact, 
the testing procedure does not allow me to conclude.
2. Using a deterministic (breaking) trend as null rather than the unit root as null. 
The objective is to test whether fertility series can be satisfactorily 
represented by a deterministic (breaking) trend model. In an ideal world, the
76 Perron’s critical values for the limiting distribution test depends on X, the time of the break 
relative to the total sample size. Practically, A, is computed as the ratio of the pre-break sample to 
the total sample size. I obtained a value for X = 0.8. I then picked up the critical value 
corresponding to the sample value of X at the chosen significance level.
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testing-procedure would test this model against the alternative of a stochastic 
trend (DSP). Unfortunately, econometric testing proceeds the other way 
around: it tests whether the series follows a stochastic trend (model 1), 
against the alternative of a deterministic (breaking) trend (model 2). The null 
hypothesis is: the process is stochastic (or unit root). At the present time, one 
cannot test the deterministic breaking trend as the null hypothesis.
3. Low power of unit root tests. Tests of unit roots should be ‘powerful’ to 
discriminate the null hypothesis against the alternative. It has however been 
well documented that unit root tests have low power, especially against trend- 
stationary alternatives. Koop (1992) argues that: “even sophisticated 
traditional unit root tests are badly flawed, and at best should be used with 
extreme caution.”. To increase the power of those tests, Maddala and Kim 
(1998) recently suggested increasing the number of observations, the 
frequency of observations and/or use panel data.
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Appendix 3.2
Testing the Non-Stationaritv of Russian Fertility Data
The fact that the time series is non-stationary is often self-evident from a plot of 
the series. Determining the actual form of non-stationarity is however not easy from just 
a visual inspection: an examination of the sample auto-correlation function (SACF) for 
various differences may be required. The SACF tells us how much correlation there is 
(and by implication how much interdependency there is) between neighbouring data 
points in the series77.
I define the sample auto-correlation with lag k (rk) as:
rk = cov (y„ yt+k) / a* Cyt+k
To characterize the behaviour of the non-stationarv series. I use Monte-Carlo 
simulations. Typically, a non-stationary (random walk) process is consistent with the 
following features:
• SACF of actual data: High SACF in the level at lag 1 and slow decay with 
increasing lags.
• SACF of the first differences: The SACF is expected to be positive and 
significant at lag 1, but not at longer lags.
Tables 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 show the sample auto-correlation function with increasing 
lags for actual and first-difference Russian fertility data, respectively. Both tables show 
consistent results: almost all fertility series (with the exception of the first two age- 
adjusted fertility series) exhibit a non-stationary behaviour over time. Indeed, the SACF 
of actual fertility data is high in the first lag and is slowly decaying; the SACF of the first 
difference is still significant at longer lags78.
77 For an introduction on auto-correlation function, see Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1991), Chap 15.
78 The latter results are arguably less significant.
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Table 3.2.1
Sample Autocorrelation of the Natural Logs of Annual Fertility data
Series ri *2 *4 r5 *6
Total fertility rate 
Age-adjusted Fertility rate
0.785 0.566 0.316 0.113 -0.029 -0.122
< 20 years 0.959 0.890 0.800 0.705 0.608 0.512
20 to 24 years 0.792 0.549 0.255 0.026 -0.128 -0.216
24 to 29 years 0.829 0.625 0.391 0.187 0.034 -0.071
29 to 34 years 0.845 0.663 0.471 0.314 0.192 0.102
34 to 39 years 0.848 0.684 0.591 0.382 0.270 0.184
39 to 45 years 0.870 0.739 0.615 0.512 0.423 0.352
< 20 to 49 years 0.799 0.568 0.308 0.087 -0.081 -0.202
*'The sample size is 36 and ^  is the ith order auto-correlation coefficient.
Sources: Goskomstat (1996), INED (1996,1998) and author's own computation
Table 3.2.2
Sample Autocorrelation of the First Difference of the Natural Logs of Annual Fertility data (*}
Series U 12 ra U *5 *6
Total fertility rate 
Age-adjusted Fertility rate
0.603 0.375 0.275 0.118 -0.050 -0.169
< 20 years 0.348 -0.034 -0.137 -0.017 0.031 -0.032
20 to 24 years 0.642 0.459 0.300 0.135 0.002 -0.098
24 to 29 years 0.646 0.307 0.187 0.018 -0.153 -0.287
29 to 34 years 0.659 0.250 0.096 0.019 -0.139 -0.290
34 to 39 years 0.625 0.241 0.067 -0.004 -0.148 -0.370
39 to 45 years 0.527 0.094 -0.151 -0.163 -0.269 -0.415
< 20 to 49 years 0.761 0.576 0.465 0.326 0.101 -0.073
*'The sample size is 36 and r; is the ith order auto-correlation coefficient.
Sources: Goskomstat (1996), INED (1996,1998) and author's own computation
96
IV. The Effect of Shifts in Income and Uncertainty on Fertility:
Evidence from Russian Regional Data
“C’est la facility de parler, et Vimpuissance d’examiner, qui ontfait dire que 
plus les sujets itaient pauvres, plus les families etaient nombreuses ”
Montesquieu, 1871
Introduction
This chapter assesses the impact of the fall in aggregate income on the fertility 
rate, using Russian regional data for the 1990-95 period. The deterioration in material 
wellbeing, as measured by income, is conventionally regarded as the primary factor 
behind the fall in the fertility rate. In particular, the rapid fertility decline is viewed as the 
short-term (negative) freeze reaction to the economic crisis. My findings challenge this 
simple economic explanation of the fertility decline for Russia, and show a much more 
complex phenomenon: the fertility rate fell in response to (proxies for) both lower income 
and increased uncertainty.
The conventional wisdom, that ‘the 
income fall caused the fertility crisis’, stems 
from the view that the process of economic and 
political transition led to large economic costs 
to the population, of which the deterioration in 
income is the most salient indicator. For 
example, figure 4.1 shows that, in Russia, 
monthly real wages fell by more than half 
between 1990 and 1996 (RET 1997)79. The 
coping mechanism to this new budget 
constraint was a reduction in the consumption of all goods, including the number of 
children.
The connection between income and fertility is however not as simple as it looks. 
First, the connection has weak micro-economic foundations. The economic theory of 
reproductive behaviour suggests that a change in income can either increase or decrease 
fertility (Becker 1981).
79 It is however important to note that there was a fundamental break in the economic situation in 
1992, and that the pre and post 1992 data about the retail market are non-comparable. I am 
grateful to Michael Ellman for this point.
Fig. 4.1: Real Monthly Wage, 
Russia, 1990-96
(1995 = 100)250
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Source: Russian Economic Trends, 1997
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Second, empirical studies on the relationship between changes in fertility and 
income have hitherto given mixed results. Showing that such a relationship exists, in a 
cross section, would be in itself a significant step. Finally, the nature of the income 
concerned has to be further defined. Are we talking about individual or aggregate 
income? Is current income the only factor that matters? Does future income matter as 
well? In particular, can the uncertainty surrounding future income explain the fertility 
change?
The outcome of this chapter is threefold: first, the dominant economic hypothesis 
on the rapid fertility decline is tested empirically. Second, the simple economic 
explanation of the fertility decline is enriched by adding a second explanatory variable, 
‘people’s perception of uncertainty’. Finally, cross-regional data for Russia is used for 
empirical testing.
As I will show below, this chapter uses regional data of Russia for the 1990-95 
period. The (change in the) volume of industrial production is used to proxy (the change 
in) income (Goskomstat 1996b). The unemployment rate in 1994 from the Labour Force 
Survey is used to proxy ‘people’s perception of uncertainty’ (Goskomstat 1996a). The 
dependent variable is the change in the fertility rate (i.e. total, urban and rural) (INED 
1996,1998).
I find that (proxies for) income and uncertainty can explain regional differences 
in the fertility decline. In particular, regions with the largest fall in the fertility rate 
experienced the largest fall in (the proxy for) income and higher uncertainty. This 
conclusion holds, in a cross-section, for changes in the total and urban fertility rates, but 
not in the rural fertility rate.
The structure of the chapter is as follows: section 1 investigates the regional 
dimension of the rapid fertility decline in Russia. Section 2 examines theories and 
evidence on the effect of income on the fertility rate. Section 3 considers the question of 
empirical measurement of income. Section 4 uses standard regression analysis to test the 
extent to which income and uncertainty explain regional differences in the rate of fertility 
decline.
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1. The Regional Dimension to the Fertility Decline in Russia
This section examines whether there are regional disparities in the rate of fertility 
decline. Using Russian fertility data (total, rural and urban fertility rate), I show that 
regions differ in the fertility levels and rate of decline in the 1980s, but there is a striking 
uniformity in the rate of decline over the 1990-95 period.
1.1. Preliminary Observations
That there are regional differences behind national measures of the total fertility 
rate (TFR) is straightforward. Some regions may have a TFR quite above the national 
TFR, other regions quite below, and the distribution of regions on the fertility scale may 
vary a great deal. Knowing the national change in the fertility rate becomes secondary, 
once regional disparities are put in evidence.
The study of the regional dimension of the fertility decline is important for two 
reasons: first, references to the Central and East European fertility decline are based on 
national (aggregated) fertility data. Despite regional data recently made available in some 
countries, there has been little attention devoted to the regions, and the regional 
dimension of the fertility decline.
Second, for Western European countries, the few regional fertility studies that are 
available are largely descriptive. Most studies observe regional disparities in the fertility 
rate, while failing to explaining their causes. For example, it is generally claimed that the 
Italian TFR decline hides wide regional disparities. In particular, there is a geographical 
difference between the north and the south of Italy. For example, the deviation from the 
national average (TFRg7 = 1.3) between the northern regions (Center North TFR87 = 1.09) 
and the southern regions (Mezzorgiomo TFRs? = 1.65) is quite large (Golini 1991). Up to 
now, demographic studies have largely failed to explain these regional disparities.
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Using regional fertility data for Russia (1990-95), the following preliminary 
observations can be made:
1. The fertility rate collapsed in all the 
regions o f Russia. It is therefore the 
rate of change (and the initial level), 
rather than the decline per se that 
characterizes each region.
2. There are regional differences 
between the urban and the rural 
fertility rates. As shown in Figure
4.2, both fertility rates collapsed.
The urban fertility rate appears, however, to have fallen slightly more: this 
suggests that both rates should be investigated separately.
3. The TFR can hide differences in the rate of urbanization. For example, the 
TFR may reflect the fertility behaviour of a region predominantly rural, while 
decisions in urban areas may be considerably different. In what follows, I 
will have to control for this effect.
1.2. Regional Diversity in Urban Fertility Rates: Characterization
I order 66 regions (or territorial administrative units) of Russia into five 
subgroups of regions. This grouping is consistent with the typology proposed by 
Zakharov and Ivanova (1996). Their typology is based on a study o f cultural and 
economic (modernization) differences among regions. I use this typology to ease the
on
presentation of this large sample of regions .
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I investigate separately the urban fertility rate from the rural fertility rate . For 
each subgroup of regions, I compute aggregate (average) indicators of urban fertility. The 
following indicators are considered: 1) the urban fertility rate in 1990, 2) the urban 
fertility rate in 1995, 3) the (average annual) change in the urban fertility rate over the
80 Appendix 4.1 shows the typology used for the urban fertility rate.
81 Appendix 4.2 examines the regional rural fertility rates.
Fig. 4.2: Urban and  R ural 
F ertility  Rates, R ussia, 1985-94
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Sources: Goskomstat, 1996; INED, 1996
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1990-95 period, 4) the change in the urban fertility rate between 1990 and 1995 and 5) the 
change in the crude birth rate between 1980 and 198882.
From table 4.1, there are three observations:
1. For each subgroup of regions, there are distinct urban fertility levels in 1990 
and 1995.
2. Despite that, there is a striking uniformity in the rate of urban fertility decline 
in the first half of the 1990s. Across all groups of regions, the urban fertility 
rate fell, on average, by 32 percent between 1990 and 1995—the equivalent of 
an annual fall of 8 percent.
3. Provided that the change in the crude birth rate can be used to proxy for what 
happened to the urban fertility rate in the 1980s, table 4.1 shows that the 
fertility decline accelerated across all the regions in the 1990s. For example, 
in the fifth subgroup of regions, fertility fell by 3.8 percent between 1980 and 
1988, while it fell by ten times more between 1990 and 1995.
Table 4.1: Russian Urban Fertility Rate bv Group of Regions. 1980-95
Urban Fertility rate Crude Birth Rate
1990 1995 Avg annual chg Chg o f 1995 Chg o f 1988 over
1990-95 over 1990 1980
(in percent) (in percent) (in percent)
Group 1 2.411 1.643 -7.49 -32.15 0.82
Group 2 1.932 1.319 -7.40 -31.81 -2.07
Group 3 1.846 1.213 -8.05 -34.24 -2.16
Group 4 1.721 1.126 -8.12 -34.43 -4.80
Group 5 1.644 1.118 -7.41 -31.84 -3.88
Note: Each indicator is an average o f regions in the group (appendix 4.1). 
Sources: Goskomstat (1996), INED (1996,1998) and author's own calculation
82 Because the regional urban fertility rate is not available in the 1980s, I used the crude birth rate- 
both series (crude birth rate and urban fertility rate) are highly correlated: the coefficient of 
correlation is 0.946 in 1990. I also selected the 1980-88 period, because the 1989 crude birth rate 
data were not available.
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2. The Impact of Income on Fertility: Theory and Evidence
This section briefly reviews theories and evidence on the effect of a change in 
income on fertility. The objective is to find out whether we can support the view that an 
income fall can lead to a rapid fertility decline. I begin by defining what is meant by 
‘income’. I then show that the predictions from the economic theory of reproductive 
behaviour are ambiguous and the evidence from empirical testing is mixed. Finally, I 
draw the implications for empirical testing.
2.1. The Definition of Income
The term ‘income’ requires immediate attention. There are at least two related, 
but different concepts of income: (1) the income of the individual earner or the individual 
family. This is the appropriate concept when one focuses on the microeconomic analysis 
of individual fertility decisions. (2) Average national income (or per capita income). This 
concept is more aggregate and more general than individual income. It refers to the 
economic conditions prevailing in a given country at a given time.
What may be said about the effects of changes in average and individual incomes 
is not always the same:
1. Economic conditions and the level of average national income obviously 
affect incomes of individuals. But aggregate conditions have economic 
effects other than the effects of individual incomes that may affect fertility 
decisions. Examples include changes in employment opportunities and in 
education.
2. Individual incomes can change with no change in average income. Examples 
include change in the income distribution and transfer payments to families 
with children.
2.2. The Theory: Ambiguous Predictions
The economic theory of reproductive behaviour has usually concentrated on the 
microeconomic family decision-making aspects. The theory has gone through several 
stages that are not reviewed here. In Chapter II, I explored the most important theories. I 
briefly remind the reader of the central contributions of Becker and Mincer.
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• Becker (1960) formalized the notion of the demand for children as 
‘consumption’ goods. He distinguished between two dimensions of a family’s 
reproductive decisions: the quantity (number) of children a family 
’purchases’ and the ‘quality’ (e.g. education) per child it decides to purchase.
• Mincer (1963) focused on the woman’s work decision, emphasizing that 
children represent an opportunity cost in foregone wage because additional 
children reduce the capacity of women to work in the market—the 
substitution effect.
As a reminder of Chapter II, the key predictions of Becker’s economic theory of 
reproductive behaviour can be described as follows:
• Central to Becker’s argument is that economic analysis should proceed on the 
assumption that tastes and values are unchanged by income. In that case, an 
increase in income should be translated into a rise in fertility. I refer later to 
a ‘pure income effect’—the partial effect of income, holding personal 
characteristics constant.
• However, in some circumstances, an increase in income might be translated 
into a decrease in fertility. The idea is that the household changes the 
purchase of other goods whose enjoyment requires time and hence competes 
with the time the family might spend with the child.
In sum, the economic theory of reproductive behaviour predicts that income- 
produced forces act on fertility in opposite directions. “It is a fact that pure economic 
theory by itself cannot predict whether the effect of an additional individual (and national) 
income will be on balance to lower or higher fertility” (Simon 1974).
Two assumptions underlie the discussion on the effect of income (and economic 
crisis) on fertility. First, reproductive decisions are based on a rational evaluation of the 
benefits and costs involved in having children. The rationalization of the reproductive 
decision-making process became dominant in the field with Becker’s work. Chapter V 
will however show that ‘rationality’ (in the economic sense) can be challenged in the 
presence of broad uncertainty.
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Second, individuals have to make a choice about reproduction. The economic 
theory states that households will consciously choose to have fewer children, whenever 
they have less income (whenever their tastes are constant). Economists prefer to believe 
that individuals have control over their lives and that everything is a matter of choice. 
The extent to which this is always true is unclear. One may imagine, for example, that 
the deterioration in income becomes so strong that individuals are forced to have fewer 
children. In that case, poverty dictates the course of life and there is no choice to make83.
2.3. Empirical Evidence: Mixed Results
The absence of a solid theory of reproductive behaviour has not discouraged 
active empirical research on the effect of income on fertility84. The idea that income or 
more generally, economic conditions, matter in family decisions has been documented in 
numerous surveys. Simon (1974) reports however, on the complexity of the issues at 
stake. “Despite the fact that income (in more developed countries) is more than sufficient 
to provide means of subsistence for many children that the average family chooses to 
have, people say in responses to questions of various sorts that their income constrains 
their family size”. This observation suggests that standards of living and economic 
conditions matter in reproductive decisions, but in an intricate way85.
2.3.1. The ‘Pure’ Income Effect
Evidence on the partial effect of income, holding personal characteristics 
constant, is twofold:
1. Time-series data over business cycles. In the short-run—during which 
parents’ tastes can be considered as fixed, aggregate time-series data show 
that change in personal income and unemployment have strong same- 
direction effect on fluctuations in fertility (Simon 1974).
2. Cross-sectional data. Comparisons of fertility rates among different income 
groups at a single point in time tell relatively less. One problem is that the
83 The discussion brings us back to the fundamental difference between the economic and the 
demographic paradigms (Chapter II). As I will argue in Chapter VI, this distinction has major 
policy implications.
I omit any considerations of the influence running from fertility and population growth to 
economic conditions.
85 It also suggests that there may be a difference between current and perceived income. I return to 
this point in chapter V.
104
income refers only to a period much shorter than the individual’s lifetime, 
usually a year. Reproductive decisions may however be affected by income 
received in earlier years, and perhaps the income stream the couple expects to 
receive in future years86.
2.3.2. The Long Term Income Effect
As noted above, the partial effect of income is to raise fertility by increasing the 
family’s power to afford children. “But in the long run a rise in income has many other 
sorts of effects upon people, some of which then influence fertility either upward or 
downward. Some of these effects are strong and unambiguous, while others are subtle 
and complicated” (Simon 1974). It is these other effects that come into the longer run 
analysis.
For example, it is generally believed that increased average income gives women 
access to education; this, in turn, lowers fertility. Income increases may also have many 
other effects upon people’s actual and perceived economic situations that may affect 
fertility in complicated ways. “For example, children are not homogenous, and people 
have at least some discretion about how much they will choose to spend on an additional 
child, e.g. whether or not to pay for his education through graduate school. This 
discretion complicates the decision about whether to have children, because a couple can 
pick different combinations of numbers of children and expenditures on them... It is, 
therefore, theoretically possible that a rise in income will have the direct effect of 
lowering the number of children people ‘purchase’.” (Simon 1974).
“All discussion of the total effect of income on fertility must confront this 
empirical fact: among the countries...with hallmarks of being modem and developed, 
there is a considerable spread of fertility rates that is not systematically associated with 
their income levels. Therefore, either there are several conflicting partial effects of 
income on fertility whose composite effect differs from place to place, or factors not 
systematically associated with income are more important than income in determining a 
nation’s average fertility level...”(Simon 1974).
86 For a discussion on the consistency between time-series and cross-sectional fertility data, see 
Simon (1974).
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2.4. Implications for Empirical Testing
Previous empirical studies suggest that conclusive findings can be obtained if the 
period of investigation is sufficiently short. During that time, ‘tastes’ for children (and 
their prices) are expected to be fixed, and there is a possibility to find a ‘pure income 
effect’. Empirical testing would come down to verify whether there is a positive 
relationship between a change in the fertility rate and a change in income.
In most circumstances, the choice of a short period of change is sufficient to 
neutralize the effect of ‘tastes’. In the context of transition, this may, however, not be 
sufficient. In fact, Chapter HI showed that there has probably been a change in ‘tastes’ in 
Russia, towards the end of the 1980s87. To minimize the problem, I chose to study the 
fertility change in the period after the structural break in the fertility trend, i.e. the 1990- 
95 period. During that time, ‘tastes’ are expected to be relatively stable and change 
gradually.
87 More precisely, I showed a structural break in the fertility trend in 1989 and concluded for a 
change in the attitudes towards reproduction.
3. The Measurement of Income
In transition economies, income figures are largely unreliable. In Russia in 
particular, income figures suffer from a “problem of too much ‘correction’ ” (Granville 
Shapiro and Dynnikova 1996). This section describes the problems related to the 
measurement of income in Russia and suggests some solutions—the use of a proxy and 
adequate period of investigation. I also define a proxy for ‘people’s perception of 
uncertainty’.
3.1. Which Income?
In an ideal world, I would test the effect of a change in individual income on 
fertility. Practically, individual income data is often unreliable and it may be easier to 
work with aggregate income data, or a proxy for general economic conditions.
For Granville et al. (1996), Russian individual income data are unreliable:
“Income figures are adjusted so much that they lose all meaning. It is understood 
that Goskomstat needs to make estimates of informal activity, of changes from 
roubles to hard currency and vice versa , and of non-reported income. The 
problem with the income data is, first of all, a problem of too much ‘correction’ 
(viz. wages are understated, and non-wage income overstated). In addition, there 
are reports of other errors in basic concepts. As we have found such a high 
correlation between wages and income since 1994 (precisely when reported 
income began to be so much higher than reported wages), we remain doubtful 
that anything actual is being measured by the income data, beyond non-reported 
wages”.
I now examine the extent to which aggregate income data can be used to proxy 
individual income positions. As argued in section 2.1, there are circumstances in which 
changes in individual income are not reflected in aggregate data. For example, aggregate 
data can falsely reflect individual income positions, whenever the income distribution 
changes over time.
In transition Europe where the income distribution changed considerably in the 
1990s, aggregate income data may therefore not adequately reflect individual income 
positions. As an illustration of the change in income distribution in Russia, I use the Gini
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coefficient, the most frequently used measure of income inequality: the Gini coefficient 
rose from 0.26 in 1991 to 0.40 in 1994 (Goskomstat 1996). ‘The top quintile in 1993 
received fully 20 percentage points more of total income than the top quintile in 1988, 
mainly because of an explosive increase in the relative share of the very richest people 
and also because of increasing wage dispersion” (World Bank 1996).
In Russia, aggregate income data may however be used to proxy individual 
income given that both indicators actually fell. One the one hand, the fall in GNP, a 
measure of aggregate income88, indicates that on average, people became worse off 
during the transition. On the other hand, the presence of rising income inequality 
suggests that more people may have lost from the transition than gained89. At worse, 
using aggregate income data will under-estimate the fall in individual income of those at 
the bottom of the income-scale.
3.2. A Proxy for Regional Income
I am primarily interested in obtaining a measure that, although aggregate, would 
reflect the income position of individuals. Ideally, this measure would be close to the 
National Income, Y of the National Accounts and available for each region. 
Unfortunately, such a measure is not available.
To proxy for income, the total value of output (GNP) could be used—both 
measures are identical in the national accounting sense. There are, however, a number of 
problems in using GNP:
1. National unreliability. GNP is an unreliable indicator of activity in Russia. It 
suffers from under-reporting of private and services sectors activities. 
Moreover, some goods that cannot be sold on the market are considered as 
part of the total output. The direction of the bias is in itself a matter of debate 
(Gavrilenkov and Koen 1994).
2. Regional unreliability. Although some measures of regional “GNP” were 
recently made available, they represent rough approximations of the real 
activity in the regions: these measures suffer from under- and over-reporting 
problems as well.
88 Provided that GNP is a reliable measure of aggregate income in Russia.
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3. Nominal measure. Total output is generally published in nominal terms and 
includes the computation of an index of prices. In a country that underwent 
hyper-inflation like Russia, nominal and real measures differ a great deal, the 
selection of a base-year is subjective, and the computation of a price index 
complex. These problems can be solved, but at the expense o f a large 
number o f assumptions.
To proxy for regional output, I use the volume of industrial production in the 
region (1990 = base-year). This represents a measure o f output in real terms and is 
available for each region.
I am interested not so much in the absolute level of industrial production, as by its 
variation over time. The year-to-year change in the industrial production is used to 
neutralize the effects of systematic under-reporting problems. Using the (change in the 
volume of) industry production to proxy (change in) income has been used in a number of 
empirical studies: it can be roughly justified in the specific context of Russia 
(Gavrilenkov and Koen 1994).
To illustrate the relevance of this 
proxy (at the national level), figure 4.3 
plots the index of production of various 
goods over time. As shown, the change 
over time of industrial production closely 
paralleled the change over time of two 
alternative production activities90: 1)
electricity production91, and 2) agricultural 
production. Thus, using the change in 
industrial production over time is as a 
relatively good proxy for the change in the 
production (and thus income) of other sectors of the economy.
89 The question of winners and losers of the transition is however unresolved. The concept was 
recently explored in the Russian context by Elizabeth Brainerd, 1998.
90 It could however be argued that this is not really the case in 1992-94.
91 In fact, the alternative proxy for income is electricity consumption (Ellman 1999). Here, I 
assume that production equals consumption.
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In using the industrial production to proxy for income, there is, however, a risk to 
over-estimate the fall in actual income. Indeed, while production in most sectors of 
activity fell, it actually increased in the services sector. As noted above, the main 
problem is that there is no measure available of what happened to the services sector in 
the first half of the 1990s. Thus, I will have to make the (simplifying) assumption that 
this may be a shortcoming for the metropolitan regions, Moscow and St Petersburg. In 
those two regions, there is evidence that the services sector rapidly expanded. I will 
control for this effect by defining a dummy (METROP). For the other regions, I will 
have to keep in mind that the proxy used for income change may over-estimate the actual 
fall in income.
3.3. Period under Investigation
Section 1 argued that a short period of change was desirable to keep ‘tastes’ 
constant. To control for this effect, I chose the period that followed the structural break in 
the fertility trend, i.e. 1990-95. Moreover, I compute the average year-to-year change, 
rather than the total change between 1990 and 1995. This averaging procedure provides a 
smoother measure of the variation in output.
3.4. Regions under Investigation
From the regional data that I collected, I excluded the 9 regions of the North 
Caucasus ‘rayon’ and ‘autonomous okrugs’: for those regions, data series were either 
incomplete, or suffered from reliability problems92 (Vandycke 1996). Taking into 
account other regions with missing data, the final data set consists of 6 6  regions of 
Russia.
I define a subgroup of 12 regions that is characterized by an ‘exceptionally large’ 
fall in industrial production. This subgroup encompasses regions that experienced an 
(average annual) fall in industrial production of above 17 percent. This subgroup of 
regions is expected to feature a distinct and exceptionally large fertility decline.
To capture this pattern, I define a dummy variable, DUM2. Technically, DUM2 
is defined as the product of the (change in the volume of) industrial production and 
DUM1, where DUM1 takes the value of 1 for regions where the change in industrial 
production was larger than 17 percent. As shown in Chapter HI, the dummy is used to
92 These regions happened to be predominantly Muslim, with specific fertility patterns.
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capture the distinct slope in the regression line for this subgroup of regions. Specifically, 
the regression line has the following form:
E(ATFR90-95) = Po + Pi • AIP90-95 + (^ 2- (AIP90-95 • DUM1)
For all the regions, except the 12, DUM1 = 0  => E(ATFR9o-95) = p0 + pi . AIP90.95
For the 12 regions: => E(ATFR9o-95) = p0 + (pi + P2) AIP90.95
3.5. A Proxy for ‘People’s Perception of Uncertainty’
As I will show in Chapter V, broad uncertainty is endemic to transition Europe. 
As such, uncertainty is likely to have had an impact on reproductive decisions (Ellman 
1997). In this part, I test empirically whether (a proxy for) uncertainty is a significant 
explanatory factor of the Russian regional fertility decline.
I assume that uncertainty affects the perception  of current and future job 
opportunities, future income, and the general economic climate. I consider that its effect 
is to raise ‘the lack of confidence in tomorrow’.
To proxy for ‘people’s 
perception of uncertainty’, I use the 
unemployment rate93 in 1994 from the 
Labour Force Survey (Goskomstat 
1996a). In Russia, the unemployment 
rate rose from virtually a zero-level by 
the end o f the 1980s to about 8.4 
percent in 1995 (UNECE 1998). Under 
those circumstances, it is reasonable to 
expect that uncertainty about job  prospects and future income increased; this, in turn, 
affected the fertility rate. As show in figure 4.4, preliminary evidence suggests that the 
unemployment rate is related to the (change in) total fertility rate in 66 regions of Russia.
93 The LFS data is expected to provide a better picture of the unemployment problem (and 
uncertainty regarding present and future income), than the official unemployment rate (a measure 
of the number of people claiming unemployment benefits). It is however far from being a perfect 
proxy for ‘people’s perception of uncertainty’.
Fig. 4.4: T otal F ertility  ra te  and
U nem ploym ent Rate, R ussia, 1990-95
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Sources: Goskomstat, 1996 (for LFS, 1994);
INED, 1996, 1998.
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The presence of unemployment rates similar to those in Western Europe suggests 
that the level of uncertainty is identical in Western Europe, as in Central and Eastern 
Europe. This is clearly not the case: the uncertainty surrounding job opportunities and the 
future is much larger in Central and Eastern Europe94. This observation already indicates 
that the unemployment rate is likely to be an imperfect measure of uncertainty in 
transition economies.
94 Chapter V explores the effect of uncertainty on the reproductive decision-making process.
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4. Specification and Empirical Findings
4.1. Specification
This section explores the relationship between the (average annual) change in the 
volume of industrial production (a proxy for income) and the (average annual) change in 
the fertility rate. The average annual changes in both variables are calculated over the 
1990-95 period95. I define a dummy, DUM2, to capture regions that are characterized by 
a ‘large’ fall in industrial production (i.e. an average annual fall in industrial production 
above 17 percent). The data set covers 6 6  regions of Russia.
The unemployment rate in 1994 from the Labour Force Survey is used to proxy 
for ‘people’s perception of uncertainty’ (Goskomstat 1996a). The control for inter­
regional disparities between rural and urban areas is done with a ‘modernization’ variable, 
URBAN95—defined as the share of urban population in the total population in 1995 
(Goskomstat 1996). The Regions of Moscow and St Petersburg are isolated into a 
dummy (METROP).
The dependent variable is the (average annual) change in the regional fertility 
rate, i.e. total, urban and rural fertility rates (Goskomstat, 1996 and INED 1996, 1998).
4.2. Econometric Results
The results are reported below, with the t-statistic in parenthesis96. Before I 
examine each set of results, let me start with a general remark. In the first two regressions, 
the most important explanatory variable AIP90-95 (and DUM2) is significant at a 10 percent 
level, but not at 5 percent. On conventional econometric grounds, this means that AIP90.95 
is only slightly significant (and could probably be rejected as an explanatory variable). 
However, in the particular case that is examined here, the significance of the result is 
probably the best it can possibly be-given the use of proxies, very aggregate data, and 
measurement problems, and can be retained. It indicates that the approach used in this 
chapter is only a first step in testing the economic explanation of the fertility decline and 
that further investigation is required in this direction.
95 Appendix 4.3 gives the regional data.
96 In all regressions, the value of the Durbin-Watson statistic indicates that serial correlation is 
unlikely to be present in the estimated residuals.
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The first regression shows a pattern with regard to the total fertility rate (TFR): 
regions with the largest change in the total fertility rate suffered from the largest change 
in (the proxy for) income. The positive relationship between change in the total fertility 
rate and change in (proxy for) income holds not only for the large group of regions (54 
observations), but for the 1 2  regions as well. For this latter group, the intercept of AIP90-95 
is positive—it is the sum of the coefficients of AIP90-95 and DUM2.
I find that (the proxy for) ‘people’s perception of uncertainty’, UNEMP94 is 
significant. This is a striking result. It shows that it is the combination, and not the 
unique effect of income with uncertainty, that can explain regional disparities in the rate 
of change of the total fertility rate97.
As expected, the metropolitan regions (Moscow and St Petersburg) follow a 
specific pattern, and the control for urban-rural inter-regional differences is significant— 
regions with a significantly higher share of population in urban areas had, holding all 
other variables constant, a significantly larger fall in TFR.
ATFR9o-95 = -0.035 +0.093 AIP90-95 -0.038DUM2-0.164 UNEMP94+O.O29  METROP-0.027 URBAN95 
(-2.83) (1.86) (-1.48) (-2.07) (3.22) (-1.99) (*)(1)
R-squared = 0.249 DW = 2.181 6 6  observations
(*) all coefficients are significant at a 5 percent significance level, except AIP9 0 .9 5  and DUM2.
The second regression shows the relationship between the change in the urban 
fertility rate and changes in (the proxies for) income and uncertainty. Compared to the 
first regression, I explore here the determinants of the change in the urban fertility rate 
(and ignore the urban-rural variable). The key finding is that a similar relationship holds 
for the urban fertility rate as for the total fertility rate: in the regional cross-section, the 
decline in the urban fertility rate is significantly related to the fall in income and increased 
uncertainty. In particular, regions with the largest fall in the urban fertility rate 
experienced the largest fall in income and higher uncertainty.
97 Appendix 4.4 shows that there is no multi-collinerarity in this multiple regression model.
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A T F R u r b a n ^  =  -0.057 + 0.071 AIP90.95 -  0.039D U M 2 -  0 .161  UNEM P94 +  0 .021  M E T R O P  (2 )
(-8.74) (1.61) (-1.69) (-2.31) (3.02) (*)
R-squared = 0.228 DW = 1.976 6 6  observations
(*) all coefficients are significant at a 5 percent level, except MP 9 0 .9 5  and DUM2.
The third regression shows the relationship between the change in the rural 
fertility rate and the changes in (the proxies for) income and uncertainty. I find that (the 
proxies for) uncertainty and income for the subgroup of regions fail to explain regional 
differences in the rural fertility rate change: both the proxy for uncertainty, UNEMP94 and 
the dummy for the subgroup of regions, DUM2 are insignificant. In a fourth regression, I 
dropped both variables.
ATFRnira^s = -0.051 + 0.244 AIP90.95 -  0.061DUM2 + 0.041 UNEMP94+ 0.086 METROP (3) 
(-2.96) (2.15) (-1.04) (0.22) (4.71) (*)
R-squared = 0.283 DW = 2.07 6 6  observations
(*) all coefficients are significant at a 5 percent significance level, except UNEMP94 and DUM2.
The fourth regression shows a significant relationship between the change in the 
rural fertility rate and the change in (the proxy for) income. Does this finding imply that 
‘people’s perception of uncertainty’ played no role in the rate of fertility decline in rural 
areas?
ATFRrura^s = -0.055 + 0.158 AIP90-95 + 0.081 METROP (4)
(-5.273) (2.032) (4.619) (*)
R-squared = 0.270 DW = 2.05 66  observations
(*) all coefficients are significant at a 5 percent significance level.
One reason to doubt is that both the urban and rural fertility rates fell in parallel. 
As shown in figure 4.2 above, rural fertility decline closely paralleled urban fertility 
decline. Moreover, the declines in both fertility rates were simultaneous in time. These 
observations suggest that both fertility rates responded to identical factors; there is no 
reason to believe that uncertainty affected the fertility rate in urban areas, and not in rural 
areas.
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It may, however, be possible that rural areas were less responsive to factors of 
change than urban areas. Rural areas may be more ‘conservative’, and therefore less 
inclined to changes. This may also mean that people living in rural areas may have been 
less anxious about changes. They believed that the status quo would be maintained, and 
did not experience increased uncertainty from transition.
Another explanation may be that uncertainty is more bounded for rural 
populations98. While in urban areas, people with no job have no income and hence starve, 
people in rural areas with no job can grow their own food (and do not face the uncertainty 
of death). Thus, for rural people, there is a lower bound for income that is above zero.
A much more simple explanation would be that the proxy used for ‘people’s 
perception of uncertainty’, the unemployment rate does not adequately reflect rural 
people’s perceptions of the future.
981 am grateful to Nick Barr for this explanation.
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Conclusions
This paper has presented some preliminary findings on the impact of the 
deterioration in income on fertility. It used standard econometric regression techniques to 
test the extent to which the economic crisis has influenced downturns in fertility, using 
Russian regional data. In a cross-section, it tested two hypotheses: first, the relationship 
between income and fertility; and second, the impact of uncertainty on fertility.
I began to explore the regional dimension of rapid fertility decline in Russia. I 
found a striking uniformity in the rate of fertility decline across regions. In particular, the 
urban fertility rate fell by about 30 percent across the regions of Russia between 1990 and 
1995--the equivalent of an average annual fall of 8  percent.
I then examined theory and evidence on a possible relationship between income 
and fertility. I showed that the predictions of the economic theory of reproductive 
behaviour are ambiguous and the evidence from empirical testing is mixed.
To test the hypotheses of this chapter, I used two proxies: the (average annual 
change in) the volume of industrial production to proxy for the (average annual change 
in) income; and the unemployment rate in 1994 of the Labour Force Survey to proxy for 
‘people’s perception of uncertainty’. The period of investigation is 1990-95. The 
dependent variables were the (average annual change in) the fertility rates (total, urban 
and rural fertility rates). I applied standard OLS regression technique.
I found that the fertility decline is closely connected to (proxies for) income and 
uncertainty. In particular, regions with the largest fall in the total (and urban) fertility rate 
experienced the largest fall in (the proxy for) income and higher uncertainty.
This paper gave preliminary insight into the causes of the rapid fertility decline in 
Russia: first, it showed a relationship between the change in income and the change in the 
fertility rate. In a cross-section, it showed a positive relationship between both variables. 
Second, it challenged the simple economic explanation of the fertility decline, in which 
the deterioration in income explains the entire story. It showed that ‘people’s perception 
of uncertainty’ can increase the explanatory power of the regression model.
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Appendix 4.1
Russian Urban Fertility Rate bv Group of Regions. 1980-95
TFR 1990 TFR 1995
Chg TFR 
1990-95
Avg an. chg TFR 
1990-95
chg birth rate 
1980-88
Group 1 2.411 1.643 •0.322 -0.075 0.008
56 Tuva 2.669 1.938 -0.274 -0.062 0.125
55 Buiyatia 2.184 1.398 -0.360 -0.085 -0.025
33 Kamylda 2.379 1.592 -0.331 -0.077 -0.076
Group 2 1.932 1.319 -0.318 -0.074 •0.021
61 Yakutia 2.098 1.572 -0.251 -0.056 0.097
59 Irkutsk oblast 2.051 1.328 -0.353 -0.083 -0.037
54 Tyumen oblast 1.873 1.332 -0.289 •0.066 0.000
60 Chita oblast 2.008 1.522 -0.242 -0.054 -0.095
64 Amur oblast 1.930 1.275 -0.339 •0.080 •0.028
3 Arkhangelsk 1.878 1.195 -0.364 -0.086 -0.084
41 Bashkortstan 1.931 1.322 -0.315 -0.073 0.080
67 Sakhalin 1.920 1.192 -0.379 -0.091 -0.024
36 Vologda 1.785 1.201 -0.327 -0.076 -0.026
50 Kemerovo 1.846 1.252 -0.322 -0.075 -0.090
Group 3 1.846 1.213 -0.342 -0.081 •0.022
62 Primorski krai 1.857 1.192 -0.358 -0.085 -0.077
2 Komi 1.775 1.194 -0.327 -0.076 -0.105
1 Karelia 1.889 1.175 -0.378 -0.091 -0.018
42 Udmurtia 1.891 1.157 -0.388 -0.094 -0.011
34 Tatarstan 1.949 1.293 -0.337 -0.079 0.121
10 Bryansk 1.861 1.284 -0.310 -0.072 -0.077
43 Kurgan 1.889 1.177 -0.377 -0.090 -0.058
28 Belgorod 1.798 1.239 -0.311 -0.072 -0.039
52 Omsk 1.765 1.203 •0.318 -0.074 -0.056
45 Perm 1.851 1.195 -0.354 -0.084 0.026
47 Chelyabinsk 1.853 1.210 -0.347 -0.082 -0.013
4 Volgograd 1.865 1.203 -0.355 -0.084 -0.070
26 Kirov 1.806 1.169 -0.353 -0.083 -0.065
23 Mari El 1.924 1.211 -0.371 •0.088 0.011
68 Kalingrad 1.763 1.179 -0.331 -0.077 0.007
40 Ulyanovsk 1.856 1.196 -0.356 •0.084 0.094
44 Orenburg 1.882 1.256 -0.333 -0.078 -0.052
46 Sverdlovsk 1.737 1.183 -0.319 -0.074 -0.056
35 Astrakhan 1.874 1.308 -0.302 •0.069 0.068
58 Knsnoyarslri krai 1.827 1.237 -0.323 -0.075 -0.061
Group 4 1.721 1.126 •0.344 -0.081 -0.048
14 Kostroma oblast 1.786 1.137 -0.363 •0.086 -0.045
25 Chuvashia 1.861 1.131 -0.392 -0.095 0.000
65 Kamchatka 1.590 1.167 -0.266 -0.060 -0.056
49 Altai krai 1.741 1.032 -0.407 -0.099 -0.076
7 Leningrad 1.702 1.135 -0.333 -0.078 -0.054
5 Murmansk 1.610 1.134 -0.296 -0.068 -0.110
66 Magadan 1.753 1.020 -0.418 -0.103 -0.019
39 Saratov 1.758 1.161 -0.340 •0.080 0.021
9 Pskov 1.712 1.124 -0.343 -0.081 -0.083
8 Novgorod 1.769 1.146 -0.352 -0.083 -0.089
30 Kursk 1.757 1.134 -0.355 -0.084 -0.037
29 Voronezh 1.705 1.167 -0.316 -0.073 -0.039
51 Novosibirsk 1.688 1.104 -0.346 -0.081 -0.097
13 Kaluga 1.690 1.151 -0.319 -0.074 -0.047
18 Ryazan 1.707 1.128 -0.339 -0.080 -0.027
27 Nizhnii Novgorod 1.704 1.152 -0.324 -0.075 -0.007
Group 5 1.644 1.118 •0.318 -0.074 -0.039
22 Yaroslav 1.667 1.095 -0.343 -0.081 -0.050
19 Smolensk 1.664 1.126 -0.323 -0.075 -0.063
32 Tambov 1.678 1.172 -0.302 -0.069 -0.007
38 Samara 1.674 1.132 -0.324 -0.075 -0.060
37 Penza 1.741 1.117 -0.358 -0.085 -0.075
31 Lipetsk 1.694 1.173 -0.308 -0.071 0.000
11 Vladimir oblast 1.747 1.102 -0.369 -0.088 -0.054
24 Mordovia 1.758 1.158 -0.341 -0.080 0.031
20 Tver 1.669 1.107 -0.337 -0.079 -0.015
53 Tomsk 1.616 1.112 -0.312 -0.072 •0.070
21 Tula 1.641 1.124 -0.315 -0.073 -0.032
12 Ivanovo 1.674 1.044 -0.376 -0.090 -0.071
17 Orel 1.644 1.173 -0.286 -0.065 -0.103
16 Moscow oblast 1.444 1.051 -0.272 -0.062 -0.038
15 city of Moscow 1.502 1.192 •0.206 -0.045 -0.022
6 Sl Petersburg 1.486 1.008 -0.322 -0.075 0.007
Sources: Goskomstat (1996), INED (1996,1998), Zakharov and Ivanova (1996), and author's own calculation 
Note: There are 65 observations (missing region: Kabarovsky kray)
118
Appendix 4.2
Russian Rural Fertility Rate bv Group of Regions. 1980-95
TFR 1990 TFR 1995
Chg TFR 
1990-95
Avg an. chg TFR 
1990-95
chg birth rate 
1980-88
Group 1 3.278 2.452 •0.254 0.082 •0.059
56 Tuva 3.812 3.444 -0.097 0.047 -0.020
SS Buiyatia 3.381 1.946 -0.424 0.069 -0.105
33 Kamykia 3.009 2.395 -0.204 0.070 -0.045
60 Chita 3.248 2.153 -0.337 -0.028 -0.079
59 Irkutsk 3.237 2.024 -0.375 0.013 -0.090
41 Bashkortstan 3.049 2.262 -0.258 0.154 -0.058
61 Yakutia 3.210 2.940 -0.084 0.249 -0.017
Group 2 2.777 1.785 -0.358 0.022 -0.085
52 Omsk 2.724 1.940 -0.288 -0.083 •0.066
23 Mari El 2.753 1.787 -0.351 0.073 -0.083
45 Perm 2.785 1.756 -0.369 0.065 -0.088
25 Chuvashia 2.944 1.995 -0.322 0.139 -0.075
42 Udmurtia 2.790 1.705 -0.389 0.042 -0.094
64 Amur 2.812 1.722 -0.388 -0.103 -0.093
3 Arkhangelsk 2.634 1.587 -0.397 0.016 -0.096
Group 3 2.544 1.674 -0.342 0.060 -0.081
47 Chelyabinsk 2.754 1.713 -0.378 0.079 -0.091
50 Kemerovo 2.629 1.675 -0.363 0.000 -0.086
35 Astrakhan 2.821 1.819 -0.355 0.150 -0.084
34 Tatarstan 2.823 2.113 -0.252 0.262 -0.056
2 Komi 2.271 1.630 -0.282 -0.022 -0.064
53 Tomsk 2.468 1.485 -0.398 -0.069 -0.097
62 Primorski krai 2.528 1.754 -0.306 -0.092 -0.070
39 Saratov 2.623 1.758 -0.330 0.123 •0.077
10 Bryansk 2.605 1.872 -0.281 0.241 -0.064
49 Altai krai 2.515 1.491 -0.407 -0.037 -0.099
43 Kurgan 2.618 1.597 -0.390 0.036 -0.094
36 Vologda 2.663 1.821 -0.316 0.051 -0.073
44 Orenburg 2.900 1.980 -0.317 0.141 -0.073
26 Kirov 2.561 1.557 -0.392 0.013 -0.095
24 Mordovia 2.208 1.643 -0.256 0.054 -0.057
4 Volgograd 2.582 1.669 -0.354 0.068 -0.084
40 Ulyanovsk 2.546 1.638 -0357 0.119 -0.084
14 Kostroma 2.547 1.432 •0.438 0.187 -0.109
54 Tyumen 2.417 1.678 -0.306 0.043 -0.070
30 Kursk 2.324 1.720 -0.260 0.105 -0.058
38 Samara 2.339 1.613 -0.310 0.212 -0.072
68 Kalingrad 2.333 1.540 -0.340 -0.016 -0.080
1 Karelia 2.265 1.354 -0.402 -0.081 -0.098
46 Sverdlovsk 2.668 1.658 -0.379 0.024 -0.091
51 Novosibirsk 2.593 1.631 -0.371 -0.095 -0.089
Group 4 2.343 i.608 -0313 0.136 -0.075
58 Krasnoyarski krai 2.839 1.816 -0.360 0.000 -0.085
67 Sakhalin 2.482 1.439 -0.420 -0.048 -0.103
28 Belgorod 2.367 1.762 -0.256 0.223 -0.057
65 Kamchatka 2.083 1.522 -0.269 -0.020 -0.061
66 Magadan 2.397 3.181 0.327 -0.077 0.058
9 Pskov 2.317 1.459 -0.370 0.200 -0.088
8 Novgorod 2.409 1.534 -0.363 0.258 -0.086
29 Voronezh 2.167 1.554 -0.283 0.138 -0.064
13 Kaluga 2.292 1.460 -0.363 0.147 -0.086
18 Ryazan 2.291 1.475 -0.356 0.167 -0.084
27 Nizhnii Novgorod 2.251 1.537 -0.317 0.161 -0.073
22 Yaroslav 2.281 1.413 -0.381 0.138 -0.091
19 Smolensk 2.406 1.544 -0.358 0.195 -0.085
32 Tambov 2.274 1.564 -0.312 0.155 -0.072
37 Penza 2.326 1.579 -0.321 0.118 -0.075
31 Lipetsk 2.191 1.533 -0.300 0.180 -0.069
11 Vladimir 2.245 1.411 -0.371 0.052 -0.089
20 Tver 2.532 1.466 -0.421 0.218 -0.104
21 Tula 2.228 1.527 -0.315 0.183 -0.073
12 Ivanovo 2.298 1.317 -0.427 0.095 -0.105
17 Orel 2.525 1.670 -0.339 0.370 -0.079
Group 5 1.648 1.148 -0.298 0.026 •0.069
16 Moscow oblast 1.726 1.176 -0.319 0.008 -0.074
5 Murmansk 1.493 1.213 -0.188 0.063 -0.041
7 Leningrad 1.724 1.055 -0.388 0.008 -0.094
Sources: Goskomstat (1996), INED (1996,1998), Zakharov and Ivanova (1996), and author's own calculation
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Appendix 4J
Regional Data. Russia. 1990-95
Industrial Fertility Rate 1990-95 Unemployment Urban Population
Production 1990-95 Total Urban Rural rate 1994 1995 (share in
(avg an. chg) (avg an. chg) (avg an. chg) (avg an. chg) (LFS) total pop)
Kareliya -0.109 -0.090 -0.091 -0.098 0.077 0.743
Komi -0.106 -0.073 -0.076 -0.064 0.090 0.749
Arkhangelst -0.103 -0.090 -0.086 -0.096 0.101 0.734
Volgograd -0.072 -0.085 -0.084 -0.084 0.072 0.672
Murmansk -0.094 -0.065 -0.068 -0.041 0.103 0.924
City of St. Petersburg -0.163 -0.075 -0.075 0.000 0.091 1.000
Leningrad -0.094 -0.083 -0.078 -0.094 0.101 0.660
Novgorod -0.109 -0.084 -0.083 -0.086 0.078 0.708
Pskov -0.199 -0.083 -0.081 -0.088 0.115 0.651
Bryansk -0.189 -0.068 -0.072 -0.064 0.080 0.683
Vladimir -0.159 -0.088 -0.088 -0.089 0.096 0.801
Ivanovo -0.214 -0.093 -0.090 -0.105 0.132 0.823
Kaluga -0.144 -0.078 -0.074 -0.086 0.051 0.736 ^
Kostroma -0.180 -0.092 -0.086 -0.109 0.085 0.661 (t . 
1.000the city of Moscow -0.159 -0.045 -0.045 0.000 0.061
Moskow oblast -0.172 -0.064 -0.062 -0.074 0.082 0.797
Orel -0.180 -0.069 -0.065 -0.079 0.058 0.627
Ryazansk -0.155 -0.080 -0.080 -0.084 0.062 0.678
Smolensk -0.116 -0.077 -0.075 -0.085 0.066 0.696
Tver -0.159 -0.085 -0.079 -0.104 0.066 0.724
Tula -0.119 -0.072 -0.073 -0.073 0.062 0.813
Yaroslav -0.163 -0.082 -0.081 -0.091 0.079 0.808
Mari El -0.159 -0.085 -0.088 -0.083 0.085 0.622
Mordovia -0.194 -0.072 -0.080 -0.057 0.074 0.586
Chuvashia -0.176 -0.087 -0.095 -0.075 0.091 0.604
Kirov -0.144 -0.087 -0.083 -0.095 0.096 0.702
Nizhnii Novgorod -0.113 -0.075 -0.075 -0.073 0.060 0.778
Belgorod -0.066 -0.065 -0.072 -0.057 0.047 0.645
Voronezh -0.167 -0.068 -0.073 -0.064 0.051 0.615
Kursk -0.103 -0.074 -0.084 -0.058 0.057 0.599
Lipetz -0.080 -0.069 -0.071 -0.069 0.052 0.633
Tambov -0.109 -0.070 -0.069 -0.072 0.070 0.575
Kalmykiya-Halmg -0.163 -0.058 -0.077 -0.045 0.125 0.378
Tatarstan -0.085 -0.070 -0.079 -0.056 0.058 0.734
Astrakhan -0.083 -0.076 -0.069 -0.084 0.088 0.670
Volgograd -0.163 -0.073 -0.076 -0.073 0.066 0.743
Penza -0.163 -0.081 -0.085 -0.075 0.076 0.640
Samara -0.097 -0.074 -0.075 -0.072 0.058 0.804
Saratov -0.148 -0.077 -0.080 -0.077 0.078 0.739
Ulyanovsk -0.074 -0.083 -0.084 -0.084 0.057 0.726
Bashkortostan -0.094 -0.065 -0.073 -0.058 0.060 0.646
Udmurt -0.151 -0.093 -0.094 -0.094 0.083 0.699
Kurgan -0.159 -0.091 -0.090 -0.094 0.090 0.548
Orenburg •0.094 -0.076 -0.078 -0.073 0.056 0.641
Perm -0.103 -0.084 -0.084 -0.088 0.083 0.764
Sverdlovsk -0.148 -0.076 -0.074 -0.091 0.080 0.876
Chelyabinsk -0.144 -0.083 -0.082 -0.091 0.078 0.813
Altai •0.163 -0.096 -0.099 -0.099 0.075 0.521
Kemerov -0.097 -0.076 -0.075 -0.086 0.086 0.868
Novosibirsk -0.137 -0.082 -0.081 -0.089 0.080 0.738
Omsk -0.126 -0.069 -0.074 -0.066 0.068 0.674
Tomsk -0.066 -0.077 -0.072 -0.097 0.093 0.653
Tyumen -0.088 -0.067 -0.066 -0.070 0.068 0.761
Buryatia -0.123 -0.093 -0.085 -0.105 0.098 0.594
Tyva -0.129 -0.047 -0.062 -0.020 0.096 0.481
Krasnoyarski -0.100 -0.079 -0.075 -0.085 0.080 0.737
Irkutsk -0.085 -0.084 -0.083 -0.090 0.086 0.794
Chita -0.185 -0.063 -0.054 -0.079 0.077 0.631
Saha (Yakutiya) -0.056 -0.040 -0.056 -0.017 0.058 0.645
Primorsky -0.109 •0.081 -0.085 -0.070 0.078 0.777
Kabarovsky -0.199 -0.097 -0.097 -0.088 0.101 0.807
Amur -0.140 -0.084 -0.080 -0.093 0.090 0.663
Kamchatka -0.140 -0.060 -0.060 -0.061 0.100 0.808
Magadan -0.094 -0.097 -0.103 0.058 0.102 0.870
Sakhalin -0.103 -0.094 -0.091 -0.103 0.089 0.851
Kaliningrad -0.180 -0.076 -0.077 -0.080 0.091 0.781
Sources: Goskomstat (1996), INED (1996,1998) and author's own calculation
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Appendix 4.4
Testing for Multi-collinearitv
One of the assumptions of the multiple regression model is that there is no exact 
linear relationship between any of the independent variables in the model. If such a linear 
relationship does exist, we say that perfect collinearity exists99.
Let us assume that variables Xi and X2 are perfectly collinear because Xi = 5 X2 
for each observation of the sample. When both variables appear in the regression, we are 
faced with an impossible problem. The coefficient of the Xi variable is a partial 
regression coefficient measuring the change in Y associated with a unit change in Xi with 
all other variables constant. Since it is impossible to keep all other variables constant, 
we are not able to interpret (or even define) the regression coefficient.
In practice, the problem is essentially that independent variables have a high 
degree of multi-collinearitv. Multi-collinearity arises when two or more variables (or 
combination of variables) are highly (but not perfectly) correlated with each other. In this 
case, it will be possible to calculate the least-squares estimates of the regression 
coefficients, but the interpretation of the coefficients will be quite difficult. The 
regression coefficient of the first of the two highly correlated variables is interpreted to 
measure the change in Y due to a change in the variable in question, other things being 
equal. But, the presence of multi-collinearity implies that there will be very little data in 
the sample to give one confidence about such an interpretation. Any time a given change 
in one variable occurs, the corresponding observation on its highly correlated partner is 
likely to change predictably.
In my regression, I could reasonably expect AIP90.95 , the change in the volume of 
industrial production, to be highly correlated with UNEMP94, the unemployment rate 
variable. There is therefore a need to investigate whether there is a possibility of multi- 
collinearity.
The easiest way to tell whether multi-collinearity is causing problems is to 
examine the standard errors of the coefficients. If several coefficients have high standard 
errors and dropping one or more variables from the equation lowers the standard errors of 
the remaining variables, multi-collinearity will be the source of the problem.
99 For an introductory treatment of multi-collinearity, see Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1991).
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Table 4.4.1 reports the standard errors for each variable of the first regression in 
the main text (change in TFR). It shows that the standard errors are low, and that 
dropping for example, the unemployment rate UNEMP94, does not significantly lower the 
standard errors of the other coefficients. This suggests that there is no problem of multi- 
collinarity in this multiple regression100.
Table 4.4.1
Regression Results of the Change in TFR, Russia, 1990-95
(standard errors in parenthesis)
constant chg in IP90-95 DUM2 UNEMP94 METROP URBAN95 R-squared
Chg in TFR90.95 (1) -0.034 0.093 -0.038 -0.164 0.029 -0.027 0.249
(0.012) (0.050) (0.025) (0.079) (0.009) (0.013)
(2) -0.041 0.121 -0.039 0.031 -0.030 0.195
(0.012) (0.049) (0.026) (0.009) (0.013)
Sources: Goskomstat (1996), INED (1996,1998) and author's own calculation
100 An alternative measure is the coefficient of correlation between the change in industrial 
production and the unemployment rate (correlation = -0.348). The low correlation is consistent 
with the labour hoarding phenomenon, well-documented in Russian enterprises.
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V. Decision about an Incremental Child under Broad Uncertainty:
A Preliminary Discussion
"The more complex and unique the issues we confront, 
the more uncertain the outcome" 
Douglass North, 1990
Introduction
This chapter attempts to reconcile the standard economic theory of reproductive 
behaviour and empirical findings by building a simple model. It is based on my findings 
that reproductive decisions cannot entirely be explained by a change in income: the rise in 
people’s perception of uncertainty, the growing sense of anxiety and lack of confidence in 
the future, are likely to be significant factors in reproductive decisions as well. The model 
shows how the lack of confidence in tomorrow can affect individual reproductive 
decisions.
If uncertainty is present in Western Europe, it is even more prevalent in transition 
Europe. I will show that rapid economic and political transformations in Central and 
Eastern Europe have made everyday life broadly uncertain. The presence of widespread, 
broad uncertainty enhances the complexity of individual decision-making, and affects 
individual behaviour. The key question is how does uncertainty influence individual 
decision-making, particularly vis-a-vis children.
Despite its significance, ‘uncertainty’ is largely ignored in the economic model of 
reproductive behaviour: Becker assumes that agents are well informed about the present 
and can rationally decide now how many children they will have in the course of their 
life. This chapter extends this simple model and investigates how broad uncertainty can 
help explain the rapid fertility decline in transition Europe.
This chapter does not pretend to give a full account of the effect of uncertainty on 
reproductive decisions. Rather, it shows, with the help of a simple model, that the 
treatment of uncertainty deserves more analysis. It also gives insight into the rapid 
fertility declines in Slovenia, Poland or the Czech Republic. Compared to Russia, those 
countries experienced a continuous fall in their fertility rate, while their aggregate income 
has been steadily growing.
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The structure of the chapter is as follows: section 1 shows that broad uncertainty 
pervades every facet of life in transition Europe. Section 2 examines the standard 
behavioural assumptions of economic theory under uncertainty. Section 3 develops a 
simple model of reproductive decision under broad uncertainty. Section 4 shows how 
‘uncertainty’ can help to understand rapid fertility declines in countries where income has 
long been growing.
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1. Broad Uncertainty in Transition Economies
“All human endeavors are constrained by our limited and uncertain knowledge— 
about external events past, present, and future; about the laws of Nature, God, and man; 
about our own productive and exchange opportunities; about how other people and even 
we ourselves are likely to behave.” (Hirshleifer and Riley 1992). “However hard we may 
try to avoid it, everyday’s decisions have to be made in an uncertain world—a world of 
ignorance, doubt, haziness and hesitation.” (Hey 1979).
If uncertainty is inherent to modem economic life, it is even more so in a time of 
rapid economic and political transformations101. Alexander (1998) depicts the 
environment: “For a people long accustomed to the granite-like immobility of state 
structures in the USSR, the ‘disappearance’ of the State in the Russian successors has 
created great confusion and uncertainty”. In what follows, I will argue that transition 
Europe does not only feature uncertainty, but also broad uncertainty. This section 
attempts to define the concept of broad uncertainty.
I define an environment as ‘broadly uncertain* whenever people perceive that 
there is widespread unpredictability. In transition Europe, people are uncertain about the 
institutional environment (and preferences), prices and income.
1.1. Institutional Uncertainty
As argued above, prior to transition, Central and Eastern European countries were 
characterized by the “granite-like immobility of ... State structures” (Alexander 1998). 
These structures gave stability to human interaction. At present, transition Europe is 
characterized by two problems regarding institutions102:
101 Attention has been been paid to certain forms of uncertainty in the analysis of the disincentive 
effects of benefits in transition Europe by, inter alia, Dustmann and Micklewright (1993).
102 Institutions (the State and the broader society) are providing for the formal (laws and 
regulations) and informal rules and norms (World Bank 1997). For North (1990), “our lives are 
made up of routines in which the matter of choices appears to be regular, repetitive, and clearly 
evident, so that 90 percent of our actions in a day do not require much reflection. But in fact, it is 
the existence of an imbedded set of institutions that has made it possible for us not to have to think 
about problems or to make such choices. We take them for granted, because the structure of 
exchange has been institutionalized in such a way as to reduce uncertainty”. Failure to provide a 
stable institutional environment results in increased transaction costs and reduction in economic 
activity (North 1990).
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1. The first problem concerns the lack of confidence vis-a-vis existing
institutions. The lack of people’s trust is a particularly acute problem in
transition economies. In Russia, for example, an opinion poll carried out 
between June 1993 and March 1994 shows a remarkable fall in confidence 
vis-a-vis all institutions, i.e. government, President, army, trade unions, Press, 
TV, except the Orthodox Church (Vciom 1994).
2. The second problem concerns the lack of institutions adequate to market
economies. “The many institutions that support market exchange and shape
private ownership in advanced market economies— both concrete 
organizations and abstract rules of the game— largely disappeared under 
central planning” (World Bank 1996). The challenge of transition is to 
reinstate those institutions.
“Prior to the Gorbatchev period, Soviet citizens had become unaccustomed to 
anything more radical than incremental change— in sharp contrast with Western 
societies, in which recent change has been driven by rapid technological 
advances, economic fluctuations and political variability. W hereas Western 
processes o f change occur on the bedrock of constitutional and (especially in the 
case of Great Britain) common law, the tectonic nature of Russian reforms means
that they are disrupting Russia at all levels as society is being overturned in a
seemingly headlong rush toward the reconstruction o f political and economic 
institutions” (Alexander 1998).
To illustrate the 
magnitude of the problem,
I constructed an overall 
indicator of ‘institutional 
uncertainty’, based on 
cross-country private 
sector large-scale surveys 
data, that were recently
made available by the 
World Bank (World Bank
1997)103 a s shown in
103 Appendix 5.1 explores the index of institutional uncertainty.
Figure 5.1: Index of " In stitu tio n a l U ncerta in ty" , 1996
3.60 n
Source: World Bank data, 1997; author's own calculation
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figure 5.1, the indexes of ‘institutional uncertainty’ are markedly higher in Central and 
Eastern Europe, than in Western Europe. Russia exhibits one of the highest indexes of 
‘institutional uncertainty’ in the region.
As a result, individuals in transition Europe are often unable to identify their 
tastes (or preferences). When asked about what they want, people express only vague 
hope and exhibit a generalized lack of confidence in tomorrow (Alexander 1998)104.
1.2. Price Uncertainty
For people who never before experienced inflationary conditions, the rise of 
inflation has created tremendous uncertainty on the current and future purchasing power 
of income. In Russia, for example, annual inflation increased by more than 1,500 percent 
during the worst episode of hyper-inflation (UNECE 1998). In other Central and Eastern 
European countries, inflation has been lower than in Russia, but it is still high and shows 
resilience to decrease. This indicates that 
macroeconomic instability in transition Europe.
1.3. Income Uncertainty
For economies that previously 
guaranteed the right to work (and a stable 
income), the emergence of unemployment 
increased the uncertainty regarding the ability 
to keep or find a job. Most transition 
economies experienced a rise from a virtually 
zero-level to more than 10 percent during the 
transition period. Figure 5.2 shows the Labour 
Force Survey unemployment rate in Russia 
(RET 1997). The worst fear in the early days of the transition was that a high level of 
unemployment would persist over time. This fear has been consolidated over time: 
unemployment fell only slightly despite economic recovery. In Slovenia, for example, the 
1997 unemployment rate rose to 14.8 percent despite a 3.3 percent annual GDP growth 
(UNECE 1998). This indicates that high unemployment rates are part of the transition 
context.
104 An opinion poll survey carried out on the Russian urban population in 1994 shows that more 
than a third of the interviewees (35 %) was unable to say what would their family’s wellbeing be 
in a year from now; another third (31 %) responded that it would be worse (Vciom 1994).
there is still a major potential for
Fig.5.2: U nem ploym ent ra te , 
R ussia, 1990-96
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Source: Russian Economic Trends, 1997.
127
As discussed in Chapter IV, the presence of unemployment rates similar to those 
in Western Europe suggest that the level o f uncertainty is identical in W estern and 
Eastern Europe. This is clearly not the case. Uncertainty regarding job opportunities and 
future income is much larger in Eastern Europe105.
In some transition economies, 
income uncertainty is further exacerbated by
1OAthe culture of non-payment of wages 
Figure 5.3 shows the rise in wage arrears, as 
a share of the monthly wage bill in the 
industrial sector in Russia. This figure gives 
some indication of the magnitude of the 
problem. People who do not get paid or are 
not paid on time, are officially registered as 
employed, and are therefore expected to live 
on their income. In reality, they share all the characteristics o f regarding the perception of 
future income and job opportunities unemployed (except in receiving benefits).
1.4. Definition of ‘Broad Uncertainty’
I define the concept of ‘broad uncertainty’ in two terms:
•  Aggregated nature of the concept: broad uncertainty qualifies both the 
microeconomic and  macroeconomic environment in which people live;
• Subjective nature of the concept: broad uncertainty is purposefully defined in 
terms o f people’s perception of the environment. In some cases, people’s 
perceptions coincide to objective facts. More often, people’s perception can 
differ from objective facts. For example, in a country where unemployment 
was high for a long time, but recently fell, people may still perceive that
105 The utility cost of being unemployed is higher in transition Europe than in the West. Under 
communism, only rogues, vagabonds, drunkards, wastrels and idiots had no job; thus being 
unemployed involved personal failings and/or culpability. This is far less the case in the West 
where a) we all know good people who have been unemployed, and b) at least some of us accept 
the idea of involuntary unemployment. What all this leads to is that a given aggregate 
unemployment rate is more uncertainty-inducing in transition Europe than in the West. I am 
grateful to Nick Barr for this point.
106 The problem of wage arrears in Russia has been empirically investigated, inter alia, by John 
Earle and Klara Sabirianova (1999). I am grateful to John Earle for useful discussions. Wage 
arrears are generally considered as a typical Soviet phenomenon. Informal evidence gathered from 
participants in the conference on the “Causes and Consequences of Wage Arrears in Russia” 
(Stockholm 1998) suggest that it may have concerned Baltic countries as well.
Fig 5.3: Ratio of W age A rrears to 
M onthly W age Bill in the Industry, 
R ussia, 1992-96
(in percent)
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Source: Russian Economic Trends, 1997
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uncertainty on their ability to keep a job is high. People may then behave as 
if  unemployment was still high. As I will show below, the distinction 
between objective facts and people’s perception has far-reaching 
consequences for the study of individual behaviour107.
107 As I will show below, the distinction is useful to capture phenomena like the lack of confidence 
in tomorrow and anxiety about the future.
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2. Economic Theory and Uncertainty
The presence of uncertainty enhances the complexity of individual decision­
making. In his Economics o f Uncertainty, Hey (1979) describes one aspect of this 
complexity:
“The economic theory of (household) acting in a world of certainty is a superbly 
elegant and refined construction: a monument to the skill and perseverance of 
previous generations of economic theorists...(However), it is clearly superfluous 
to point out that (these) assumptions do not hold good in a real world...The 
individual, when considering his inter-good and his inter-temporal allocation 
problem is faced with a whole set of uncertainties and deficiencies of 
information.... It would be pleasant to be able to report that the incorporation of 
uncertainty into consumer theory could be achieved without blemishing the 
beautiful edifice of certainty theory. Unfortunately, this is not so. Indeed, given 
the present state of economists’ skills in modeling uncertainty, the introduction of 
uncertainty causes a complete destruction of this edifice. ” 108
This section examines the standard model of economic behaviour under 
uncertainty. I organize the discussion along three questions: what is the object of choice? 
What structures this choice? What principle leads to this choice? The purpose of this 
section is to show why the presence of uncertainty poses a challenge to the standard 
behavioural assumptions of economic theory. This discussion is however tentative and 
does not pretend to give a full coverage of the issue.
2.1. Context of Choice
The focus of economic theory is on individual choice. The individual is 
confronted with a set of commodity bundles. Each commodity bundle can be 
unambiguously and objectively described. The individual has to make a choice among 
these bundles.
How does uncertainty affect the context of choice? It is generally assumed that, 
because of uncertainty, the individual does not know, in advance of making his choice,
108 The “destabilizing” effect of adding uncertainty in game-theoretic analysis has been explored, 
inter alia, by Kreps David M. and Robert Wilson (1982). “Reputation and Imperfect Information”. 
Journal of Economic Theory 27, 253-279.
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what will be the actual outcome of any particular choice—or which commodity bundle he 
will end up with.
Why does the individual fail to know the final outcome? Economic theory 
assumes that the outcome of any particular choice depends on “what the state of the 
world” is (Hirshleifer and Riley 1992). There are several states of the world possible, and 
the individual does not know which particular state of the world will actually prevail109. 
This framework assumes that uncertainty arises from a lack of information about the 
states of the world110.
To deal with this problem111, economic models can, for example, assume that 
individuals can gather this information at a negligible cost (Cukierman 1980); or that they 
can decide to voluntarily delay their decision on the ground that more information is 
needed to form probability judgements (Pindyck 1989)112. As I will show below, an 
alternative is to assume that individuals have rational expectations (Newbery 1989)113
2.2. Structure of Choice
The computational power of the decision-maker is assumed to be unlimited. This 
means that each individual is able to process all available information in a consistent way. 
In other words, the individual behaves perfectly ‘rationally’ (in the economic sense).
• In the static context, rationality means that individual preferences are 
internally consistent. The requirement of internal consistency specifies that it 
is possible to “explain the set of actual choices as resulting from 
maximization according to some binary relation” (Sen 1998). In even more 
demanding formulations, “the binary relation is required to be fully transitive, 
and more demandingly still, even representable by a numerical function
109 This is the essential difference with risk where individuals are conventionally assumed to be 
able to attach probabilities to the states of the world (Barr 1998).
110 Hirshleifer and Riley (1992) distinguishes between the “economics of uncertainty”—where the 
individual is presumed to act on the basis of current fixed beliefs, and the “economics of 
information”—where the individual can overcome his ignorance by ‘informational actions’.
111 A related problem concerns the incompleteness of the market structure. The concept of missing 
future markets is explored, inter alia, by David M. Newbery, 1989. “Missing Markets: 
Consequences and Remedies”. In Hahn Frank (ed.). The Economics of Missing Markets, 
Information, and Games. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
1 I choose to ignore the literature on the optimal level of information.
113 This means that individuals’ beliefs about market-clearing prices that will prevail in each state 
of the world are correct, that they will base their actions on these beliefs, and the resulting 
equilibrium confirms these beliefs.
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which the person can be seen as maximizing” (Sen 1998)114. “Economists 
traditionally have assumed that, when faced with uncertainty, people 
correctly form their subjective probabilistic assessments according to the 
laws of probability. But researchers have documented many systematic 
departures from rationality in judgement under uncertainty.” (Rabin 1998)115.
• In the dynamic (inter-temporal) context, the rationality assumption can take 
the form of a rational expectations (RE) requirement. RE is probably one of 
the most restrictive and unrealistic assumptions about economic behaviour. 
Yet, because of its widespread use in economic theory, it is important to 
carefully examine it.
The context under investigation is one in which individuals have to make a 
decision that involves several periods. Economic theory assumes that there is a 
connection between the present and the future. In particular, individuals’ actual 
behaviour is affected by the ‘views’ (or expectations) they hold about the future. How do 
they form their expectations about the future?
Rational expectations (RE or forward-looking behaviour) gives a specific mould 
to the process of expectations formation116. Individuals are assumed to behave 
purposefully in collecting and using information, just as they do in other activities117. 
They do not waste information that is scarce when they make their decisions118. 
Expectations are viewed as “informed predictions of future events” (Sheffrin 1996)
114 The concept of ‘rationality’ was first discussed in Chapter II, Section 1.
115 For example, Arrow (1983) argues that the transitivity requirement does not hold—a 
phenomenon known as preference reversal: “Suitably chosen pairs of gambles can be found with 
the following characteristics: When subjects are asked to choose between the two, they express a 
preference for one. But when asked to state the amount of money which, if given with certainty, 
would be indifferent to each gamble, the amounts chosen are in opposite order to the expressed 
preferences”. He concludes: “no simple rational explanation could be found”.
An alternative is ‘adaptative expectations’ (or backward looking behaviour).
117 “Efficient utilization” means that the typical individual’s perception of the probability 
distribution of future outcomes (his subjective distribution) conditional on available information, 
coincides with the actual probability distribution conditional on that information.
118 It also encompasses the idea of a ‘typical’ individual. This assumption is used operationally 
with reference to the aggregate behaviour of individuals. It means that individuals in the aggregate 
act in a regular manner as if each was a typical individual following a systematic decision process. 
In periods of large transformation and uncertainty, this assumption may be unrealistic for there is 
little evidence of systematic behaviour.
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Moreover, individuals form their expectations of future events based on current 
information and prior beliefs, using Baves’ rule. This rule gives a specific form to the way 
individuals update their probability distribution when new information comes up: 
individuals will always give more weight to prior information than to new information. 
Bayes’ rule is a device used to introduce rationality into probability judgments.
Two outcomes are possible if the individual has rational expectations:
1. The individual correctly anticipated a sudden event/shock. This is the 
simplest case: there is no unpredictable uncertainty. In that case, the actual 
values of the variables will, on average, equal the expectations—this is often 
referred as ‘perfect foresight’.
2. The individual did not anticipate the shock—the “surprise effect”. In this 
case, the expectations will diverge from actual values only because of some 
unpredictable uncertainty in the system.
Economists will assume that “surprises” are hard to sustain whenever: 1) 
information is as up-to-date as in a modem economy, and 2) patterns of economic 
behaviour are well settled in times. Thus, individuals will be able to correctly anticipate 
all that can possibly be anticipated in an environment showing considerable stability119.
What happens in the presence of widespread uncertainty? In a time of rapid 
economic, political and social transformations, one can reasonably expect that the 
individual will depart from ‘perfect rationality’:
1) Information and its update become problematic. Specifically, individuals 
may misuse Bayes’ rale. They will give too little weight to prior information 
and will be overly influenced by current information (Arrow 1983). For 
example, they will exaggerate the current costs of doing something now,
119 All that is not anticipated (and expected) by agents, is purely unpredictable. There are no 
systematic errors related to expectations. This is known as the independence of errors in decision­
making.
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relative to tomorrow (Akerlof 1991)120. I will return to this point in the next 
section121.
2) Patterns of economic behaviour may be disturbed in an unfamiliar way. 
Typically, individuals cannot adopt a perfectly rational, forward-looking 
behaviour. “Surprises” can become the rule, rather than the exception.
2.3. Decision-Making Principle.
Each individual always looks for the first-best outcome: his objective will be to 
maximize his (inter-temporal expected) utility.
In the presence of uncertainty, the decision rule is however not as simple. For 
Hey (1979), “there is no universally agreed best procedure (nor, because of the nature of 
the problem, is one ever likely to be found; perhaps this, more than any other reason, is 
why economists have steered clear of its analysis)”.
Alternative decision rales include, for example, maximin, maximax, minimax 
regret...and, in Hey’s terms, “one can continue to suggest alternative decision rales ad 
nauseam—the patience of the reader being likely to be exhausted before the ingenuity of 
the inventor!”. And, as if it was not already complex enough, alternative rales give rise to 
different ‘first-best’ outcomes.
2.4. The Effects of ‘Broad Uncertainty’
Thus, in the presence of ‘broad uncertainty’, the simple economic model of 
reproductive behaviour can be challenged. In particular, and to summarize what we 
learnt so far:
• Agents can lack the necessary information to make their decisions—a 
problem of missing/incomplete information.
• Agents can find it harder to process this information. Perfect rationality (and 
the RE hypothesis) may be at stake.
• Agents can opt for alternative decisions rales rather than maximization.
120 Akerlof (1991) shows that, in situations involving repeated decisions, undue salience leads to 
non-independence of errors in decision making.
121 Section 3 models the lack of confidence in tomorrow by ‘inflating’ the cost of having an 
additional child now, relative to tomorrow.
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To sum up, decision-making under ‘broad uncertainty’ is a highly complex phenomenon; 
it cannot be confined to an informational problem.
This definition distinguishes informational problems from incapacity ‘rationally’ 
to process information (a problem related to ‘people’s perception of uncertainty’). This 
distinction can be useful to capture phenomenon like the lack of confidence in tomorrow. 
‘Fear of the future’ is much more related to people’s perception of uncertainty, and their 
capacity to process information, than a lack of information per se. I will return to this 
point in the model below.
135
3. Reproductive Decisions under ‘Lack of Confidence in Tomorrow*: A Simple 
Model
This section develops a simple economic model of reproductive decision 
whenever individuals lack confidence in tomorrow. In this model, households can choose 
between having a child now, or having it later. This decision has to be made in an 
extremely unpredictable (or broadly uncertain) environment. I assume that this 
environment affects households in the following way: they perceive that the cost 
associated in having a child today is ‘overly high’, compared to having it tomorrow—the 
salience cost reflects the lack of confidence in tomorrow. As a result, they tend to 
postpone the birth of a child until tomorrow. If replicated over a large number of 
households, the individual decision to procrastinate entails an aggregate short-term fall in 
the fertility rate.
To model households’ decision-making process, I use the contributions of 
Becker-Murphy (1988) and Akerlof (1991) to standard economic analysis122. At the end 
of the section, I will have explicitly introduced ‘broad uncertainty’ in an individual 
decision over an incremental child.
3.1. The Model123
• Each household (treated as a unit of analysis) has planned the number of 
children it wants. The decision process investigated here concerns the 
incremental child, and not the total number of children.
• The household has to make a decision every period.
• Each period, it has to decide between having a child now, or having it 
tomorrow (postponing the birth)124. If it decides to have the child later, it has
122 Standard economic analysis is based upon the view that individuals have fixed utilities that do 
not change. Stigler-Becker (1977) and Becker-Murphy (1988) have gone so far as to posit these 
utilities do change, but that individuals are forward looking and thus foresee the changes that will 
occur. Based on a more modem view of behaviour, Akerlof (1991) posits that individuals have 
utilities that do change and, in addition, they fail to foresee those changes or even recognize that 
they have occurred.
123 This part reproduces Akerlof s model (1991). His original model gives insight into a range of 
‘deviant’ individual behaviours such as substance abuse.
124 I assume that there is no uncertainty on the outcomes (or probability associated to these 
options). This means that each household can fully control when it wants not to have children. As 
discussed in Chapter III, this is the case in a perfectly contraceptive world, and, arguably, in 
Russia.
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the same options to choose from the next period: have a child now, or have it 
tomorrow.
• Each period, the household compares the (net) cost of having a child now, 
with the (net) cost of having it the period immediately after. It will choose 
the option that minimizes the (net) cost.
• I assume that the ‘benefits’ of an additional child is a fixed amount x per 
period.
• The cost of having a child now goes beyond the direct cost in rearing 
children. It includes the opportunity cost o f having a child as well. For 
example, if the household decides to have a child today, one of its members 
may have to leave his/her job. The opportunity cost of this additional child 
would be the (lost) wage. For simplicity, I assume that both the direct and 
the opportunity costs are included in a fixed cost per period, c.
• Due to broad uncertainty, each household tends to over-value the cost of 
having an additional child now relative to any future period, by a factor S. 
Uncertainty ‘inflates’ (artificially) the cost of having a child now125. Put in 
another way, they perceive that the cost for one of its members to leave 
his/her job today, and find another job tomorrow, is ‘overly high’. This 
specification captures the idea that households lack confidence in tomorrow.
On each period t, each household makes a plan to have a child on date t*. It 
chooses the period t* to minimize the cost (net of the benefits) of an additional child, V.
• If it decides to have an additional child at date t. V would be:
V = c . (1 + 8) -  (T - 1*). x for t* = t (1)
l25De facto, broad uncertainty undermines households’ capacity to ‘rationally’ process information. 
This means that individuals cease to have rational expectations (or a forward-looking behaviour). I 
am aware that the violation of the standard assumption of rational expectations drives the 
procrastination result.
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where,
8 represents the extra cost (premium) of having a child due to broad 
uncertainty; this extra cost represents their ‘perception of 
uncertainty’126; and 
T represents the final time of the game.
• If it decides to wait until next period. V would be:
V = c -  (T - 1*). x for t + 1 < t* < T (2)
From the specifications of the (net) cost functions V in (1) and (2), it is clear that 
there is an inherent propensity to procrastinate until the next period127.
Akerlof s original model (1991) assumed that, at time T, the (net) cost is equal to 
zero (i.e. having a child in the final period does not cost anything (in net terms)). As I 
will argue below, it is, however, possible to imagine situations where the cost of action in 
the final period is non-zero, and possibly large.
3.2. Outcomes of the Model
1. Every period, each household postpones the decision of having an additional 
child. The decision of not having a child in the current period arises because 
of broad uncertainty—it causes the cost of having a child now to be unduly 
salient in comparison with future costs. If replicated over a large number of 
households, the individual decision to procrastinate entails an aggregate 
short-term fall in the fertility rate.
2. Each household ends up having the additional child at time T. We could 
however, imagine that the (net) cost of having a child in the last period, VT is 
non-zero—or individuals believe it to be zero, but it turns out to be positive. 
In the final period, households may then have to make a decision between 
having a child in T and incurring a positive (net) cost; or not having a child in
126 8 intends to capture the perception of uncertainty. As noted in section 1.4, there may be a 
discrepancy between perception and reality. This point would require further investigation. I 
assume here that households behave as if  8 was positive (and 8c sufficiently large).
127 As I will argue below, the decision to have a child has a major asymmetry: having a child is a 
permanent decision, while postponing it is a temporary choice.
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T. In those circumstances, they may decide not to have a child in T. The final 
outcome is a definite suspension of childbearing.
3.3. Procrastination and Rationality
The model showed that, under certain circumstances, individual households can 
decide to procrastinate. Assuming that this decision is replicated over a large number of 
households, it can entail an aggregate short-term fall in the fertility rate.
A separate question concerns ‘rationality’. Was the individual decision to 
procrastinate ‘rational’? The model above assumed that procrastination was not a 
perfectly rational decision to make. In particular, the presence of broad uncertainty 
impeded households’ ability to both maximize over the long-term and being rational over 
that time horizon. The relaxation of the RE hypothesis led them to decide on not having 
children in the current period.
Specifically, every period, broad uncertainty led them to postpone their plan until 
the next period. They failed to foresee that, when the next period came, they would again 
postpone the decision of having a child tomorrow. If they had had RE, households would 
have been able to forecast the sequence of postponements, and the utility losses incurred 
every period. They would have then made the perfectly rational decision (in the 
economic sense) of having the child in the first period, rather than the last one. Thus, 
there would have been no short-term, aggregate fall in the fertility rate.
Is the departure from the Rational Expectations hypothesis justified? As argued 
in section 2.1, the presence of broad uncertainty makes information (and its update) more 
problematic and disturbs patterns of economic behaviour in ‘an unfamiliar way’. Thus, in 
an environment showing considerable instability, it is reasonable to argue that individuals 
cannot adopt Rational Expectations (or a forward-looking behaviour).
It could, however, be argued that procrastination was a perfectly rational 
decision. Although this point would require further exploration, let me expose two 
alternative hypotheses128:
1281 am grateful to Nick Barr for suggesting those hypotheses.
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1. Asymmetric Cost Hypothesis. In an environment where everything is 
collapsing, individuals maximize their utility (net cost) over a short-term, 
rather than a long-term horizon. They value the cost of procrastination as 
‘low’ and the cost of not postponing as ‘high’. The asymmetric cost structure 
makes the decision to wait to be ‘rational’ (bounded rationality).
2. Information Overload Hypothesis. Individuals are surrounded by ‘too much’ 
information, often contradictory and easily reversed. In that case, the rational 
decision consists in not doing anything: the freeze reaction129.
129 In the interdisciplinary spirit of the thesis, a reference can be made to the animal world. This 
hypothesis exactly describes the way a rabbit ‘freezes’ when caught in a car headlight.
4. The Income -  Fertility Dilemma
This section explores how uncertainty can help explain the apparent income- 
fertility dilemma. The dilemma can be summarized as follows:
• The fall in income generally explains the rapid fall in the fertility rate. The 
positive relationship between income and fertility lies at the heart of the 
economic theory of reproductive behaviour, is widely perceived as the 
primary factor behind the fertility crisis, and was shown by using cross- 
regional fertility data in Russia.
• Income recovered in most countries of central Europe; yet, the total fertility 
rate has not turned around.
The Slovenian, Polish and Czech cases are particularly interesting in this respect. 
Here are three Central European countries, quite advanced in the process of economic and 
political reforms, growing for the last four years (at least) at steady rates. Yet, their 
current fertility rates are a third of what they were at the beginning of the transition 
process.
The Slovenian and Czech cases130 illustrate how complex the relationship 
between income and fertility can become in the presence of broad uncertainty. At first 
sight, there are two sorts of countries:
• Russia, where fertility has been falling because income collapsed and 
uncertainty rose. This relationship was shown in Chapter IV.
• Slovenia and the Czech Republic, where fertility has been falling, while 
income has been steadily growing.
The Slovenian example may be consistent with evidence from Russia, and in 
particular, with a positive relationship between changes in income and fertility, if people’s 
perception of uncertainty is accounted for131.
130 Poland may however be a particular case: religious factors affect predominantly reproductive 
choice. Some argue that the decline in fertility in traditionally fecund Catholic countries 
demonstrate a decline in the Church’s influence and gains in wealth which have lead to 
postponement of marriage and raising a family.
Thus, ‘people’s perception of uncertainty’ gives insight into the Slovenian fertility decline, 
without postulating a change in attitudes (i.e. when people have more money they want to spend it 
on other things than children) or a ‘substitution effect’ of Becker’s type.
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Although this point requires further investigation, a high perception of 
uncertainty could help to resolve the apparent income-fertility dilemma. Indeed, some 
countries of Central Europe may have recovered from the initial transition shocks; yet, 
their people can still perceive that uncertainty remained high, and exhibit a generalized 
lack of confidence in tomorrow. The effect of ‘people’s perception of uncertainty’ on 
reproductive decisions can be so strong that it outweighs the gains from increased 
income.
‘People’s perception of uncertainty’ can go well beyond job opportunities and 
future income132. It may encompass uncertainty on housing. For example, young couples 
perceive that they have little prospects to find a place to live (Shapiro 1998). This is 
obviously a serious constraint when deciding for a child. Another uncertainty concerns 
kindergarten facilities (Comia 1995). With transition, most of these facilities that were 
free in the 1980s either disappeared, or became privately owned (and expensive). 
Uncertainty as to whether parents will be able to find a place in such a facility, may 
become a serious impediment to having children as well.
132 It includes income from labour and benefits (e.g. family benefits that were guaranteed by the 
state before transition).
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Conclusions
In a preliminary investigation, this chapter explored the specific connection 
between reproductive decisions and people’s perception of uncertainty. It began to show 
that Central and Eastern Europe feature ‘broad uncertainty’. Individuals have to make 
individual decisions in an environment characterized by institutional, prices and income 
uncertainties. The presence of uncertainty enhances the complexity of individual 
decision-making.
It then explored the prevailing economic paradigm under uncertainty. In a 
preliminary discussion, it shows that most behavioural assumptions of economic theory 
are disputable in the presence of uncertainty:
1. Complete Information. Under uncertainty, individuals often lack the 
necessary information to make their decisions;
2. Perfect Rationality. Under uncertainty, individuals can find it harder to 
‘rationally’ process information;
3. Optimization Behaviour. Under uncertainty, individuals can opt for 
alternative decision rules than maximization.
In an attempt to reconcile the economic model of reproductive behaviour with 
uncertainty, I develop a simple model. In this model, each household can choose between 
having a child now, or having it later. But the presence of uncertainty undermines the 
household’s capacity to process information: it perceives that the cost of doing something 
now is ‘overly high’, compared to doing it tomorrow. As a result of this extra cost, each 
household puts off the birth of the additional child. If the individual decision to 
procrastinate is replicated over a large number of households, it will entail an aggregate 
short-term fall in the total fertility rate.
Although further investigation is required to confirm this point—notably 
empirically testing this hypothesis, ‘people’s perception of uncertainty’ can also give 
insight into the rapid fertility decline in Slovenia (Poland and the Czech Republic). In 
those countries, the total fertility rate continued to fall, while aggregate income has been 
steadily growing. The positive income-fertility relationship that characterized the Russian 
case can be recovered if ‘people’s perception of uncertainty’ is taken into account. For 
example, the rapid Slovenian fertility decline can be explained by ‘broad uncertainty’, the
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effects of which are so strong that it supplants any improvement in income and holds the 
fertility rate down.
To sum up, this chapter opened a new avenue to investigate the causes of fertility 
decline in general. It showed that the treatment of uncertainty in the economic theory of 
reproductive behaviour deserves more analysis.
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Appendix 5.1
Index of Institutional Uncertainty
To illustrate the scope of institutional uncertainty in transition Europe, I used 
cross-country private sector large-scale survey data that were recently made available by 
the W orld Bank (World Bank 1997). The survey was carried out in 1996 on local 
entrepreneurs of 28 countries133. Its aim was to capture local entrepreneurs’ views vis-a- 
vis the reliability of the institutional framework. The following aspects o f the 
institutional framework were assessed:
1) predictability o f changes in law and policies;
2) importance of discretionary and corrupt bureaucracies;
3) efficiency in public provision of some services (for example: customs, roads, 
mail delivery, public health care provision); and
4) Government’s protection of property rights.
Figure 5.1.1 
shows the results o f the 
survey for some 
countries. In Russia, for 
example, local
entrepreneurs perceive 
that the State fails to 
apply law and policies 
predictably, ensure 
efficient public provision 
of services, enforce 
property rights, and is 
corrupt. Large values for each indicator of reliability of the institutional framework 
suggest a large degree of perceived  uncertainty by local entrepreneurs.
133 U nfortunately , the survey  d id  not include S lovenia. T he questionnaire  consisted  o f  25 m ultip le 
choice questions. Q uestions aim ed  at identify ing  the degree o f  uncertain ty  crea ted  by S tate  action. 
For exam ple, the survey asked: “D o you expect the governm ent to stick  to announced  m ajor 
po lic ies” . O ptions ranged  from  1 (alw ays) to 6  (never). T hose questions w ere asked to  “private 
sector en trep reneurs” in com pan ies o f  various sizes, sectors o f  activ ity , locations (inc lud ing  or not 
foreign  participation , and exp o rtin g  or not).
Figure 5.1.1: Indicators of "Institutional U ncertainty", 
1996
4.50 n
■ Unpredictable change in Policies ■ Corruption 
□ Inefficiency Public Provision □ Insecurity of Property Rights
Source: World Bank data, 1997
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Compared to some Western European countries (with the exception of Italy), 
Central and Eastern European countries show lesser reliability of the institutional 
framework, and thus, a larger degree of uncertainty.
To construct the overall indicator of ‘institutional uncertainty’. I compounded the 
four indicators of reliability described above134.
134 The sample survey results shown in figure 5.3 cover four questions (one in each of the category 
described above). The value obtained for each indicator represents the country mean for the 
complete sample. On measurement problems, see World Bank (1997).
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VI. Summary and Policy Conclusions
"It is reasonable to suppose that in a not too distant future 
we shall be competent to understand so simple a thing as a star"
A.S. Eddington135
Introduction
This inquiry started from a general concern about the social impact of the 
transition process in Central and Eastern Europe. Initially, the transition towards a 
market-based system was expected to bring positive changes to the life of all. Far- 
reaching economic and political reforms initiated in 1989 were universally hailed as the 
harbingers of greater freedom, fast economic growth and rapid improvements in standards 
of living (Comia 1995).
Although progress would be realized in some areas, it rapidly became clear that 
transition would take time and be costly. De facto, transition entailed institutional 
weakening, political uncertainty and large economic dislocations136. The expected rapid 
growth of the economy has turned into a generalized recession of phenomenal 
proportions.
The short-run impact of transition has been very negative on the standards of 
living of the population. Throughout the region, unemployment rose sharply, income 
inequalities deepened and poverty exploded. Even in countries where economic growth 
has been recovering, the deterioration in income-based indicators has not yet approached 
a turning point. UNICEF (1997) declares the ascent of a “social crisis”137.
But, transition did not only affect the standards of living of people, and their 
position in society; it also altered their individual capabilities to function, that is, their 
ability to have a long and healthy life, be well nourished, literate and safe. This, in turn, 
affected their well-being.
To appreciate the welfare loss, Shapiro (1995, 1997) examined the crude death 
rates in Russia. Her pioneering studies suggested a close link between the sharp upsurge 
in the Russian crude death rate, and the “crisis of transformation”. “Russia’s mortality
1351 am grateful to Professor Roxburgh for this quote.
136 According to Comia (1995), the transition represents “one of the most pronounced cases of 
collective mis-theorizing and mis-forecasting in recent history”.
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crisis has its roots in the same unsettled macroeconomic climate which provokes fear 
about the future shape of Russian society. The key new factor pushing up death rates 
arguably is increased stress” (Shapiro 1997).
In view of her findings, I started to investigate the demographic counterpart of the 
death rate: the crude birth rate. In a preliminary investigation, I found that the Russian 
cmde birth rate sharply fell during the 1990s. Evidence gathered in Moscow suggested a 
link with the transition process (Vandycke 1996a).
As the investigation progressed, I made three findings that set the directions for 
my future research.
1. Using the crude birth rate to measure fertility can give a misleading picture of 
what really happened to reproductive decisions during transition. Contrary to 
what the crude birth rate suggests, reproductive decisions radically changed 
by the end of the 1980s only. The total fertility rate (TFR) that ignores the 
effect of the age-sex structure of the population fell sharply from 1989 on, 
and not three years earlier as the crude birth rate data show (Vandycke 
1996b).
2. The demographic problem of Russia lies in fact in reproductive decisions. 
Even if Russia featured rising death rates, it faced a much sharper decline in 
the TFR. In this respect, looking at the “scissors” of the falling crude birth 
rates and rising crude death rates in Shapiro (1995) can be misleading: the 
figure suggests that the birth rate has been steadily declining for a long time. 
In fact, fertility decline dramatically accelerated by the end of the 1980s.
3. The accelerated decline in the TFR is repeated throughout the Central and 
Eastern European region. Thus, it is not a typical post-Soviet phenomenon, 
like the mortality crisis turned out to be (Shapiro 1995, UNICEF 1997).
The purpose of the inquiry was to investigate the causes for the sharp fall in the 
total fertility rate across Central and Eastern Europe, by using Russia as a focus. 
Specifically, this thesis investigated if and how, transition altered the fertility rates. Its 
expected outcomes were twofold: first, provide empirical evidence (if any) of a
137 Obviously, UNICEF has no indication on freedom and opportunities.
148
connection between transition and the change in the TFR; and second, conclude whether 
the decline in the TFR was a negative indicator of the transition process.
Provided that conclusions can be drawn from the Russian experience for the rest 
of Central and Eastern Europe, this inquiry found that:
1. Transition, and the economic crisis in particular, has influenced the downturn 
in the TFR. In a cross-section study, I showed that the decline in the TFR 
represented the response to lower income and higher uncertainty (insecurity). 
This finding was particularly interesting for it showed no simple causal link 
between economic and fertility indicators: a variable such as ‘people’s 
perception of uncertainty’ contributed to explain the rapid fertility decline as 
well.
2. Based on those findings, I concluded that the deterioration in the fertility 
rates represented a strong negative indicator of the transition process: it 
reflected the deterioration in the quality of life and happiness. In Amartya 
Sen’s terms—and provided that the ability to have the number of children 
individuals want is part of the “capability of an individual to function”, the 
rapid fall in the TFR indicates a loss in welfare138.
Policy-makers of transition countries should be concerned by the deterioration in 
the fertility rates for at least two reasons:
1. Transition raised the hopes to bring positive changes to the life of all. It 
promised to make people feel better both in providing them with greater 
political freedom and higher standards of living. This inquiry showed that 
unhappiness and frustrations are undermining the transition process: policy­
makers have hitherto failed to meet the expectations.
2. A sustained fertility decline bears important policy consequences for the 
future of those countries. In particular, there is a risk that a declining younger 
generation will find it harder to provide pensions and health care for a large 
older generation.
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The structure of this chapter is as follows: section 1 summarizes each chapter of 
the inquiry. Section 2 addresses the policy implications of the inquiry. Finally, section 3 
suggests some avenues for further investigation.
1. Summary
Chapter I depicts the object of this inquiry: the abrupt, unexpected and virtually 
unparalleled decline in the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) across Central and Eastern Europe 
[Section 1], Rapid decline in the TFR is universally repeated throughout the region. It 
even features the ‘successful reformers’ of transition Europe, such as Slovenia, Poland 
and the Czech Republic. This thesis concentrates on Russia, which is experiencing one of 
the most severe deteriorations in the fertility indicators of the region.
Chapter I discusses why fertility declines are an important subject of investigation 
and a politically salient issue for Central and Eastern Europe. It argues that accelerated 
fertility declines to a level well below replacement will entail a net loss of population in 
those countries. In the long term, this trend is likely to undermine future economic 
growth. In the medium term, it may threaten the foundations of their ‘Welfare States’: 
Central and Eastern Europe, like Western Europe faces the prospect of a rapidly shrinking 
younger population financing welfare expenditures of a growing proportion of older 
people.
On the political front, the fertility decline reopened the sensitive debate on 
immigration, particularly of ethnic minorities from higher fertility regions of the world. 
More alarmingly, it has been used, in Central and Eastern Europe, to undermine the 
political support for reforms in those countries. In Russia, the ‘fertility crisis’ is often 
attributed to the ‘shock therapy’ administered to the economy—explicitly blaming over- 
zealous economic reforms, Western advisors and the international community, and 
nurturing nationalistic feelings.
Chapter I turns to explore previous research on the subject [Section 2]. The 
present state of knowledge cannot precisely identify the causes for rapid fertility declines 
in general, and of Central and Eastern Europe in particular. The field on reproductive 
choice often emerges as a collection of prior beliefs, popular perceptions and 
speculations.
138 In an original approach, this investigation integrated income-based welfare criteria (aggregate
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In the literature on transition, it became conventional wisdom to attribute the 
rapid fertility decline to the process of economic and political transition. The causal links 
through which transition is connected to rapid fertility declines are, however, far from 
clear. There are at least two reasons to justify further investigation. First, in Russia, the
crude birth rate started to fall before the 1992 introduction of market reforms. Second, the
mechanisms through which transition may have affected fertility can be many-fold. To 
cite a few of them: the deterioration in living standards (and the increase in the 
opportunity cost of children); a shift towards modem Western individualistic values; 
another shift in the incentives structure; the lack of new flats; or broad uncertainty 
associated with rising unemployment.
This thesis chooses to investigate two particular mechanisms of transmission. 
The choice of those mechanisms is based on the fact that they are consistent with popular 
perceptions of the fertility decline, and have been widely used in the Transition literature 
as validated hypotheses. These are:
1. Fertility fell in response to the spread of Western individualistic values to 
the East that accompanied transition. In the process of ‘adaptation’ 
towards Western fertility levels, a new system of values and attitudes 
towards family formation emerged. This system features greater 
emphasis on individualism and a lesser desire for children. The decline
in fertility is viewed as an indicator of progress towards modernity, and
thus a positive indicator of the process of transition. This will be referred 
to as the demographic hypothesis.
2. The decline in fertility is attributed to the economic crisis in general, and 
the deterioration in income that accompanied transition in particular. 
Households wanted as many children as before the transition, but they 
could not afford them because their income had shrunk. The decline in 
fertility therefore reflects the deterioration in the quality of life and 
happiness. In other words, it is a strong negative indicator of the process 
of transition. This will be referred to as the economic hypothesis.
Using preliminary evidence for Russia and Slovenia, Chapter I shows why the 
economic hypothesis requires in-depth investigation: in Russia, the crude birth rate started
income and uncertainty) into an analysis of changes in a capability-based welfare indicator (TFR).
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to fall in 1986, about 3 years before (the proxy for) income started to fall. In Slovenia, 
the total fertility rate has continued to fall since 1990, while aggregate income has been 
steadily growing.
To investigate the causes for the rapid fertility decline in Central and Eastern 
Europe, the thesis uses comparative analysis, econometric tools, theoretical modeling and 
interdisciplinary approach [Section 3]. I show how those tools are used in the different 
parts of the inquiry.
• Chapter II uses comparative analysis to highlight the essential differences 
between theories on reproductive behaviour. It shows that there are three 
approaches to the topic, i.e. economic, sociological and demographic, with 
each of them talking at cross-purposes. In seeking to bridge the disciplinary 
gap, it clarifies the hypotheses underlying each approach. The comparative 
approach helps, in particular, to show the differences between the economic 
and demographic conceptions of reproductive behaviour.
• Chapter HI and IV test the demographic and economic hypotheses of the 
rapid fertility decline. Russian time-series fertility data are used to explore 
the behaviour of fertility over long periods of time; and Russian cross- 
regional fertility and income data are used to explore possible explanatory 
factors.
• These two chapters make use of econometric techniques. Stochastic (unit 
root) analysis is used to study the behaviour of fertility data over time; 
structural break analysis is used to detect an abrupt change in the evolution of 
the fertility trend over time; and standard linear regression technique is 
applied to regional data.
• I discuss the sources of information, their diversity and the originality of data. 
The inquiry is based on official Russian regional and time-series fertility data 
(Goskomstat) and more sophisticated demographic information (Centre for 
Human Ecology and Demography and Institut National d’Etudes 
Demographiques). I obtained economic and demographic data for countries 
of the Central and Eastern European region from the Economic Commission 
for Europe and the International Child Development Centre.
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• In a preliminary attempt to model ‘people’s perception of uncertainty’, 
chapter V shows how the ‘lack of confidence in tomorrow’ can lead a 
household to postpone having an additional child to a later date.
• This thesis is deliberately interdisciplinary. Indeed, one of my earliest 
findings has been that the absence of such a broad approach is handicapping 
progress in understanding development in this field. In reality, reproductive 
decisions are likely to be influenced by a complex series of contextual forces: 
economic, social, cultural, educational and political, as well as personal 
circumstances. These factors are neither fully independent of each other nor 
mutually exclusive: they overlap and interact. In using an interdisciplinary 
approach, I shed some light on the benefits of a broader approach to the topic.
Chapter II observes that there is no single grand explanation on why and how 
reproduction changes over time. The field emerges as a collection of quite distinct and 
often contradictory approaches. Three approaches dominate the topic, i.e. economic, 
sociological and demographic, with each of them talking at cross-purposes. In an effort 
to find out the reasons for this disagreement, chapter II contrasts the different approaches 
and establishes the limitations and strengths in each case.
The first section explores the economic model of reproductive behaviour [Section 
1]. This model is an application of Rational Choice theory to reproduction. Rational 
Choice theory is characterized, using the following questions: what is the object of 
choice? What structures this choice? What principle leads to this choice? In economics, 
the object of choice is a commodity bundle -  the outcome of an individual choice. This 
choice is structured by an ordering of those bundles in an internally consistent way (the 
concept of perfect rationality), by a budget constraint, and often by a numerical utility 
function. The choice between commodity bundles is driven by an optimization 
behaviour.
I focus on Becker’s contribution to the field. His theory emerges as a special 
version of the consumer choice theory: individuals (or households) are assumed to solve 
their problems, say, in terms of choosing a family size, by choosing a bundle of children 
and goods, given the budget constraint, which maximizes utility.
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Using this framework, the economic determinants of reproductive decisions are: 
(1) the price of children relative to other commodities (quality of children and opportunity 
cost of time); (2) individual income; and (3) ‘other constraints’ (for example, availability 
and cost of contraceptive techniques and provision of housing).
I formally present Becker’s model of reproductive behaviour. The model 
embodies the standard behavioural assumptions of Rational Choice theory. The 
determinants of reproductive decisions are the costs of children and income—other 
constraints like technology are held constant. The model treats each household as a unit 
of analysis and children as “consumption goods”. I show that reproductive decisions 
result from two effects (in the Slutzky sense): (1) a positive income effect, and (2) a 
negative substitution effect.
I then investigate two possible extensions of Becker’s model. The first extension 
introduces an inter-temporal dimension to reproductive decisions. I briefly discuss two 
models: the ‘fertility cycle hypothesis’ of Easterlin in which fertility and the economy are 
linked in a perpetual series of fluctuations, powered by income expectations, alternation 
of cohort size, and autonomous cycles in the economy itself; and the altruistic model of 
Barro and Becker. The latter model assumes that individuals are well informed and adopt 
a perfectly rational, forward-looking behaviour in making their decisions. As I will argue 
in chapter V, this assumption is unsatisfactory in a context of broad uncertainty.
The second extension considers the collective dimension of reproductive 
decisions. Individual fertility decisions may not be socially optimal under two 
circumstances: (1) the presence of externalities, and (2) ‘wrong’ relative prices of goods 
and services due to imperfections in the market for children.
The second section studies the prevailing sociological paradigm, comparing it 
with the economic paradigm [Section 2]. In general, economists value the contributions 
of sociologists in the field of reproductive behaviour: sociologists may adopt different 
methods than those economists are used to, but the concepts underlying their 
investigation, such as choice in human action and rationality, are very similar. In some 
respects, it can be argued that there is no essential contradiction between the two 
paradigms, only a difference in emphasis.
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I characterize the prevailing sociological paradigm using three questions: what is 
the object of choice? What structures this choice? What principle leads to this choice? In 
sociology, the object of choice is an idea about the desirable number of children (or ideal 
family size) -the outcome of a social choice. The ideal family size is constrained by 
attitudes (or tastes) towards reproduction. These attitudes are shaped by ‘norms and 
values’ and are internalized by individuals in the process of socialization. The dynamics 
of social behaviour is described as a process that leads either to an optimum or to a 
weaker form, satisfaction.
I illustrate some of these aspects by looking at institutional theories of 
reproduction. These theories attribute a primary role to socio-economic conditions in the 
process of formation of ‘norms’ and the ‘ideal’ family size. Each individual is said to be, 
in any society, under strong constraints regarding reproduction. These constraints are set 
by the institutional structure of every society, that defines, among others, the ‘rewards’ of 
having a child, and how much couples must ‘sacrifice’ to have children.
The third section explores the model of a sub-group of demographers, the 
proponents of the deterministic model of fertility change [Section 3]. I call them 
‘classical demographers’ and distinguish them from ‘modem’ demographers that support 
socio-demographic theories of fertility change. I choose to focus on ‘classical’ 
demography for it reveals the essential differences between the demographic and 
economic conceptions of human behaviour.
I highlight the disagreement that exists between demographers and economists. 
On the whole, economists look at the contribution of demographers the field of 
reproductive behaviour with mixed feelings. In an effort to find out the reasons for this 
disagreement, I clarify the hypotheses underlying each paradigm.
My findings can be summarized as follows:
1. Demography assumes that each society converges towards an equilibrium. 
Economics embodies the concept of equilibrium, but not exclusively: it 
allows for no-equilibrium situations to arise.
2. Demography assumes that this equilibrium is unique, while economics allows 
for multiple equilibria to emerge as well.
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3. Demography assumes that the mechanism that drives each society towards 
this equilibrium is beyond its control. In particular, fertility behaviour is pre­
determined. In contrast, economics responds to the idea of ‘voluntarism’ on 
behalf of individuals.
I analyze the demographic paradigm using three questions: what is the object of 
choice? What structures this choice? What principle leads to this choice? It is understood 
from the discussion above that the term ‘choice’ is used loosely here. In demography, 
there is no object of choice: there is no fertility decision to make either by individuals, or 
society. Reproduction is constrained by superior laws of Nature; it results from two inter­
linked processes: the “struggle for existence” and the Darwinian selection process.
I contrast further the prevailing economic and demographic paradigms by 
showing that demography is primarily interested in long-term trends in the fertility rate. 
In contrast, economics makes relatively fewer assumptions about long-term equilibrium 
relationships: it is primarily concerned with short-term fluctuations in the fertility rate. I 
conclude that the demographic paradigm does not simply differ from the economic 
paradigm in its approach to study reproductive behaviour; it makes up for an entirely 
distinct paradigm.
Finally, I illustrate the scope of the demographic paradigm by looking at the 
‘Demographic Transition Hypothesis’. This hypothesis states that each society 
experiences an ‘adaptation’ towards a given equilibrium fertility level. This equilibrium 
level is unique and theoretical: as chapter III will argue, demographers never observed 
this equilibrium level, but only detected the presence of a long-term trend towards that 
equilibrium.
I explain why demographers view the decline in fertility, an irreversible feature of 
the adaptation process, as a positive long-term indicator of development. For 
demographers, the decline in fertility: (1) features only ‘modem’ societies; (2) it reflects 
‘increased rationality’ on behalf of agents who make the decision; and (3) it is associated 
with the desirable prospect of ‘Westernization’ and adoption of ‘Western values and 
attitudes’. Although attractive by its simplicity, the ‘Demographic Transition Hypothesis’ 
is frequently in dispute with factual evidence.
Chapter III develops and tests the demographic hypothesis of the fertility decline. 
It begins with the observation that there is no grand demographic theory on the fertility
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decline in transition Europe, but only fragmented pieces of explanations that emphasize 
the role of ‘adaptation’ towards Western fertility levels [Section 1]. The purpose of this 
chapter is twofold: first, to derive a consistent demographic hypothesis of the fertility 
decline in Russia; and second, to test this hypothesis on Russian time-series fertility data.
To formulate such a hypothesis, I make use of two central, theoretical concepts in 
demography: adaptation and shifts in the timing of births. The first concept refers to the 
process by which each society progresses from a high fertility level towards a low fertility 
level. The second concept concerns the decision on the timing of birth. Demography 
assumes that parents can shift (bring forward or postpone) the birth of a child in response 
to a change in the environment in which they live.
These concepts are then used to formulate the demographic hypothesis on the 
fertility decline in Russia.
• Leading Russian demographers believe that ‘adaptation’ has been underway 
since the end of the 1950s in Russia.
• I assume that transition was similar to a large social shock to the population: 
it accelerated the ‘adaptation’ process—the so-called catching-up effect. 
With the opening of borders, the East has been adopting the Western system 
of values and attitudes. This system promotes greater individualism and a 
lower desire for children.
• Even if there was a large social shock, the attitudes towards reproduction 
cannot have radically changed overnight. I find an additional factor to 
account for the sharpness of the decline in the history of the country. In the 
mid-1980s, the Russian government introduced pro-natalist policies. The 
immediate effect was to reduce the interval between successive births, while 
leaving reproductive intentions unchanged. In this framework, the current 
fertility decline is nothing else than a return to the ‘normal’ fertility level— 
the lagged-effect of pro-natalist policies.
I translate this hypothesis into statistical concepts that can be applied to actual 
data. To establish such a link, I make two assumptions.
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1. I assume that the long-term fertility trend reflects fundamental attitudes 
towards reproduction. Thus, a change in attitudes can be detected whenever a 
new fertility trend emerges. To detect this new trend, I use structural break 
analysis.
2. Fluctuations in fertility data around the fertility trend reflect shifts in the 
timing of births. I compare the behaviour of fertility with output in the 
business cycle. I assume that fertility behaves in a similar way: like output, 
fertility follows a long-term trend and fluctuates around that trend. To test 
this model, I use stochastic (unit root) analysis.
The first part of the testing procedure concerns ‘changes in attitudes’ [Section 2]. 
After exploring the benefits of structural break analysis to detect sharp changes in trends, 
I apply the technique to time-series fertility data. I find two significant structural breaks in 
the fertility trend: 1989 and 1992. To assess the comparative importance of these breaks I 
run a third regression that contains both of them. I find that the 1989 structural break is 
the only significant one. Thus, (the slope of) the fertility trend broke in 1989, suggesting 
an attitudinal change towards reproduction around that time.
In the second part, I test the full demographic hypothesis—the existence of an 
attitudinal change and shift in the timing of births [Section 3]. Two models are defined to 
represent fertility data over time. The first model assumes that fertility data behaves 
randomly over time (stochastic model). The second model assumes that fertility data 
behave in a ‘predictable’ way over time. In particular, fertility follows a long-term trend, 
with a structural break in 1989 and fluctuates around that trend. The second model is the 
(approximate) statistical representation of the demographic hypothesis.
Using stochastic (unit root) techniques, I test whether fertility data follow a 
stochastic behaviour (model 1) against the alternative of a deterministic trend with a 
structural break in 1989 (model 2, the demographic hypothesis). The data set consists of 
the Russian Total fertility rate (TFR) and the age-adjusted fertility rate time-series (1960- 
95).
The findings can be summarized as follows:
158
1. There is insufficient evidence for the demographic hypothesis. Specifically, I 
cannot reject the stochastic model for almost all fertility series (except two 
age-adjusted fertility time series). This means that fertility data behave 
randomly; they cannot simply be represented by a long-term breaking 
deterministic trend with fluctuations around that trend. I am in the presence 
of a highly complex phenomenon.
2. Two age-adiusted fertility series (for women between 20 and 24 and below 
24) follow a distinct pattern. For these two series, I can reject the stochastic 
model. Thus, fertility data do not behave completely randomly. This is as far 
as I can conclude from this finding. In particular, I cannot infer that these 
series follow therefore a ‘deterministic (breaking) trend’ model, and I cannot 
tell what is the appropriate statistical model for these series.
Finally, I discuss the limits of the testing procedure. First, I argue that the 
method, constrained by the current knowledge in econometrics, only imperfectly tested 
the demographic hypothesis as initially stated. In particular, I could not test, specifically, 
whether the current fertility decline resulted from the historical lagged effect of pro- 
natalist policies in the 1980s. I only tested the much broader idea of reversion to a 
deterministic trend (or cyclical fluctuations). Second, I examine the extent to which the 
appropriate procedure was used to test the demographic hypothesis. In an ideal world, it 
would have been more satisfactory to test the representation of the demographic 
hypothesis (model 2, deterministic breaking trend), against the stochastic model (model 
1), and not the inverse. However, this procedure was constrained by techniques presently 
available in econometrics: it is yet technically impossible to test the deterministic 
breaking trend model, against the stochastic model.
Chapter IV explores the economic hypothesis of the fertility decline. The first 
section investigates the regional dimension of the rapid fertility decline, by using Russian 
regional fertility data (total, rural and urban fertility rates) [Section 1]. I make the 
following findings: (1) the TFR collapsed across all regions of Russia. (2) The fertility 
rate change hides large intra-regional differences. While both the urban and the rural 
fertility rates collapsed, the urban fertility rate appears to have fallen slightly more. (3) 
There is a striking uniformity in the rate of urban fertility decline: it fell by 30 percent 
across all regions of Russia between 1990 and 1995.
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The second section explores theory and evidence on the connection between 
income and fertility changes [Section 2]. I argue that Becker’s theory of reproductive 
behaviour by itself cannot predict whether the effect of a lower income will be, on 
balance, to lower or higher fertility. In fact, Becker predicts that income-produced forces 
act on fertility in opposite directions: whenever tastes and values are fixed, an increase in 
income should be translated into a rise in fertility—the pure income effect. However, in 
some circumstances, an increase in income might be translated into a decrease in fertility. 
I show that empirical evidence on the effect of changes in income on fertility have been 
hitherto mixed.
I derive the implications of this discussion for testing purposes. To minimize the 
effect of changes in ‘tastes’ during the period explored, I choose the period after the 
structural break in the fertility trend, i.e. the 1990-95 period.
The third section describes problems related to the measurement of income in 
Russia, and suggests some solutions [Section 3]. In transition Europe in general, and 
Russia in particular, individual income figures are largely unreliable, and it may be easier 
to work with aggregate data. I discuss whether, in Russia, aggregate income data are a 
good proxy for individual income. I suggest that, at worst, using aggregate income data 
will under-estimate the fall in individual income of those at the bottom of the income- 
scale.
To proxy the change in income in Russia, I choose the (change in the) volume of 
industrial production. The choice of this proxy can be justified, in the specific context of 
Russia, on the grounds that: 1) aggregate income, and its equivalent in the National 
Accounting sense, the total value of output (GNP) are unreliable indicators of activity, 
and 2) nominal measures of production are undesirable in a country that experienced 
hyper-inflation. As a result, I choose the physical (volume of) industrial production to 
proxy regional output. I use the year-to-year change in the proxy to neutralize the effects 
of systematic under-reporting problems.
In anticipation of Chapter V, a second explanatory variable is introduced in the 
analysis: (a proxy for) ‘people’s perception of uncertainty’. Intuitively, uncertainty is 
likely to affect the perception of current and future job opportunities and enhances the 
fear for the future (the lack of confidence in tomorrow). To proxy for ‘people’s 
perception of uncertainty’, I use the Labour Force Survey unemployment rate in 1994. I 
show that it is significantly related to the (change in) total fertility rate for the 66 regions
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of Russia. The presence of unemployment rates similar to those in Western Europe 
suggests that the level of uncertainty is identical in Western Europe as in Eastern Europe. 
This is clearly not the case: uncertainty is much broader in Eastern Europe. Thus, the 
unemployment rate is likely to be an imperfect, crude measure of uncertainty.
The fourth section turns to the specification of the regression model and the 
interpretation of Endings [Section 4]. Using Goskomstat and Labour Force Survey (LFS) 
data for 66 regions of Russia, I explore the relationship between the (average annual) 
change in the volume of industrial production (a proxy for income), AIP^s, and the 
(average annual) change in the fertility rate between 1990 and 1995. I define a dummy, 
DUM2, to account for 12 regions that are characterized by a ‘large’ fall in industrial 
production. I use the LFS unemployment rate in 1994 to proxy for ‘people’s perception 
of uncertainty’. The control for inter-regional disparities between rural and urban areas is 
done with a “modernization” variable, URBAN95 (share of urban population in the total 
population in 1995). The Regions of Moscow and St Petersburg are isolated into a 
dummy (METROP). The dependent variable is the fertility rate (total, urban and rural).
Before I examine the set of results, I observe that, on conventional econometric 
grounds, (the proxy for) income, AIP90.95 (and DUM2), is only slightly significant and 
could be rejected as an explanatory variable.
The findings can be summarized as follows:
1. There is a pattern with regard to the total fertility rate: regions with the largest 
change in the total fertility rate suffered from the largest change in (the proxy 
for) income. The positive relationship between income and fertility holds 
across regions. I also find (the proxy for) regional disparity in uncertainty, 
UNEMP94 to be significant. This is a striking result. It shows that it is the 
combination, and not the unique effect of income, with uncertainty that can 
explain regional disparities in the TFR change. As expected, the 
metropolitan regions (Moscow and St Petersburg) follow a specific pattern; 
and the control for urban-rural inter-regional differences is significant.
2. A similar pattern exists for the urban fertility rate: regions with the largest fall 
in the urban fertility rate experienced the largest fall in (proxy for) income 
and higher uncertainty.
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3. The (proxies for) income and uncertainty fail to jointly explain the change in 
the rural fertility rate. The rural fertility rate appears to have only responded 
to the fall in income, and not uncertainty. I then discuss whether this result 
indicates that uncertainty played no role in the fertility decline of rural areas. 
I conclude that further investigation is required in this area, notably in 
developing a better indicator of uncertainty.
To sum up, this chapter challenged the simple economic model of reproductive 
decisions where fertility fell in response to the deterioration in living standards, and 
suggested an additional connection with uncertainty. The deterioration in material 
wellbeing explained in part, the rapid fertility decline: the rise in (the proxy for) 
uncertainty contributed to explain it as well.
Chapter V reconciles the standard economic model of reproductive behaviour 
with my findings by building a simple model. The first section shows that transition 
Europe features ‘broad uncertainty’ [Section 1]. Individuals have to make decisions in an 
environment characterized by institutional, prices and income uncertainties. The presence 
of broad uncertainty enhances the complexity of individual decision-making.
The second section examines the standard model of economic behaviour under 
uncertainty [Section 2]. It shows that the presence of uncertainty poses a challenge the 
standard behavioural assumptions of economic theory:
• Completeness of Information. Uncertainty affects the capacity of individuals 
to know about ‘what state of the world’ will prevail; individuals do not have 
all the necessary information to make probability judgements.
• Perfect Rationality. In the presence of uncertainty, individuals may be unable 
to process all available information in a consistent way. In a static decision­
making context, preferences of agents may fail to be internally consistent. In 
a dynamic context, individuals may be unable to adopt rational expectations 
(or a forward-looking behaviour). In particular, one can reasonably expect 
that the individual will depart from perfect rationality in an environment 
where information (and its update) becomes problematic, and patterns of 
economic behaviour are not well settled in times.
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• Optimization Behaviour. Under uncertainty, individuals may not necessarily 
look for utility ‘maximization’. Depending on the decision rule adopted, 
different first-best outcomes may emerge.
To sum up, decision-making under broad uncertainty is a highly complex phenomenon; it 
cannot be confined to an informational problem.
The third section develops a simple economic model of reproductive decision, 
where households lack confidence in tomorrow [Section 3]. In this model, each 
household can choose between having a child now, or having it later. This decision has to 
be made in an extremely unpredictable (or broadly uncertain) environment. I assume that 
broad uncertainty impedes the household’s capacity to ‘rationally’ process information: it 
perceives that the cost of having a child now is ‘overly high’ compared to having it 
tomorrow. This extra cost proxies for the lack of confidence in tomorrow. The model 
shows that the household will postpone the task until tomorrow. If replicated over a large 
number of households, the individual decision to procrastinate entails an aggregate short­
term fall in the fertility rate.
In the model, each household is treated as a unit of analysis. Moreover, I make 
the following assumptions: (1) the decision concerns the incremental child, (2) each 
household has to make a decision every period, (3) the benefits of an additional child is 
fixed, (4) the costs of having a child include the direct cost of rearing a child and the 
opportunity cost (foregone wage).
Reproducing Akerlof s model (1991), I formally decompose the decision-making 
process. The model allows for the following outcomes:
1. Every period, each household postpones the decision of having an additional 
child. This decision arises from the presence of broad uncertainty: it causes 
the cost of having a child now to be unduly salient in comparison with future 
costs. If replicated over a large number of households, the individual 
decision to procrastinate entails an aggregate short-term fall in the fertility 
rate.
2. In some circumstances, the final outcome may be a definite suspension of 
childbearing.
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I conclude the section by discussing the ‘perfect rationality’ assumption. Was the 
individual decision to procrastinate ‘rational’? In the model, I assumed that broad 
uncertainty impeded households’ capacity to both maximize over the long-term and being 
rational over that time horizon. The relaxation of the Rational Expectations (forward- 
looking behaviour) assumption led them to decide not to have children now.
It could, however, be argued that procrastination was a perfectly rational 
decision. I suggest two alternative hypotheses: the asymmetric cost hypothesis and the 
information overload hypothesis.
Finally, I explore the apparent income-fertility dilemma in transition Europe 
[Section 4]. On the one hand, the fall in income explains the rapid fall in the fertility rate 
in Russia. On the other hand, income recovered in most countries of Central Europe; but 
the fertility rate has not turned around. This is, for example, the case in Slovenia, Poland 
and the Czech Republic.
The Slovenian case is consistent with the Russian evidence (and in particular, the 
positive income-fertility relationship) provided that a second explanatory variable, 
‘people’s perception of uncertainty’, is accounted for. Although some countries in 
Central Europe recovered from the initial reforms, people may still perceive that 
uncertainty is high and show a generalized lack of confidence in tomorrow. The effect of 
people’s perception of uncertainty on reproductive decisions can be so strong that it 
outweighs the benefits from increased income.
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2. Policy Conclusions
The decline in the total fertility rate was initially perceived as transitory. But, 
recent figures indicate that fertility declines and stabilization around a low fertility level 
are on the verge of becoming endemic to transition Europe. This situation raises three 
interesting policy questions: first, can anything be done to reverse this decline; second, 
should anything be done; and third, if so, what can be done about it.
2.1. Can anything be done?
The extent to which fertility decline can be reversed brings us back to the 
fundamental difference between the economic and the demographic conceptions of 
reproductive behaviour (Chapter II). For economists, reproductive behaviour is a matter 
of individual and conscious choice. As such, the fertility decline can be influenced by 
adequate incentives and can be easily reversed139. In contrast, for ‘classical’ 
demographers, fertility behaviour is constrained by laws of Nature that dictate to society 
and individuals the equilibrium fertility level (ideal number of children). Low level of 
fertility is an inherent feature of modem Western life, and its decline is largely 
irreversible.
2.2. Should anything be done?
Two distinct visions on whether anything should be done ensue from this 
comparison. For ‘classical’ demographers, the decline in fertility is largely a positive 
indicator of development. The sharp fertility decline in Central and Eastern Europe 
results from a process of accelerated adaptation towards a modem, Western life: there is 
no ‘fertility crisis’ and nothing should be done about it140. In contrast, for economists, the 
fertility decline is a strong negative indicator of development. The sharp fertility decline 
in Central Europe reflects the deterioration in the quality of life and happiness. To sum 
up, there is a ‘fertility crisis’ in transition Europe, and something should be done about it 
(Chapter IV).
139 The effect of tax benefits on the timing of births has been recently explored by Dickert-Conlin 
and Chandra, 1999.
140 As argued in Chapter I, this is a simplified interpretation of the demographic model. In fact, 
demographers are concerned by fertility declines in transition Europe (and refer to a fertility crisis) 
for the changes in the TFR were sharp and the subsequent level is below replacement.
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2.3. What can be done?
The policy conclusions that are presented here are partial for two reasons:
1. Although the thesis attempted to incorporate a number of explanatory factors, 
it had to concentrate on a few of them for empirical testing. In particular, this 
inquiry ignored particular factors, such as personal circumstances or 
educational differences that may have been important explanatory factors as 
well.
2. Moreover, the conclusions are based on Russian evidence. It was hoped that 
Russia would be a sufficiently representative case of the entire Central and 
Eastern European region. Further country-specific studies are however 
required to confirm this point.
This investigation provided evidence that the rapid decline in fertility is a highly 
complex phenomenon:
• In part, the Russian fertility decline reflects an adaptation of family patterns 
towards the modem, Western system of values and attitudes. Thus, it is a 
positive indicator of development for Central and Eastern European societies.
• But, most of the cross-sectional evidence suggested that fertility declines 
represented the individual response to lower income and higher uncertainty 
(insecurity); and thus, a strong negative development indicator for Central 
and Eastern Europe.
Based on these findings, the policy-makers of Central and Eastern Europe should be 
concerned with the rapid fertility decline, for it largely represents frustrations, 
unhappiness and deterioration in the quality of life subsequent to transition. In order to 
reverse the fertility decline in transition Europe, ‘successful reforms’ have to be rapidly 
achieved. In particular, the following specific policy suggestions emerge as palliatives, 
although important ones, if the fertility decline is to end sooner rather than later:
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1. Strong and rapid recovery of the individual income is a priority for the entire 
region;
2. Provision of an adequate social safety net is needed to stabilize individual 
income and minimize the uncertainty surrounding income. This is 
particularly important during the period of rapid economic and political 
transformation those countries are presently undergoing.
3. After the turmoil of the first years of reforms, economic and political 
‘stabilization’ is needed in the region. Stabilization should help reverse the 
generalized lack of confidence in tomorrow that has characterized the 
transition period.
Moreover, the rapid recovery of the total fertility rate is particularly important in 
view of the present ageing population trend. In the absence of a rapid fertility recovery, 
Central and Eastern European countries are likely to experience an exacerbated ‘old age 
crisis’, whereby the rapidly shrinking younger population will have to provide for the 
growing proportion of older people. There is a risk that the financial burden imposed by 
such a trend becomes rapidly unsustainable.
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3. Further Work
This investigation opened a range of new questions. It also showed the limits of 
our current understanding of what emerges as an important subject of investigation. This 
section suggests some avenues worth pursuing in this area.
3.1. Economic Theory of Reproductive Behaviour
The standard economic model of reproductive behaviour should be extended to 
encompass ‘people’s perception of uncertainty’. This inquiry used empirical evidence and 
examples to show its importance in reproductive decisions.
More broadly, the standard behavioural assumptions of Rational Choice theory 
are difficult to reconcile with the presence of uncertainty. Rational Choice theory adopts 
a narrow view of the effect of uncertainty on individual behaviour: it often confines 
uncertainty to an informational problem, while it clearly goes beyond that problem. 
There is a need to broaden the prevailing economic paradigm.
Economic theory relies heavily on the rationality assumption. Even Becker in his 
Nobel Prize lecture (1996) recognizes that “(his) work may have sometimes assumed too 
much rationality”141. Unfortunately, “the deficiencies in the ‘rational actor’ model have 
long been recognized... economists have defended their pursuit of the rational actor 
model on the grounds that it was the best game in town: it gave well-defined (refutable, 
and, unfortunately, refuted) predictions, while the alternative was a Pandora’s box—there 
was an infinity of possible irrational behaviours” (Stiglitz 1991)142. This is, however, to 
forget that economists must study how individuals actually behave, whether that 
behaviour conforms to rationality or not.
Some economists have recently set a new direction of analysis. In a variety of 
papers that I explored, Akerlof showed that, if individual behaviour is not rational (in the 
economic sense), it does not mean that it is not predictable. Incorporating this dimension 
into the economic theory of reproductive behaviour, as I started to do, can help
141 Becker pursues “but I believe it has been an antidote to the extensive research that does not 
credit people with enough rationality”.
142 Stiglitz (1991) pursues: “The economists of the twentieth century, by pushing the neoclassical 
model to its logical conclusions, and thereby illuminating the absurdities of the world which they 
had created, have made an invaluable contribution to the economics of the coming century: they 
have set the agenda, work on which has already begun.”
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understand certain fertility patterns that cannot be presently explained (for example, the 
rapid fertility decline in Slovenia).
3.2. Testable Hypotheses
Economic and demographic theories of fertility changes should provide testable 
hypotheses. At present, Becker’s economic theory of reproductive behaviour cannot be 
falsified; the ‘Demographic Transition Hypothesis’ was never validated empirically. The 
theoretical relationships that emerge from these frameworks are so broad that they can be 
reconciled with any findings. As a result, none of these theories is able to predict 
reproductive patterns.
3.3. Interdisciplinary Focus
Using an interdisciplinary approach to understand reproductive behaviour is 
highly desirable. Each discipline can learn a lot from one another. Even a discipline like 
macroeconomics can give insight into this area. For example, I used stochastic (unit root) 
analysis usually applied to analyze macroeconomic GNP time-series and explored how 
their application to demographic data could improve our understanding of reproductive 
behaviour.
3.4. Econometric Approach
Econometrics provides powerful tools to test alternative hypotheses on data. I, 
however, showed the limits of our present state of knowledge. Even the most advanced 
econometric tools are not strong enough to discriminate among fundamental different 
hypotheses. For example, as chapter IV showed, stochastic econometric techniques allow 
to test one type of model (stochastic trend), against another (deterministic trend), but not 
the inverse. Efforts to develop these tools should help to analyze data and improve our 
understanding of observed behaviour.
Econometric techniques can be useful to improve short-term forecasts and long­
term projections of the total fertility rate. Under our present state of knowledge, the 
trajectory of the total fertility rate cannot be predicted. This area deserves further 
investigation, particularly in regard to its importance for policy purposes. For example, 
reliable forecasts of the fertility rate for the next 10 years should help project future needs 
in the health care, education and housing sectors, and thereby their provision.
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3.5. Measurement of People’s Perception of Uncertainty
Probably the most original finding of this investigation has been that ‘people’s 
perception of uncertainty’ matters in reproductive decisions. To test the explanatory 
power of uncertainty, I used cross-regional data of Russia. But the proxy that I used, the 
Labour Force Unemployment rate, was clearly an imperfect and crude measure of 
uncertainty (although readily available). There is scope to develop a refined indicator of 
uncertainty.
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